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Historijat
Ovaj izvještaj analizira funkcioniranje Sporazuma o slobodnoj trgovini (FTA), koji je
Bosna i Hercegovina (BiH) potpisala sa svojim regionalnim partnerima u okviru procesa
Pakta stabilnosti za Jugoistoènu Europu (Albanija, Bugarska, Hrvatska, Makedonija,
Moldavija, Rumunija i Srbija i Crna Gora). Cilj ove studije, kako ga je definirao EPPU, jest
da formulira zakljuèke u pogledu politika jaèanja djelotvornosti navedenih sporazuma.
Izvještaj ne razmatra detaljno trgovinske i druge odnose izmeðu BiH i EU. Ipak,
date su reference na ove važne procese gdje god je to relevantno za cilj ovog rada.
Nekoliko preporuka je primjenjivo i na ukupni uèinak vanjsko-trgovinske politike
BiH. Vrijedi upamtiti, meðutim, da se integracija unutar Jugoistoène Europe zahtijeva
kao dio integracijskog procesa u EU.
Rad na ovom izvještaju (jesen 2006.) poklapa se sa konaènom fazom pregovora o
multilateralnom trgovinskom sporazumu (CEFTA 2006.), koji u maju 2007. godine
treba da zamijeni mrežu od preko 30 bilateralnih sporazuma o slobodnoj trgovini.
Stoga preporuke u pogledu politika koje proizlaze iz ovog rada nisu zamišljene kako
bi se direktno primjenjivale na one FTA koje su sad na snazi. Meðutim, lekcije i
preporuke koje proistièu iz ove analize relevantne su za novu CEFTA-u, ako ništa
drugo onda stoga što su mnoge karakteristike FTA saèuvane u CEFTA 2006. Štaviše,
neke preporuke su zapravo mnogo šire u svom opsegu te ostaju relevantne u okviru
opće trgovinske politike bez obzira na njihovu specifiènu institucionalnu strukturu.
Opći zakljuèak koji proistièe iz analize predstavljene ovim izvještajem je da, dok
su regionalni FTA mogli imati neki pozitivan efekat na ekonomiju BiH, taj efekat nije
bio posebno velik a potencijal regionalnih aranžmana o slobodnoj trgovini nije još
uvijek potpuno ostvaren. Razlozi za to su mnogostruki, ukljuèujući malu ekonomsku
snagu regiona Jugoistoène Europe i kratko vrijeme proteklo od poèetka provedbe FTA.
Štaviše, postoje dva sluèaja u kojima bilateralno smanjenje tarifa još nije ni dovršeno.
Iskustvo CEFTA-e od poèetka 1990-tih ukazuje na to da možda treba više vremena da
regionalni trgovinski tokovi znaèajnije osnaže kako bi donijeli dobrobit svim stranama
i da dublja ekonomska integracija sa EU igra u tome važnu ulogu.
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Iskustvo trgovinske integracije u susjedstvu EU
Analiza BiH FTA treba da se pozicionira u širi kontekst regionalnih trgovinskih
sporazuma, pogotovo onih u kojima uèestvuju evropske zemlje. Stoga, poglavlja 1 i 2
razmatraju glavne karakteristike FTA, sa posebnom pažnjom usmjerenom na prva
iskustva CEFTA-e (sklopljene poèetkom 1990-tih izmeðu Poljske, Maðarske, Èeške
Republike i Slovaèke) te neke FTA izmeðu EU i njenih susjednih zemalja.
Mogući efekti formiranja zone slobodne trgovine
Mogući efekti FTA su višestruki. Postoje mogućnosti za efekte pokretanja trgovine,
njenog preusmjeravanja i skretanja. Oni poèinju sa promjenama u trgovinskim
tokovima koji rezultiraju iz smanjenja trgovinskih barijera prema zemljama
èlanicama FTA, ali ne i prema ostatku svijeta. Time što uvećavaju tržište, FTA mogu
snažiti i priliv direktnih stranih investicija. Nadalje, FTA mogu donijeti pozitivne
socijalne efekte (niže cijene, otvaranje radnih mjesta, smanjivanje siromaštva) te
podrazumijevaju intenziviranje politièke saradnje, dok zauzvrat utjeèu na nekoliko
drugih sfera mimo ekonomske politike. Štaviše, uzajamno dogovorene odluke da se
uspostave specifiène institucije ili uvedu posebni mehanizmi (npr. standardi) mogu
biti djelotvorni instrumenti koji daju poticaj reformama.
Obuhvat FTA
Obuhvat svakog pojedinog FTA može biti odluèujući faktor u pogledu njegovih
efekata na zemlje potpisnice. Općenito govoreći, za zemlju koja ima komparativne
prednosti u proizvodnji hrane i poljoprivrednih proizvoda, te u drugim radno-
intenzivnim sektorima, jedan tipièan – opsegom ogranièen – FTA koii obuhvata trgovinu
nepoljoprivrednim robama, te ima dugi prijelazni period za neke «osjetljive» radno-
intenzivne sektore, može donijeti malu korist. Druga važna stavka odnosi se na nivo
zaštite od trećih zemalja. Visoke uvozne dažbine za treće zemlje mogu dovesti do toga
da FTA rezultira znaèajnim preusmjeravanjem trgovine i gubicima na socijalnom planu.
Unutarbalkanska trgovinska liberalizacija – dosadašnje iskustvo
Procjena prvih iskustava ukupne mreže FTA u regionu Jugoistoène Europe teško
je moguća iz cijelog niza razloga, ukljuèujući veoma kratak period djelovanja.
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Zakljuèujemo da se ne može oèekivati previše dinamièno povećanje tokova unutar
Jugoistoène Europe koje bi uslijedilo nakon implementacije regionalnih FTA - barem
ne odmah. Sliènost, izmeðu većine zemalja Jugoistoène Europe, u  faktorima
prirodnih bogastava i male razlike u tehnologijama podrazumijevaju da se
kratkoroèno i srednjoroèno ne može oèekivati bilo kakav rast trgovine unutar
pojedinih industrija. Prije se može oèekivati jaèa trgovina izmeðu industrija
zasnovanih na relativnom faktorima prirodnih bogatstava (kako to opisuje
neoklasièna teorija trgovine). Pored toga, trgovinski tokovi izmeðu nekih (ali ne svih)
zemalja o kojima je ovdje rijeè od 1999. do 2002. godine bili su već sasvim visoki i
vjerovatno blizu svog potencijalnog maksimalnog nivoa. U nekim sluèajevima
(prvenstveno u sluèaju Srbije i Crne Gore), trgovina sa partnerima u Jugoistoènoj
Europi možda je vještaèki ojaèana uslijed potisnutih ekonomskih odnosa sa drugim
partnerima. Stoga u svakom sluèaju treba oèekivati izvjesno preusmjeravanje trgovine
Srbije i Crne Gore od nekih partnera u FTA ka drugim zemljama (posebno EU i
Hrvatskoj), bez obzira na proces FTA.
No, jednostavna analiza geografske strukture trgovine unutar regiona Jugoistoène
Evrope ukazuje na to da su FTA mogli u nekim sluèajevima biti uspješni. Trgovina
izmeðu zemalja Jugoistoène Europe je rasla ujednaèeno, a u nekim sluèajevima i brže
od ukupne trgovine, što je dovelo do toga da udio trgovine u Jugoistoènoj Europi
ostane u velikoj mjeri slièan ili èak bude u porastu.
Trgovinska politika BiH
BiH od 1997. godine ima relativno liberalan trgovinski režim. Odluka da se
znaèajno smanje uvozne barijere bila je motivirana sa tri faktora: (1) domaća
proizvodnja i proizvodni kapaciteti su bili vrlo niski odmah nakon rata 1990-tih, te se  u
to doba nije mogla opravdati zaštita bilo koje pojedine industrijske grane, (2) od
meðunarodnih donatora se oèekivala velika pomoć u obnovi pa bi carinske tarife
smanjile stvarne efekte te pomoći, i (3) administrativni kapaciteti (ukljuèujući graniènu
kontrolu), te javne finansije bile su u lošem stanju, što znaèi da prihodi vezani za carine
nisu bili na ispravan naèin prikupljani, praćeni niti alocirani.
Obnova poslijeratne državne strukture izazvala je porast broja entitetskih zakona,
institucija i praksi koji su imali tendenciju zanemarivanja potrebe za koordinacijom i
odnosima izmeðu entiteta i države, te izmeðu dva entiteta. Vanjskotrgovinski zakoni i
propisi su donošeni na nivou države, ali su ih doskora implementirali entiteti, bez
jasnog praćenja njihovog poštivanja (posebno je bitno da su postojale nezavisne
carinske uprave). Državna granièna služba stvorena je 2000. godine, dok je djelotvorna
kontrola graniènih prijelaza uspostavljena tek 2004. godine. Objedinjavanje carinskih
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uprava 2004. godine te formiranje Uprave za indirektno oporezivanje (UIO) na nivou
države znatno su poboljšali uslove za vanjsku trgovinu. 
Meðutim, još uvijek ima dosta institucionalnih prepreka za vanjsku trgovinu.
Institucije i zakonodavstvo vezani za tehnièke propise, procjenu usklaðenosti, sanitarna
i fitosanitarna te veterinarska pitanja općenito nisu dovoljno razvijeni i usaglašeni sa
standardima EU. Perspektiva pregovora sa EU o Sporazumu o stabilizaciji i
pridruživanju pomogla je da se postignu kompromisi i ubrzaju institucionalne reforme
koje, meðutim, još uvijek treba u potpunosti implementirati kako bi uistinu donijele
ekonomske efekte. Važnu prepreku èini ogranièena sposobnost rješavanja
kompliciranih tehnièkih pitanja vezanih za trgovinu u Ministarstvu vanjske trgovine i
ekonomskih odnosa, te drugim relevantnim institucijama. 
Liberalizacija regionalne trgovine BiH
Trgovinska integracija sa partnerima u Jugoistoènoj Europi potaknuta je
Memorandum o razumijevanju Pakta stabilnosti iz 2001. godine, koji je predvidio
zakljuèivanje niza bilateralnih sporazuma izmeðu zemalja Jugoistoène Europe
(Albanije, BiH, Bugarske, Hrvatske, Bivše Jugoslavenske Republike Makedonije,
Moldavije, Rumunije, Srbije i Crne Gore, a odskora i UNMIK-a/Kosova). BiH je brzo
zakljuèila FTA sporazume sa svim zemljama Jugoistoène Europe (u nekoliko sluèajeva
su ti sporazumi bili asimetrièni), èime je smjesta dobila pristup drugim tržištima, dok
su se njene tarife trebale postepeno uklanjati. 
U odnosu na druge zemlje regiona, BiH je prvobitno sasvim snažno sprovela
otvaranje svog tržišta poljoprivrednih proizvoda. No, kasnije je BiH unilateralno unijela
zaštitne mjere za nekoliko odabranih poljoprivrednih proizvoda (uglavnom mlijeène i
mesne  proizvode) iz Hrvatske te Srbije i Crne Gore. Ovo je izazvalo neke probleme, te
su  trgovinski partneri BiH stalno ukazivali na unilateralni karakter politike BiH te na
èinjenicu da BiH još uvijek nije dala uvjerljive dokaze koji bi potkrijepili njenu
suspenziju nekih elemenata FTA. Problemi u postizanju kompromisa u vezi s ovim
doveli su u posljednjem trenutku, u decembru 2006. do teških pregovora o pridruživanju
BiH svim ostalim potpisnicama koje su se složile o formi CEFTA 2006. BiH je ponovo,
unutar CEFTA 2006., meðu zemljama sa najliberalnijim trgovinskim režimima. 
Trgovinski tokovi BiH
BiH je relativno otvorena za vanjsku trgovinu. U posljednjih 10 godina to je bilo
prvenstveno uzrokovano obimom uvoza, ali od 2003. godine uèinci na polju izvoza
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takoðer su znatno poboljšani zahvaljujući aktuelnom restrukturiranju odreðenih
sektora i prilivu direktnih stranih investicija. U periodu 2002-2005. BiH je zabilježila
veliki trgovinski deficit od 45% BDP-a (manji, ako se raèuna i siva ekonomija). Rast
izvoza će se vjerovatno nastaviti i u bliskoj budućnosti, zahvaljujući nekolicini velikih
investicijskih projekata, pogotovo onim u metalurgiji (proizvodnja èelika i aluminija).
Izvoz BiH je u praksi ogranièen na tržište EU (oko 55%) i region Jugoistoène
Europe (35-40%), odnosno na ona tržišta koja su geografski najbliža i gdje robe BiH
uživaju prefencijalni status. Uvoz je donekle više diversificiran, sa udjelom zemalja
koje nisu u EU i nisu u Jugoistoènoj Europi od oko 20%.
BiH ima veoma usku proizvodnu i izvoznu bazu i to je kljuèni problem, zbog kojeg je
zemlja izložeona oscilacijama na meðunarodnom tržištu. Izvoz je u velikoj mjeri
usmjeren na eksploataciju prirodnih resursa i radno-intenzivnu proizvodnju roba u
granama koje zapošljavaju niskokvalificiranu radnu snagu. Bazni metali i proizvodi od
metala dominiraju u strukturi izvoza a njihov udio je odskora u daljnjem porastu.
Poljoprivredni proizvodi predstavljaju tek mali dio izvoza (oko 6%), a ti proizvodi su
gotovo u potpunosti usmjereni na tržište Jugoistoène Europe, pošto BiH nema relevantne
institucije (sanitarne i fitosanitarne inspekcije) za izvoz poljoprivrednih proizvoda u EU.
Determinante izvoza i uvoza BiH
Gravitacijski model vanjske trgovine BiH, izraèunat u ovom izvještaju, ukazuje na
to da su trgovinski odnosi BiH sa susjedima iz bivše Jugoslavije veoma jaki. Èini se da
su intenzivniji nego što bi ukazivala geografska bliskost i ekonomski potencijal
partnera. To se može objasniti snažnim historijskim industrijskim odnosima u okviru
ranije jedinstvene države, kao i zajednièkim granicama i efektom sliènosti jezika koji
èesto pozitivno utjeèu na obim trgovine izmeðu zemalja. Nasuprot tome, èini se da EU
ne predstavlja veći udio u izvozu BIH kao što bi se moglo predvidjeti na temelju
osnovnih specifikacija, unatoè tome što je EU dala trgovinske preferencijale za
proizvode iz BiH. Objašnjenje za ovo možda leži u netarifnim barijerama koje štite
tržišta EU ili je potrebno da proðe odreðeno vrijeme da bi  olakšan pristup tržištu
rezultirao većim izvoznim tokovima iz BiH. Zanimljivo je da se èini da je EU (blago)
manje zastupljena meðu uvoznim tržištima BiH, na što ukazuje negativna indikativna
varijabla za EU u uvoznoj jednaèini. 
Konaèno, gravitacijska specifikacija ne može potvrditi hipotezu da FTA dodatno
ojaèava trgovinu sa partnerskim zemljama Jugoistoène Europe. Nekoliko upozorenja
treba dodati takvom tumaèenju. Prvo, FTA sporazumi su relativno novi i za ostvarenje
njihovog efekta na trgovinske tokove možda treba više vremena. Drugo, moguće je i
da su neki FTA možda bili djelotvorni u pogledu smanjenja trgovinskih barijera za
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izvoz iz BiH, dok neki drugi (iz razloga vezanih za njihov sadržaj i/ili implementaciju)
nisu odigrali takvu ulogu.
Efekti regionalne trgovine na socijalne prilike u  BiH
Posmatrajući efekte FTA iz druge perspektive, vidimo neke (slabe) indikacije
trgovinske ekspanzije do koje je došlo, mada definitivna procjena zbog nedostatka
relevantnih podataka nije moguća. Ne vidimo nijedan razlog za oèekivanje da se u
sluèaju FTA BiH desi preusmjeravanje trgovine koje bi bilo takvih razmjera da bi
moglo naškoditi privredi BiH. U pogledu skretanja trgovine takoðer se èini da ima više
argumenata koji podržavaju gledište da će BiH, ako do toga i doðe, vjerovatno služiti
kao ulazna taèka za proizvode trećih zemalja koji se kasnije prosljeðuju dalje drugim
zemljama Jugoistoène Europe, nego da će biti «žrtva» skretanja trgovine tako što će
partneri FTA iz trećih zemalja uvoziti proizvode u BiH bez plaćanja dažbina.
Netarifne trgovinske barijere sa partnerima iz Jugoistoène Europe
Brojne su netarifne barijere koje škode trgovini. Razgovori sa  poduzetnicima u
BiH, sa onima koji definiraju politike, te sa analitièarima, uz analizu nekih
komparativnih statistièkih podataka, ukazuju na to da se ozbiljne trgovinske barijere
javljaju na sljedećim poljima: nepriznavanje u inostranstvu fitosanitarnih i veterinarskih
certifikata koje izdaje BiH, korupcija i niska kvalificiranost carinske službe BiH (mada
su sagovornici ukazali na nedavna velika poboljšanja u toj sferi), slaba transportna
infrastruktura (pogotovo željeznice), pretjerano licenciranje u nekim sektorima, te
problemi vezani za dobijanje potvrda o porijeklu (vrijeme èekanja, nedostatak
informacija, problemi sa prihvaćanjem potvrda). Sasvim neoèekivano, sagovornici su
pokazali tendenciju da ne navode tehnièke standarde meðu glavne trgovinske barijere.
Moguće je da u ovom trenutku oni predstavljaju znaèajne barijere trgovini iskljuèivo sa
EU. Neki sagovornici u BiH su takoðer ukazali na postojanje “mekih“ graniènih taksi na
odredišnim tržištima te su se žalili na funkcioniranje carine u nekim stranim zemljama.
Analiza drugih usluga koje se tièu trgovine ukazuje na to da se ne èini da
nedovoljna razvijenost domaćeg finansijskog sektora predstavlja veliku prepreku
trgovini. No, èini se da se veliki dio trgovine dešava bez bilo kakvog finansijskog
osiguranja ili adekvatnih finansijskih garancija. To jasno ogranièava mogućnosti
novih trgovinskih kontakata te onemogućava brzi rast trgovinskog prometa. S
obzirom na ogranièenja na strani ponude te zbog èinjenice da male firme u BiH rade
s niskim maržama, postupni razvoj tog sektora je od kljuènog znaèaja za daljnju
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podršku izvozu iz BiH. Regionalna statistika takoðer ukazuje na telekomunikacijsku
infrastrukturu, koja zaostaje za nekim drugim zemljama Jugoistoène Europe, te  na
visoke troškove telekomunikacijskih usluga.
Opće preporuke u pogledu politika
Neki problemi koji onemogućavaju razvoj vanjske trgovine BiH su vezani za opći
ekonomski i institucionalni okvir, investicijsku klimu te uslove za poduzetništvo.
Drugim rijeèima, prvi set kljuènih prepreka poboljšanju trgovinskih rezultata je
domaće prirode. Prva preporuka poziva na pojednostavljivanje institucionalnog
okvira za upravljanje ekonomskom politikom, te – u mjeri u kojoj je to moguće – na
potrebu da se ide na jednostavne propise kako ne bi došlo do veće neefikasnosti u
njihovoj implementaciji. Treba poboljšati kapacitete institucija BiH, kako onih koji se
bave općim ekonomskim politikama, tako i specifiènih institucija koje se bave
trgovinskom politikom (npr. pregovori o pristupanju Svjetskoj trgovinskoj
organizaciji, Sporazum o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju, trgovinski sporovi itd.).
Kašnjenja u privatizaciji, te veoma slabo restrukturiranje državnih kompanija
onemogućavaju veću produktivnost. Privatizacija bi takoðer mogla pomoći u
privlaèenju direktnih stranih investicija koje su od vitalnog znaèaja za poboljšanje
konkurentnosti preraðivaèkog sektora BiH. Direktne strane investicije mogle bi biti
važan katalizator razvoja konkurentskih prednosti raznih sektora privrede BiH i
integracije njenih kompanija u logistièke lance regionalnih i transnacionalnih
kompanija (uglavnom sa sjedištem u EU).
Motiviranje kompanija da se restrukturiraju treba da prate reforme èiji je cilj veća
fleksibilnost tržišta rada. Potrebna je i povoljna klima za funkcioniranje malih i
srednjih preduzeća, a ona zahtijeva pojednostavljivanje procesa registracije
preduzeća, pojednostavljenu poresku strukturu i skraćene inspekcijske procedure. Iz
perspektive meðunarodne konkurentnosti BH proizvodnje, èini se da visoke domaće
realne plaće, kada se porede s drugim zemljama u regionu, predstavljaju važnu
prepreku. Smanjenje poreznih opterećenja te bolja kvalificiranost radnika trebalo bi
da pomognu rješavanju tog problema.
Pristup infrastrukturi je važna determinanta za investicijske odluke i
konkurentnost preduzeća. S obzirom na nerazvijenost infrastrukture u BiH,
poboljšanja na ovom polju mogla bi imati znaèajnog utjecaja na konkurentnost
kompanija u BiH. Prioritet treba dati stvaranju odgovarajućeg okruženja za razvoj
infrastrukturnih službi koje su u privatnom vlasništvu ili privatno funkcioniraju.
Transparentna privatizacija komunalnih službi i uspostavljanje pravih investicijskih
poticaja, te regulatornog okvira obećavaju bolje rezultate.
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Preporuke za trgovinsku politiku BiH 
Kljuèno pitanje trgovinske politike koje se izuzetno istièe u debati o funkcioniranju
FTA BiH i o optimalnom obliku novog sporazuma CEFTA tièe se nivoa liberalizacije
trgovine poljoprivrednih proizvoda. Èuju se glasovi u prilog iskljuèivanju bilo kakve
liberalizacije na planu poljoprivredne trgovine. Za BiH, tendencija je da se to temelji
na percepciji nelojalne konkurencije za nekoliko poljoprivrednih roba (npr. meso,
mlijeko) koje se proizvode u zemljama trgovinskim partnerima BiH – Hrvatskoj i
Srbiji. Po našem mišljenju, BiH ne treba oèekivati bilo kakve velike dobitke iz
pokušaja da štiti i razvija odabrane domaće sektore time što će uvesti ili povećati
trgovinske barijere. Uzevši u obzir institucionalne kapacitete BiH te meðunarodne
posljedice trgovinskih politika, zakljuèujemo da se èini da je zaštita poljoprivrede time
što će se povećati trgovinske barijere u krajnjoj instanci protiv interesa BiH. Slièno
razmišljanje se može primijeniti i na druge grane industrije.
Efikasno funkcioniranje meðunarodno priznatih institucija za certifikaciju,
akreditaciju, mjeriteljstvo i standarde trebalo bi da ojaèa izvozne kapacitete domaćih
kompanija i promovira razvoj preraðivaèkog sektora. 
Tarifna struktura u BiH, mada relativno jednostavna i takva da općenito izbjegava
visoke stope, ipak ima neke slabosti. Potreban je širi pogled na tarifne politike kako bi
se izbjegla situacija u kojoj se neki specifièni elementi politika utvrðuju pod utjecajem
lobbyja, bez uzimanja u obzir šireg ekonomskog efekta. Jedno se pitanje tièe carinskih
tarifa za neke sirovine i poluproizvode koji se ne proizvode u BiH (ili zemljama
potpisnicama CEFTA 2006), ali se koriste u proizvodnim procesima u BiH. To
smanjuje uèinak zaštite za proizvode preraðivaèke industrije te može biti štetno za
kapacitet domaće proizvodnje.
Graniène procedure za izvoz/uvoz mogle bi se takoðer pojednostaviti i uèiniti
predvidljivijim (u smislu vremena èekanja). U tom pogledu, treba nastaviti reformu
carinske službe.
Èini se da postoji prostor za veću promociju izvoza i usluge informiranja za
kompanije zainteresirane da šire svoje aktivnosti na strana tržišta. Ovdje je kljuèno
pitanje da se osigura da te usluge budu visokog kvaliteta i da budu po razumnoj cijeni.   
Sektorske preporuke 
Konaèno nudimo neke specifiène sektorske preporuke vezane za grane sa visokim
izvoznim potencijalom: metalurgiju, proizvodnju automobilskih dijelova, proizvodnju
hrane i pića, te proizvoda od drveta. Zajednièka karakteristika ovih preporuka
ukljuèuje potrebu za stvaranjem povoljne klime i informiranjem potencijalnih stranih
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investitora, pružanjem pomoći u uspostavi kontakata izmeðu proizvoðaèa u BiH i
potencijalnih klijenata/investitora, podrškom marketingu BH proizvoda, dostupnošću
obuke za male proizvoðaèe, podrškom spajanju (ili stvaranju grupa proizvoðaèa)
malih preduzeća u grupe proizvoðaèa tako da mogu uživati u prednostima ekonomije
obima u pogledu marketinga, izgradnje brendova, ambalaže, dizajna i ulaganja u
modernu proizvodnu tehnologiju.
Translation: Senada Kreso
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Background
This report analyses the functioning of free trade agreements (FTAs) signed by
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) with its regional partners in the SEE Stability Pact
process (Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, and Serbia and
Montenegro). The objective of the study, as defined by the EPPU, was to formulate
policy conclusions on enhancing the effectiveness of these FTAs.
The report does not discuss in any detail trade and other relations between BiH
and the EU. Nevertheless, references to these important processes are made whenever
it is relevant for the objective of this work. Also, several recommendations are
applicable for the overall performance of BiH foreign trade policy. It is worth
remembering, though, that intra-SEE integration is required as part of the EU
integration process.
The work on this report (main bulk done in autumn 2006) coincided with the final
stage of negotiations on a multilateral trade agreement (CEFTA 2006) that is to
replace the network of over 30 bilateral FTAs in May 2007. Therefore, the policy
recommendations stemming from this work are not designed to be directly applicable
to the functioning of FTAs. However, the lessons and recommendations arising from
this analysis are also relevant for the new CEFTA, if only because many features of the
FTAs were preserved in the CEFTA 2006. Moreover, several of recommendations are
in fact much broader in scope and remain relevant in the context of general trade
policies irrespective of their specific institutional set-up.
The general conclusion emerging from the analysis presented in this report is that
while the regional FTAs might have had some positive impact on the BiH economy, this
effect was not particularly strong and the potential of the regional free trade
arrangement has not yet fully materialised. The reasons for this are manifold, including
the small economic size of the SEE region and the short time that has passed since the
FTA was implemented. Moreover, there are two cases in which bilateral lowering of
tariffs has not yet ended. The CEFTA experience from the early 1990s suggests that it
may take longer before regional trade flows are boosted more substantially to the benefit
of all sides and that deeper economic integration with the EU plays a role in this.
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Executive summary
The experience of trade integration in the EU neighbourhood
Analysis of BiH’s FTAs needs to be positioned in the wider context of regional trade
agreements, particularly those where European countries participate. Therefore,
chapters 1 and 2 review the major features of the FTAs, focusing on the early experience
of CEFTA (in the early 1990s, comprising Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and
Slovakia) and some FTAs between the EU and its neighbouring countries.
Possible effects of forming a free trade area
The possible effects of FTAs are multiple. There are possibilities for trade creation,
diversion, and deflection effects. These start with changes in trade flows resulting
from lowering of trade barriers towards FTA partners but not towards the rest of the
world. FTAs, by enlarging the size of the market, may foster FDI inflows.
Furthermore, FTAs may bring positive welfare effects (lower prices, job creation,
alleviation of poverty) and imply intensified political co-operation, in turn affecting
several other spheres beyond economic policy. Moreover, mutually agreed decisions
to set-up specific institutions or introduce particular mechanisms (e.g. standards) may
be effective tools motivating reforms.
FTA coverage
The coverage of any particular FTA can be decisive in terms of its effects on its
signatories. Generally speaking, for a country possessing comparative advantage in
food and agricultural production and other labour-intensive sectors, a typical –
limited in scope – FTA covering trade in non-agricultural goods and including long
transition periods for some of ‘sensitive’ labour-intensive sectors may bring little
gains. Another important point relates to the level of protection against third
countries. High import duties for third countries may lead to an FTA resulting in
substantial trade diversion and welfare losses.
Intra-Balkan trade liberalisation – experience to date
An assessment of the early experience of the overall network of FTAs in the SEE
region is difficult for a number of reasons, including the very short period of their
operation. We conclude that one cannot expect an over-dynamic increase in intra-SEE
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flows following the implementation of the network of regional FTAs, at least not
immediately. Similarity, for the majority of SEE countries, factor endowments and
small differences in technologies imply that in the short- to medium-term one cannot
expect any major boost in intra-industry trade. One can rather expect stronger inter-
industry trade based on relative factor endowments (as described by neo-classical trade
theory). Besides, trade flows between some (but not all) of the countries under
consideration here by 1999-2002 were already quite high and probably around their
potential levels. In some instances (primarily the case of Serbia and Montenegro) trade
with SEE partners may have been artificially boosted due to suppressed economic
relations with other partners. Thus, some reorientation of Serbia and Montenegro
trade away from (some) FTA partners towards other countries (in particular the EU
and Croatia) should have been expected anyway, irrespective of the FTA process.
However, simple analysis of the geographical structure of trade within the SEE
region suggests that the FTAs could have been successful in some cases. Trade between
SEE countries has been growing on a par with and in some instances faster than
overall trade, leading to SEE trade shares staying broadly similar or even increasing.
BiH trade policy
Since 1997 BiH has had a relatively liberal trade regime. The decision to substantially
lower barriers to imports was primarily motivated by three factors: (1) domestic
production and production capacity was very low immediately after the 1990s war and
could not be justified in terms of protecting any particular industry at that time, (2) very
large reconstruction assistance from international donors was expected and custom tariffs
would reduce actual effects of such assistance, and (3) administrative capacities (including
border controls) and public finances were in poor condition, meaning that custom-related
revenues were not properly collected, monitored or allocated. 
The reconstruction of post-war state structures caused a proliferation of entity-
related legislation, institutions and practices that tended to disregard the need for co-
ordination of relations between entities and the state and between entities. Foreign
trade laws and regulations are passed by the state, but until recently have been
implemented by the entities themselves, without clear monitoring of compliance (in
particular, there were independent custom administrations). The State Border Service
was created in 2000 and effective control of border crossings was established only in
2004. Unification of custom administration in 2004 and creation of the state-level
Indirect Taxation Authority (ITA) substantially improved conditions for foreign trade. 
However, there are still substantial institutional impediments to foreign trade.
Institutions and legislation dealing with technical regulations, conformity assessment,
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sanitary and phytosanitary, and veterinary issues are generally not sufficiently
developed and harmonised with EU standards. The prospect of negotiations with the
EU on the Stabilisation and Association Agreement has helped to work out
compromises and accelerated institutional reforms, which, however, still need to be
accomplished to bring economic effects. An important obstacle is the limited capacity
to deal with complicated technical trade-related matters in the Ministry of Foreign
Trade and Economic Relations and other relevant institutions.
Liberalisation of BiH’s regional trade
Trade integration with SEE partners has been driven by the 2001 Stability Pact
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which foresaw the conclusion of a series of
bilateral agreements among the SEE countries (Albania, BiH, Bulgaria, Croatia, the
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro,
and more recently also UNMIK/Kosovo). BiH quickly reached FTA agreements with all
SEE countries (in a few cases these agreements were asymmetrical), getting immediate
access to other markets, while its tariffs were to be removed gradually. 
Relative to other countries in the region BiH initially quite vigorously pursued an
opening of its agricultural markets. However, BiH later unilaterally introduced
protective measures on a few selected agricultural products (mainly milk and meat
products) from Croatia and Serbia and Montenegro. This has caused some problems
and has been continuously raised by BiH’s trade partners, who pointed to the
unilateral character of BiH’s policies and to the fact that BiH has not yet presented
convincing evidence to back up suspending some elements of the FTAs. Problems in
finding a compromise on this point led to difficult last-minute negotiations in
December 2006 on BiH joining all the other parties that had agreed on the shape of
CEFTA 2006. Finally, BiH signed CEFTA, but reserved the right to use safeguard
measures in agricultural trade.
BiH trade flows
BiH is relatively open to foreign trade. In the past 10 years this has been primarily
driven by import volumes, but since 2003 export performance has also improved
considerably on the back of ongoing restructuring in certain sectors and foreign direct
investment inflows. In 2002-2005, BiH recorded large trade deficits of 45% of GDP
(less, if the unregistered economy is accounted for). Export growth is likely to
continue in the near future, driven by a few large investment projects, particularly in
the metal industry (steel and aluminium).
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BiH’s exports are in practice limited to the EU market (around 55%) and SEE
region (35-40%), i.e. those markets that are geographically closest and where BiH
goods enjoy preferential access. Imports are somewhat more diversified, with the
share of non-EU and non-SEE countries at around 20%. 
BiH’s very narrow production and export base are key problems, exposing the
country to volatility in international markets. Exports are largely concentrated on
exploitation of natural resources and low-skill labour-intensive goods. Base metals and
metal products dominate in the export structure and their share has been growing
recently. Agricultural products account for only a small fraction of exports (around 6%)
and these products are almost entirely directed to the SEE market, since BiH does not
have relevant institutions (SPS inspections) for agricultural exports to the EU.
Determinants of BiH exports and imports
The gravity model for BiH foreign trade estimated in the report indicates that BiH
trade relations with its ex-Yugoslavia neighbours are very strong. They seem to be more
intensive than the geographical proximity and the partners’ economic potential would
indicate. This can be explained by the strength of historical industrial relations within the
previously united country, as well as common borders and language effects that are often
found to positively affect trade volumes between countries. In contrast, the EU does not
seem to account for a larger share of BiH exports than would be predicted by the basic
specification, despite granting trade preferences for BiH products. The explanation for
this may lie in non-tariff barriers protecting EU markets or it may be that eased market
access takes some time to translate into higher BiH export flows. Interestingly, the EU
appears to be (slightly) underrepresented among BiH’s import markets, as indicated by
the negative sign on the EU dummy variable in the import equation.
Finally, the gravity specification cannot confirm the hypothesis that FTAs with SEE
partner countries additionally boost trade. There are several caveats that need to be added
to the interpretation. Firstly, FTA agreements are relatively new and their impact on trade
flows may take longer to materialise. Secondly, it may well be that some of the FTAs might
have been effective in reducing trade barriers for BiH exports, while other agreements (for
reasons related to their design and / or implementation) have not played such a role.
Effects of regional trade on BiH welfare
Looking at FTA effects from another perspective, we see some (weak) indication
of trade expansion taking place, although a definite assessment is not feasible due to
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lack of relevant data. We see no reasons to expect trade diversion in the case of BiH’s
FTAs of any magnitude that could harm the BiH economy. With regards trade
deflection there would seem to be more arguments supporting the view that if it
occurs, BiH is more likely to serve as an entry point for third countries’ products that
are finally sent to other SEE countries than being a ‘victim’ of trade deflection
importing third countries’ products without duties via its FTA partners.
Non-tariff barriers to trade with SEE partners
There exist numerous non-tariff barriers hampering trade. Interviews with BiH
entrepreneurs, policy makers and analysts, together with some comparative statistics,
suggest that severe barriers to trade are related to the following issues: lack of
recognition of BiH phytosanitary and veterinary certificates abroad, corruption and
low qualifications of BiH’s customs (although respondents noted strong recent
improvements in this sphere), poor transport infrastructure (especially railways),
over-licensing in some sectors and problems related to getting certificates of origin
(waiting time, lack of information, problems with acceptance of certificates). Quite
unexpectedly, the respondents tended not to list technical standards among the major
trade barriers. Possibly, at the moment these pose a significant barrier in trade with
the EU only. Some of the BiH respondents also indicated the existence of some ‘soft’
border taxes in the destination markets and complained about the functioning of
customs in selected foreign countries.
Analysis of other trade-related services suggests that the (under)development of
the domestic financial sector does not seem to be a major obstacle to trade. However,
it seems that the bulk of trade has been conducted without any kind of financial
insurance or adequate financial guarantees. This clearly limits possibilities for new
trade contacts and impedes rapid growth in trade turnover. Given the supply-side
constraints and the fact that small BiH firms operate on tight margins, the gradual
development of the sector is of crucial importance for the further support of BiH’s
exports. Regional statistics also point to telecommunication infrastructure, which lags
behind some other SEE countries, and the high costs of telecommunication services.
General policy recommendations
Several problems hindering the development of BiH’s foreign trade are related to
the general economic and institutional framework, investment climate and conditions
for entrepreneurship. In other words, the first set of key barriers to improved trade
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performance is of a domestic nature. The first recommendation calls for simplification
of the institutional framework for economic policy management and – to the extent it
is possible – the need to opt for simple regulations so that inefficiencies in
implementation are not magnified. The capacity of BiH’s institutions, both those
dealing with general economic policies and trade policy-specific institutions (e.g.
negotiations on WTO accession, SAA, trade disputes, etc.) needs to be improved.
Delays in privatisation and very slow restructuring of state-owned companies
hinder productivity gains. Privatisation may also help in attracting FDIs that are vital
for upgrading the competitiveness of the BiH manufacturing sector. FDIs could be a
very important catalyst for the development of competitive advantages in various
sectors of the BiH economy and integration of BiH companies into supply chains of
regional and transnational companies (mostly with EU headquarters).
Motivating companies to restructure needs to be accompanied by reforms aiming
at bringing more flexibility to the labour market. A favourable climate for the
functioning of small and medium enterprises is also needed, and calls for the
simplification of the business registering process, a simplified tax structure and
streamlined inspection procedures. From the perspective of the international
competitiveness of BiH’s production, high domestic real wages, when compared to
other countries in the region, would seem to pose an important obstacle. Reduction
of the tax wedge and improvement of skills should help in tackling it.
Access to infrastructure is an important determinant of investment decisions and
competitiveness of businesses. Given the underdevelopment of BiH’s infrastructure,
improvements in this field could have a substantial impact on the competitiveness of
BiH companies. Priority should be given to creating an appropriate environment for
development of privately owned or operated infrastructure services. Transparent
privatisation of utilities and setting the right investment incentives and regulatory
framework promise the best outcomes.
Recommendations for BiH’s trade policy
One key trade policy issue that emerged prominently in the debate on the
functioning of BiH’s FTAs and the optimal shape of the new CEFTA agreement
concerned the extent of liberalisation of agricultural trade. Voices have been raised in
favour of excluding any liberalisation of agricultural trade. For BiH, these have tended
to be based on the perception of unfair competition from a few agricultural goods (e.g.
meat, milk) produced in BiH’s key trade partners – Croatia and Serbia. In our view,
BiH should not expect any strong gains from attempts to protect and develop selected
domestic sectors by means of introducing or raising trade barriers. Taking into account
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BiH’s institutional capacity and the international consequences of trade policies, we
conclude that protecting agriculture by raising trade barriers appears on balance to go
against BiH’s interests. A similar reasoning can apply to other industries.
Efficient functioning of internationally recognisable institutions for certification,
accreditation, metrology and standards should boost the export capacities of domestic
companies and promote development of the manufacturing sector.
BiH’s tariff structure, while relatively simple and generally avoiding high rates,
nevertheless has some weaknesses. A broad vision on tariff policy is needed to avoid
a situation where some specific elements of the policy are set under the influences of
lobbies, without taking into account the broader economic impact. One issue
concerns custom tariffs on some raw materials and intermediate products that are not
produced in BiH (or in the CEFTA 2006 countries) but are used in production
processes in BiH. This reduces the effective rate of protection for processed products
and may be detrimental to domestic production capacity.
Border procedures for exports / imports could also be simplified and made more
predictable (in terms of waiting times). In this view, the reform of the customs service
should be continued.
There seems to be scope for enhanced export promotion and information services
for companies interested in expanding their activities on foreign markets. The key
issue here is ensuring that these services are of high quality and carried out at
reasonable cost.
Sectoral recommendations
Finally, we provide some specific sectoral recommendations related to branches
with high export potential: metal, automotive parts, food and beverage processing and
wood products. The common features of these recommendations include the need to
create a favourable climate and provision of information to prospective foreign
investors, help in establishing contacts between BiH producers and potential clients /
investors, support for the marketing of BiH products, availability of training to small
producers, support for merging (or creating producer groups) of small enterprises into
producer groups so that they can reap economies of scale in terms of marketing,
building brand names, packing, design and investing in modern production technology.
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The terms of reference for this study requested an analysis of the functioning of
the free trade agreements (FTAs) signed by BiH with its regional partners in the SEE
Stability Pact process (Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania and
Serbia and Montenegro (since mid-2006 two independent countries)) and suggestions
regarding policy measures for overcoming their perceived low effectiveness in
promoting foreign trade. The network of regional FTAs was described as giving
“unsatisfactory results” in the ToR. 
The research team chose a strategy of avoiding ex ante assumptions as to the
relative success or failure of FTAs, but rather to start with an in-depth analysis and only
later to come up with an overall assessment and practical policy recommendations. We
also tried to position the BiH FTAs with its SEE partners in the wider context – BiH
general trade policies (in particular integration with the EU), other domestic policies
potentially affecting trade performance, on the one hand, and the experience of various
trade integration initiatives in Europe and neighbouring countries on the other. 
The recommendations follow from a review of theoretical and practical aspects of
FTA functioning (chapter 1), the analysis on the strengths and weaknesses of existing
FTAs throughout Europe and in the region (chapter 2), the description of the FTAs
concluded by BiH in the context of its overall trade policy, institutions and trade flows
(chapter 3), a quantitative analysis of BiH trade flows, including estimates of
determinants of BiH’s imports and exports (chapter 4), and from in-depth interviews
with BiH stakeholders (also chapter 4).
The research team carried out a field mission to BiH in September 2006, when
most of the interviews with companies, policy makers, analysts and other stakeholders
were conducted. The results of the interviews were important in shaping the final
recommendations.
The short duration of the project and several other objective factors imply that the
report’s analysis and conclusions should be treated as preliminary and subject to
verification. Nevertheless we hope that the report will highlight some of the key issues
affecting BiH’s trade integration with its South-Eastern neighbours and will spur a
lively debate (the creation of CEFTA 2006 can be an additional motivation for
carrying out such a debate). 
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This chapter explores the issues related to trade liberalisation that may be relevant
for intra-regional trade in South Eastern Europe (SEE). The discussion starts with a
description of the textbook free trade area and then turns to locating regional trade
integration in the Balkans in the broader perspective of integrating with the EU. It
also uses examples of scenarios that can be considered ‘minimum’ and ‘maximum’
degrees of regional integration. There is also a short overview of possible welfare
effects of forming a free trade area.
1.1. FTAs as a precondition of deeper integration
The typical sequencing of regional economic integration may pass through the
following stages: granting bilateral trade preferences, setting a FTA and then possibly
creating a customs union, or even a common market and monetary union. The two
last stages require quite substantial unification of rules pertaining to various aspects
of economic activity, a common monetary policy (in a monetary union) and at least
some fiscal co-ordination rules. The recent decade or so has seen a proliferation of
regional integration initiatives, in particular in Europe. The creation of free trade
areas has been used as an initial step, potentially important in itself but also in
facilitating further development in this regard.
A textbook free trade area means liberalisation of trade on a reciprocal basis. It
implies that both trading partners decide to eliminate tariffs and quotas on imports
from the territory of the other partner. Although border controls remain in place, the
cost of access to a trading partner’s market falls as a result of zero tariff rate and the
lack of quantitative restrictions.
A free trade area is relatively easy to agree on and implement since it does not
require common policies towards third countries (such as in the case of customs
union with common external tariffs). Moreover, once approved, it requires minimal
common decision making during its functioning1.
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1. Free Trade Agreements – a snapshot
1 With the exception of harmonisation or mutual recognition of rules of origin, standards etc.
1.2. The experience of EU trade integration with neighbouring countries
The European Union has a long history of trade integration with is neighbours.
Additionally, having an attractive normative reputation with its neighbours – from
multiple angles such as honest business methods, technical modernity, economic
ideals for Europe, etc. – it is a natural model to follow from the perspective of several
countries. Moreover, the creation of the set of regional FTAs in the SEE has taken
place in the context of further integration with the EU, and the provisions of the FTAs
closely follow the usual EU trade integration practices. Therefore, before moving to
the BiH FTAs, it is useful to briefly review some other regional integration histories in
Europe and also those FTAs signed between the EU and its neighbour countries.
The early years of CEFTA: the Central European Free Trade Agreement
CEFTA – the Central European Free Trade Agreement – was signed in December
1992 and was designed to re-build economic integration between Poland, Hungary
and Czechoslovakia (and later the Czech Republic and Slovakia) and to revive trade
between these countries after they had collapsed with the dissolution of the Council
for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), an economic organisation made up of
several communist countries (Yugoslavia was not a member). This resulted in a
massive reduction in trade between ex-communist countries, relative to 1980s
(especially in relative terms)2. The CEFTA was in many respects similar to the current
network of FTAs in the SEE region (although it was a multilateral agreement from the
very beginning). Several years have passed since CEFTA’s creation, and so one may
analyse its effects and draw some lessons from it. Below, we briefly summarise the
main conclusions that may be relevant BiH’s perspective. 
After signing the agreement at end-1992, the CEFTA started to be implemented in
1994. In practise, the coverage of the agreement limited to non-agricultural goods,
tariffs for which were eliminated in 1994. Initially, agricultural trade was also
supposed to be fully liberalised, starting from the beginning of 1998. However, all the
parties recorded surpluses in agricultural production in the mid-1990s and all
subsidised agriculture, although in different ways. They were therefore unwilling to
risk similar products from neighbouring countries crowding out domestic agricultural
production. Moreover, the opening of the sectors to external competition would have
meant harmonising agricultural policies (in order to avoid subsidised production
from one country crowding out non-subsidised production in other countries). The
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2 In some cases, the nominal fall in trade between early 1980s and early 1990s (measured in US dollars) was as
large as 50% (based on data from IMF DOTS).
signatories decided not to do this and barriers for agricultural trade were lowered
only partially starting in the second half of the 1990s (Chmielewska et al., 2004). Still,
relatively high barriers in agricultural trade persisted3.
The geographical scope of the agreement changed later on and also started to
cover some Balkan countries. Slovenia joined the CEFTA in 1996, Romania in 1997,
Bulgaria in 1998, Croatia in 2002 and the Republic of Macedonia in 2006. After 2004
(when the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia left the CEFTA
and became members of the EU) the name CEFTA became relevant for intra-Balkan
integration, finally leading to the signing of the CETA 2006 agreement in December
2006 (see more on this in chapter 3).
It would seem that repetition of the experience of the early years of the CEFTA is the
minimum achievement BiH can attain in the medium-term. However, BiH (and countries
in the region) could probably reap higher benefits by going beyond the provisions of the
early CEFTA and deepening integration (e.g. by more comprehensive liberalisation of
agricultural trade), especially given that CEFTA 2006 (a new multilateral trade agreement
in SEE) builds on several years experience of the regional network of FTAs.
It should be also underlined that the formation of the CEFTA paralleled another
significant process of initiating institutional integration with the EU, the signing of
Europe Agreements in mid-December 1992. This latter process was much more
important from the perspective of Central and East European (CEE) countries, among
other things due to the size of the EU market, relations with which had been
artificially depressed prior to 1989.
Typical EU’s FTAs
A free-trade agreement of the type that the EU usually signs with its neighbours (e.g.
Europe Agreements with ex-communist countries signed in the early 1990s) falls short of
creating truly free trade. The coverage of such agreement is limited to non-agricultural
goods only, with high protection remaining in agricultural trade. This was the case with
FTAs with the ten new EU member states from Central and Eastern Europe and also with
FTAs signed more recently by the EU with Morocco and Egypt, as well as those signed
between the EU and Croatia and the EU and Macedonia (as part of the Stabilisation and
Association Agreement – SAA). This limitation in product coverage results from the
complicated structure of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). 
Moreover, a typical FTA can take as long as 10 years to be fully implemented.
However, the EU is usually willing to front-load the elimination of its tariffs, while
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3 Agriculture was excluded also for the reason that it was excluded from Europe Agreements and free trade
agreements with EFTA countries.
partner countries may benefit from gradual tariff reduction (this is typically carried in
the framework of Interim Agreements). The other important positive side of FTAs
signed by the EU, is that they typically include a number of provisions (e.g. related to
capital flows, standards, political dialogue, etc.) that could lower non-tariff barriers to
trade. Provided that the whole liberalisation program is attractive and strict but a
realistic timetable is set, such wider in scope FTAs could bring substantial gains,
which would stem mainly from domestic reforms in the EU partner countries.
EEA: European Economic Area
Perhaps the deepest and most effective example of trade integration in Europe
(excluding the EU itself) is provided by the European Economic Area. It goes well
beyond simple free trade in manufacturing, effectively extending the common internal
market beyond EU borders. The EEA was formed by the EU, Norway, Iceland and
Lichtenstein and assures four freedoms of movement in: manufacturing goods
(agricultural trade is excluded), services, capital and people. Norway, Iceland and
Lichtenstein have the right to participate in the formulation of European Community
legislation, but not the right to a voice in the decision-making process, which is reserved
exclusively for the Member States. Because the countries are very closely linked to the
EU, some of their national legislation is taken over by the EC rules (particularly issues
pertaining to trade and movement of people and businesses, but also company law) and
their laws, especially those regarding economic activity, are harmonised with the EU.
Integration of this type can be used as an example of how an ideal EU-SEE
integration may look like, even if some of the ex-Yugoslav countries choose not to become
EU members in the future. Ideal intra-SEE integration may aim at achieving a similar
model in the future but assuring more symmetry in the decision making process4.
1.3. Effects of forming an FTA
When considering welfare changes that may follow the formation of a free trade
area, economists usually distinguish the following effects:
• Trade creation, when – after lifting customs duties – cheaper imports replace
more expensive domestic production and/or exports are boosted, as
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4 However, also taking into account future integration with the EU, it seems rational to believe that intra-SEE
integration will be largely determined by the process of integration with the EU. Among the ideas that have
been discussed, at least among expert circles, the idea of SEE countries joining the EU-Turkey customs union
has been proposed (see e.g. Kernohan, 2006).
domestically manufactured goods become less expensive on a partner’s
market. This may be accompanied by so-called ‘trade expansion’, where falling
prices lead to higher demand.
• Trade diversion, when, due to the effects of trade liberalisation toward partner
countries, relative changes in external tariffs imply that more efficient
production from non-FTA countries becomes more expensive and is therefore
replaced by less cost-effective production from an FTA partner country.
• Trade deflection, which can arise when in the absence of effectively implemented
rules of origin the country with the lowest custom tariffs is likely to serve as an
entry point into its partner’s market (with higher tariffs) for the goods
originating in non-member countries.
The possibilities of the occurrence of these three effects in the BiH economy as a
result of regional trade integration are explored in section 4.3 of the report.
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This chapter reviews the experience of selected trade integration episodes
between the EU and its less developed neighbours and between emerging European
economies that may be relevant from the perspective of BiH’s FTAs and CEFTA 2006.
The focus is not on a detailed description of these arrangements, which one can easy
to find elsewhere, but rather on identification of key lessons and mechanisms that
determine the success or failure of particular regional trade integration initiatives.
2.1. The early years of Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA)
The elimination of tariffs for manufacturers in the first half of the 1990s within
the CEFTA had no significant immediate impact on bilateral trade flows. The
starting point – the beginning of the 1990s – was characterised by the collapse of
trade among CEFTA members. Trade shares were much lower than geographical
proximity and previously partially integrated production structures would suggest.
During the 1990s, after the creation of the CEFTA one could observe a gradual and
rather slow increase of intra-CEFTA trade shares in the case of Poland and
Slovenia. However, the trade shares of the other CEFTA partners showed a reverse
pattern. The most striking decline was registered in Slovakia and the Czech
Republic, mainly reflecting the disintegration of their markets that had been parts
of the same economy until end-1992 (see Figure 1). Hungary also diverted its trade
away from the other CEFTA members. Analysis of nominal trade flows leads to
similar conclusions. Although trade values for all countries in CEFTA (with the
exception of former Czechoslovakia) increased, these increases were not large and
fell short of expectations at that time (see Annex 1).
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2. Lessons to be learnt from other
existing and past FTAs in Europe
and close neighbourhood:
determinants of success and failure 
In general, trade flows among the early CEFTA members started to grow
intensively in the 2000s, with the early CEFTA members starting to gain higher shares
of each others’ trade (see  and Annex 1).
What was happening in the 1990s was that all these countries started to trade very
intensively with the EU and with other developed economies (the opening of EU
markets for non-agricultural products played a role in this), which is why the trade
shares of other CEFTA members were almost stagnant or even declining at the time.
The increase in trade with more developed economies was much more dynamic than
intra-CEFTA flows5.
What were the reasons for this? First of all, they were connected with the external
situation. The dissolution of the COMECON market, coupled with the fall in domestic
production and initial lowering of trade barriers with the EU, the CEFTA and WTO
members, were enough to make trade with ‘troubled’ neighbours unattractive and to
re-direct trade towards (newly opened for CEECs) developed markets.
It is worth considering the domestic supply capacities of the countries that formed
the CEFTA in the early to mid-1990s. These economies were recovering after deep
transformational recessions and had only just begun to restructure. Although they
were able to compete on each others’ markets in price terms they could not compete
in terms of quality or technological-intensity of traded goods vis-à-vis the EU or other
developed markets’ products. The majority of trade between CEFTA and EU countries
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Source: Own calculations based on IMF DOTS database.
Figure 1. Intra-CEFTA trade as a share of total trade of early CEFTA members, 1993-2005
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5 And much more important to changes in the structure of production for the CEFTA members.
was based on relative factor endowment, in accordance with neo-classical Heckscher-
Ohlin theory. Similar factor endowments and the low development level limited the
scope for expanding intra-industry trade between CEFTA members quite severely.
However, once the GDPs of the CEFTA partners and their production capacities
increased, these countries started to trade more intensively among themselves
(around 2000, see Fugure 1 and Annex 1). In the case of the Czech Republic and
Slovakia, another difficult moment came after 1997, as a consequence of the Czech
currency crisis and the slowdown in the real sphere.
What lessons can one draw from this to use with regard to countries such as
Bosnia and Herzegovina? Lesson number one is that trade values reflect the effects
of complex interactions of domestic and neighbouring market conditions and trade
liberalisation. A lowering of trade barriers among relatively poor partners may
result in little immediate gains (no chances for modern intra-industry trade).
However, once this is coupled with the overall opening of an economy and
domestic reforms building conditions for sustained economic growth, medium-
term welfare gains can be substantial.
Another important observation is that the effects of the early years of CEFTA’s
functioning were not limited to trade in goods. The regional trade agreement brought
other indirect gains as early as the 1990s. For example, it facilitated inflows of foreign
direct investment (FDI) from developed economies (Dangerfield, 2004). These FDIs
have had many positive effects in terms of increasing production and modernisation
of technologies in the CEECs. In the case of smaller countries, like Hungary or the
Czech Republic, FDI has been primarily export-oriented with foreign investors often
targeting the regional CEE markets. With a free trade area in place, producers have
been able to serve all CEE markets from a single location. Damijan et al. (2006)
document the importance of structural reforms and FDIs that - combined with
improved market access – are a major factor explaining the remarkable export
performance of CEECs. Moreover, the existence of the CEFTA allowed for the
development of vertical production chains, with plants located in different CEE
countries. The development of the automotive industry in the region is a good
example. These investments were behind the boost in intra-CEE trade in the 2000s.
Another example of positive indirect effects of the CEFTA is of a political nature. The
CEFTA’s functioning has allowed its signatories to gain experience in multilateral decision
making. This experience could later be used during the EU accession process and in
subsequent participation in EU institutions (Dangerfield, 2004) – even though CEFTA
countries did not co-operate much between themselves in the EU accession process.
Another important lesson is related to the fact that the original CEFTA agreement
excluded agricultural trade. Agricultural production had a large share of the partner
countries’ GDPs at the end of the 1980s and it therefore appears that CEFTA could
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have played a much more important role if agricultural markets had been liberalised
at an early stage and not only in 2004, when the four initial signatories of the CEFTA
joined the EU6. 
2.2. Selected examples of EU FTAs with neighbouring countries:
Morocco and Egypt
The recent decade or so has seen a proliferation of free trade agreements
throughout the world, with the EU playing a particularly active role in this process.
The EU’s interest in promoting FTAs (including those in the SEE region) have
stemmed from a combination of economic and political factors including attempts to
ensure stability and peace, support for democratic and market reforms, deepening of
trade and investment liberalisation in partner countries and accessing new markets
(Francois et al, 2005). There are clearly several advantages for EU partner countries
in signing FTAs with the EU, including preferential access to the EU market and
prospects of increased EU aid. 
The experience of some of these FTAs may be relevant for BiH in that the
mechanisms making particular FTAs more or less advantageous, or perhaps
disadvantageous, for partners are similar across various agreements. Therefore, below
we briefly review two examples of FTAs between the EU and Morocco and Egypt7.
While discussing the expected effects from any form of trade integration, such as
an FTA, it is important to take into account the difference between its ideal version
(full liberalisation) and a more typical version where only some sectors (e.g.
manufacturing goods) are covered8. The difference between the two can be substantial
and in particular the coverage of an FTA can be decisive in terms of the advantages
and disadvantages it affords less developed EU partners. Generally speaking, for a
country possessing comparative advantage in food and agricultural production and
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6 Apparently, none of the similar agreements in Europe in the 1990s covered trade in agricultural goods. It is
likely that a comprehensive approach to agricultural liberalisation is a key factor in determining the shape of
particular agreements.
7 The EU's policy towards the Mediterranean region, including Morocco and Egypt, is governed by the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership launched at the 1995 Barcelona summit between the EU and 10 Mediterranean
countries. The so-called “Barcelona Process” involves extending free trade across the Mediterranean region
through a network of bilateral agreements between the EU and individual Mediterranean partners, together
with free trade agreements between the partners themselves, with the objective of eventually creating a Euro-
Mediterranean Free Trade Area by 2010. Morocco and Egypt actively participate in the process. The trade
liberalisation process is asymmetric, with the EU already offering tariff-free access for industrial products
(but not – more importantly from the perspective of some Mediterranean countries – agricultural products),
and the gradual opening of Mediterranean markets.
8 See also the description of typical EU FTAs in section 1.2 of this report.
other labour-intensive sectors, a typical EU FTA covering trade in non-agricultural
goods and including long transition periods for some of the “sensitive” labour-
intensive sectors may fall short of creating free trade9. 
Interestingly, assessment of the consequences of current and planned trade
liberalisation steps differs between Egypt and Morocco10. Morocco is typically considered
a potential success story, while the FTA with Egypt can be seen as a potential failure.
The implementation of typical “partial” FTAs is expected to lead to important
welfare gains for countries such as Morocco, which is expected to realise productivity
gains in labour-intensive sectors such as textiles and chemicals very quickly, once
access to the EU market is granted. Thus, even a partial EU-Morocco FTA can be
welfare improving for Morocco. Realisation of trade induced technical change is
believed to be important in determining the scope of gains (also in social terms – e.g.
the impact on poverty). Without this mechanism, the welfare impact, while positive,
is expected to be rather small (Evans et al, 2006).
A possible problem with the EU-Egypt FTA is that it envisages for Egypt faster
elimination of tariffs on capital goods and intermediates, areas that were initially less
protected anyway, and a far more gradual removal of protection of domestic
production of consumer goods. Thus, Egyptian domestic price distortions during the
transitory period can lead to inadequate preparations for competition with EU
producers once the FTA is fully implemented (Francois et al, 2005). Furthermore, the
tariff structure towards third countries matters quite substantially. In Egypt, high
levels of protection from competition from third countries risks substantial trade
diversion during the implementation of the FTA with the EU (in Morocco this risk is
much smaller). For these reasons, Evans et al (2006), Francois et al (2005) and several
other studies conclude that a partial FTA can be welfare reducing for Egypt (while
having an overall negligible impact on the EU). 
Negative consequences for Egypt can be mitigated by liberalisation of trade with
third countries (to avoid trade diversion) and a deepening of integration with the EU
(to include the agricultural sector, provisions for services and other mechanisms
facilitating trade).
The lessons from these examples are that the impact of FTAs depends crucially on
the overall environment in which it is implemented. The coverage of an FTA, the level of
protection towards third countries (and thus the risk of trade diversion), and the
inclusion of mechanisms that can motivate productivity-enhancing domestic reforms
(little advanced in most of the North African countries) are among the key determinants
of the overall impact of particular bilateral or regional trade liberalisation initiatives.
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9 See Jakubiak and Paczynski (2007) for more detailed discussion. 
10 Much more detailed information on up to date developments in the Barcelona process is available at:
http://www.femise.org/Pub-indic/index.html
2.3. Effects of other FTAs in South East Europe
A difficult assessment
Analysis of the functioning of other FTAs in the SEE region is scarce. This may
not be overly surprising given the objective difficulties in carrying out such
assessments. Firstly, the agreements are relatively new and there is simply too little
hard evidence on the period after the implementation of FTAs to analyse their
functioning in more detail. Secondly, some effects may simply fail to materialise since
two large countries (Romania and Bulgaria) joined the EU in January 2007. For them
the impact of the FTAs is probably less relevant and more difficult to disentangle from
the impact of the pre- and post-accession period. Other countries in the region signed
a new multilateral agreement (CEFTA 2006) in December 2006, which will replace
the current network of FTAs from mid-2007. Thus, the full effects of regional trade
liberalisation that started with FTAs will probably only materialise in CEFTA 2006. 
Another issue making the analysis quite complicated is that bilateral FTAs are very
different with respect to the scale of trade between the signatories. Registered trade
between some pairs of countries has been negligible, to the tune of 1 million euro (and
only a few 6-digit HS product lines), while some other pairs of countries are very
important trade partners with the value of their annual exchange measured in
hundreds of millions of euros (and hundreds of 6-digit HS product lines). For example,
Moldova trades heavily with Romania, but has negligible trade flows with all other FTA
partner countries. Albanian exports are concentrated on Italy (70% of the total) and
Greece (10%) and exports to the whole group of FTA partners are very small. 
Furthermore, it is difficult to establish benchmarks against which an assessment
of FTAs can be made, given the turbulent recent economic and political histories of
the countries in question (e.g. security crises in Macedonia in 2001, the still
unresolved status of Kosovo, occasional political tensions in BiH) and differences in
their relations (including trade relations) with the EU. An example is provided by the
de facto economic partitioning of Serbia and Montenegro, eventually leading to the
formation of independent countries in the course of 2006. Last but not least is that the
quality of regional trade statistics is far from adequate.
The coverage of FTAs in SEE
The first step in assessing FTA’s functioning is provided by analysis of their
coverage. This exercise is already far from being simple, as illustrated by the work of
Messerlin and Miroudot (2004). Selected findings from their analysis can be
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summarised as follows. Firstly, the coverage of FTAs justifies thinking about the
network as creating a system close to a de facto free trade area in industrial goods. In
contrast, the abolition of tariff barriers in the agricultural sector has proved much
more difficult to accept for (some) parties, as evidenced by the varying and not always
sufficient (to meet formal coverage criteria set in the 2001 Memorandum of
Understanding) level of coverage of agricultural and food trade. Another interesting
observation is that FTAs appear to have quite extensive safeguard provisions, as
measured by how much space is devoted to these issues in the texts of the agreements.
FTAs monitoring
The monitoring of FTA implementation issues has been carried out by the Stability
Pact Trade Working Group, which issues regular “Progress Reports”. However, these
reports have had a natural tendency to concentrate on formal and more general issues
and are thus of limited value for an assessment of specific FTAs. For example, the
reports have regularly expressed concerns over BiH’s unilateral actions in suspending
parts of its FTA with Serbia and Montenegro, because the rules agreed in the FTAs
had not been followed (safeguard procedures were not applied). 
Intra-SEE trade
A key question in assessing the effects of FTAs is the extent to which the
agreements may have helped create trade between the countries involved. It is
therefore useful to analyse the intensity of trade in the region. Annex 2 and Figure 2
show some data on intra-regional exports of the 8 countries involved11. Three
countries stand out with a very high share of intra-regional trade – in the case of BiH,
Serbia and Montenegro and Macedonia exports to the region account for over 30% of
total exports. For Croatia, the share is below but close to 20%, although lack of data
on Croatian exports to Serbia and Montenegro makes direct comparison difficult.
Bulgaria and Moldova both send around 10% of their exports to the region – in the
case of Moldova almost all of this is accounted for by exports to Romania. Romania
and Albania have the lowest shares, well below 10%. It is evident that trade among
ex-Yugoslav countries (and within the group consisting of Romania and Moldova) is
much stronger than among other countries. This confirms the importance of historical
developments underpinning economic relations. Uvalic (2005) documents strong
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11 Serbia and Montenegro ceased to exist in 2006 with the announcement of Montenegro’s independence.
However, no sufficient historical foreign trade data exist separately for Serbia and Montenegro. Also, the
availability of trade flows with Kosovo does not allow presentation of a similar trade matrix – Kosovo’s trade
is not included in Serbia and Montenegro data.
trade integration within Yugoslavia in the 1980s and relatively weak trade relations
between the then-Yugoslav republics on the one hand and Romania, Bulgaria, and
Albania on the other.
The importance of imports from the region in overall imports is significantly lower
than in the case of exports. This is because several countries in the region, and
particularly BiH, Serbia and Montenegro and Macedonia, are characterised by very large
trade deficits with imports (from the EU and other markets) far exceeding exports12.
Is trade boosted?
From the perspective of this report, a key question is whether the intensity of
intra-regional trade before the implementation of FTAs was close to ‘potential’
and whether FTAs implementation coincided with any significant changes in
trade patterns. Some sources (e.g. Commission, 2003; World Bank, 2005) claimed
that the importance of intra-regional trade was very small during 2001-2002. Also,
some documents of the Stability Pact Trade Working Group observed that “trade
flows among the countries of the region are low” (Trade Working Group, 2005).
However, it appears that such opinions have been drawn from analysis based on
incomplete data or on not fully justified generalizations. Indeed, export shares
presented above confirm that already by 1999-2001 intra-regional trade was quite
important for the ex-Yugoslav countries, and to somewhat lesser extent also for
Bulgaria and Moldova.
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12 This also makes them similar to the early CEFTA signatories in the 1990s.
Source: Own calculations based on IMF DOTS. BiH – Serbia & Montenegro trade flows were taken from BiH
Central Bank database, Serbia & Montenegro trade flows with Croatia, Macedonia were taken from Central
Bank of Serbia (2002-2005 data) and Christie (2002) – 1999 data.
Figure 2. Share of SEE8 region in total exports, 1999-2005 (%)
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The question whether FTAs have had an impact on trade flows between
signatories is far from trivial. Most FTAs entered into force during 2003-2004.
Subsequent period (2004-2005) witnessed a relative increase in bilateral trade (i.e.
increase in trade shares) between Bulgaria and Romania. However, this cannot be
attributed to the FTA, but rather to processes related to the upcoming EU accession
(both countries liberalised bilateral trade already in late 1990s). Similarly, a slight
increase in the share of Moldovan exports directed to Romanian market in 2003-
2005 cannot be attributed to the FTA, which was in operation since 1994. It was
rather the effect of the rebound of Moldovan economy (after a prolonged recession
throughout most of the 1990s). In contrast, increasing share of Bulgarian exports
going to Croatia (and to a lesser extent – Croatian exports to Bulgaria) coincided
with implementation of the FTA. One could also notice a relative increase in
Albanian exports to Serbia and Montenegro (from 2-3% share in total Albanian
exports during 2000-2003 to 5% in 2004-2005), coinciding with implementation of
an FTA, although the increase was from a very low base.
The analysis of Serbia and Montenegro trade flows is particularly difficult not
only because of the low quality of available trade data, but because very volatile past
patterns of trade were to a large extent determined by developments in international
political scene with Serbia and Montenegro trade diverted from ‘natural’ trade
partners (as determined by geography and economics) to ‘friendly’ trade partners as
determined e.g. by attitudes to economic sanctions (see also Christie, 2002).
Consequently, trade patterns from 1990s cannot be considered as being anywhere
close to normal or equilibrium levels and some reorientation from partners with then-
high shares in trade towards other countries (e.g. Croatia, EU) should have been
expected anyway, irrespective of the FTA process.
A few countries have minimally increased the share of their exports to BiH market
during 2004-2005, albeit often from very low base (Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia,
Romania). The value of Serbia and Montenegro exports to BiH have roughly doubled
between 2002-2003 and 2004-2005, and Croatia also saw a significant increase in
exports to BiH, although in this last case the market share of BiH in total exports
stayed roughly unchanged during 2002-2005. BiH increased the share of exports
going to Croatia and Romania, while the dynamics of registered exports to Serbia and
Montenegro was slightly lower than growth rate of total exports resulting in a
reduction of Serbia and Montenegro share in total BiH exports. A more detailed
analysis of BiH trade flows is carried in section 3.4.
Gaucaite Wittich (2005) carry an analysis of relative factor endowments of SEE
countries to conclude that similarity of the majority of SEE countries with respect
to these endowments and small differences in technology levels make the potential
for a significant boost in intra-regional trade rather limited (see also Figure 3).
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However, economies of scale and product differentiation could provide a basis for
increased trade flows at a later date provided that good conditions are crated for
regional trade integration13.
Generally, the creation of the network of FTAs is perceived as a success by most
sources. World Bank (2005) finds no evidence of any increase in non-tariff trade
barriers following abolition of tariffs. This confirms the view that effective barriers to
trade decreased. However, there appears to be a broad consensus (also among the
involved countries) that substantial further effort is needed to remove existing non-
tariff barriers and facilitate trade. Also, that replacement of the network of FTAs with
a single regional agreement could simplify the trade regime and thus have chances to
positively affect trade14. This last point is certainly only relevant if the CEFTA 2006
goes significantly beyond a combination of all bilateral agreements and exemptions to
them as annexes to the new CEFTA agreement. 
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13 Then these flows will most likely include significant share of intra-industry trade (two way trade in similar
products). This view is consistent with the “new trade theory” initiated by Helpman (1981) and Krugman
(1979) claiming that factor endowments similarities, technologies plus product differentiation and scale
economies facilitate development of intra-industry trade between developed countries.
14 For example, through the diagonal cumulation of origin across all CEFTA signatories.
Source: Excerpted from Gaucaite Wittich (2005), p. 13.
Figure 3. Share of intra-SEE trade in total SEE imports, by commodity, 2004 (%)
Conclusions
Perhaps one cannot expect too dynamic increase in intra-SEE flows following the
implementation of the network of the regional FTAs, at least not in a very short-term.
First of all, it is possible that similarity of the majority of SEE countries with respect
to factor endowments and small differences in technology levels make the potential
for a significant boost in intra-regional trade rather limited. This is because in the
short- to medium-term one cannot expect any major boost in intra-industry trade, but
rather inter-industry trade based on relative factor endowments (described by the neo-
classical trade theory). Also, trade flows between some of the considered countries by
1999-2001 could have been already close to their potential levels15. Additionally, one
should note specific developments in Serbia and Montenegro, which saw its trade
flows in the 1990s much distorted and thus some reorientation away from (some) FTA
partners towards other countries (in particular the EU and Croatia) should have been
expected anyway, irrespective of the FTA process.
However, simple analysis of trade shares within the SEE region suggests that the
FTAs have been already successful in some cases. The implementation of FTAs
coincided with the intensification of trade between Bulgaria and Croatia, as well as
between Albania and Serbia and Montenegro. Besides, there is evidence suggesting
that the effective trade barriers indeed decreased in the region. Still, some examples
of increases in trade shares between countries in the region can be attributable also
(or almost exclusively) to other factors (e.g. Bulgaria-Romania, Moldova-Romania). 
When making conclusions about the effectiveness of the regional network of FTAs,
one should remember about several limitations. Agreements are relatively new and
there is simply too little hard evidence on the period after implementation of FTAs.
Two large countries will leave the network in 2007, making the analysis of effects of
FTAs and these countries’ becoming EU members impossible to disentangle. The scale
of trade flows differs largely among FTA partners, and it is difficult to find
benchmarks for comparison. Declared liberalisation of agricultural trade proved to be
too difficult, safeguard provisions in the FTAs are rather extensive, and some
countries opted for rising barriers without referring to these safeguard provisions,
especially in agricultural trade. Lastly, there are reservations connected with quality
of some data, which makes the overall assessment less reliable.
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15 Given their low levels of production (Serbia until 2000, Macedonia in 2001, Kosovo). Naturally, with non-
distorted production and higher GDPs, potential for bilateral trade would have been higher.
3.1. An overview of the BiH economy
Most of the recent economic developments in BiH were determined or exacerbated
by the 1992-1995 war, which had a devastating impact on the country’s people,
institutions and infrastructure. BiH went through a period of post-war rehabilitation
when basic infrastructure and social services underwent recovery, with substantial
international assistance. The war and its aftermath caused a delay in the process of
transition to a market economy, relative to other Central and East European countries
and as such some important economic reforms have not yet been completed. An
uncoordinated process of nation-building, that was reflected in a fragmented economic
space and the non-existence of key institutions for efficient economic management, has
proved to be an obstacle for the development of the BiH economy. 
The Dayton Accord created a unique administrative and governance structure in
BiH and its implementation has since been subject to numerous controversies. The
country consists of two entities (The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and
Republika Srpska), enjoying high levels of autonomy in creating and implementing
economic policies, while state-level government was initially assigned with very few
responsibilities16. Only recently have state-level institutions been strengthened and
some responsibilities shifted from the respective entities to the state. 
3.2. Evolution of BiH trade policy and future directions
Trade performance and issues related to trade policies have been among the most
important economic issues in recent years. Very large and persistent trade (and current
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3. The BiH economy, trade flows
and regional trade agreements
16 Apart from the two entities the small Brcko District also has a special status and was – and sometimes still is
– running its own policies in several fields. For the sake of simplicity we do not discuss issues pertaining to
Brcko in the remainder of this report.
account) deficits have been among the country’s key macroeconomic vulnerabilities. At
the same time, trade policy has been at the centre of serious internal political as well
as diplomatic misunderstandings and discussions. The conduct of foreign trade policy
has been heavily determined by the post-war state structure and fragmented
institutional set-up. Foreign trade policy has been one of the very few areas that is the
exclusive responsibility of the state. However, actual implementation has been
delegated to the entities’, with different institutional structures and non-harmonised
practices and entity legislation. Under such circumstances it has been very difficult to
conduct a unified and consistent foreign trade policy. Until 1999 the Federation of BiH
had a free trade agreement with Croatia, while Republika Srpska had a similar
agreement with Serbia and Montenegro. This was quite an unusual arrangement, with
the two constituent parts (entities) within the same customs territory trading under
different trade regimes with neighbouring countries. This was possible due to the fact
that BiH’s economic space was practically split along the entity borderlines and the
entities were strongly integrated with their respective neighbouring economies. 
The Law on Foreign Trade Policy (FT Law) from 1997 established a relatively liberal
trade regime, which was not typical for countries at such a low development level. There
were three main reasons for such an approach at that time: (1) domestic production and
production capacity were very low immediately after the war and protection of any
industry could not be justified at the time, (2) very large donor assistance (amounting to
USD 5.1 billion from 1996 to 2001) was expected and customs tariffs would have
reduced the effects of such assistance, (3) administrative capacity, e.g. related to border
controls and public finances, were in poor conditions, meaning that customs-related
revenues were not properly collected, monitored or allocated.
The FT Law established no quantitative trade restrictions. Prohibitions or
restrictions on international trade may be put in place only in extraordinary
circumstance in order to protect or preserve public policy or public security, health
and human lives, animals or plants, historical or archaeological treasures, or industrial
commercial property. There is a rather short list of products (weapon, medicines,
poisons) subject to export licensing, which is in line with international practice.
Foreign Trade Institutions
The building of post-war government structures has caused a proliferation of
entity-level legislation, institutions and practices that have largely disregarded the
need for co-ordination in entity–state or inter-entity relations. As a result, the existing
foreign trade regime has some peculiar features. Foreign trade laws and regulations
are passed by the state, but implemented by the entities, without clear monitoring of
compliance. Until recently both entities had customs administrations collecting
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customs duties, which went to each respective entities’ budgets, leading to enormous
losses of public revenues and widespread smuggling and under-valuation in customs
declarations (ADE, 2003). The State Border Service was created in 2000 and effective
control of around one hundred border crossings was established only in 2004, when
BiH’s customs territory became much better protected and monitored. 
Unification of the customs administration in 2004 was an important step in the
process of building a system for more coherent implementation of trade policies.
Under the earlier arrangement neither entities’ customs administration applied trade
or customs regulation in a harmonised way, which not only resulted in inefficient
collection of budget revenues but also led to distortions in trade flows. Merging the
customs authorities of the two entities into the Indirect Taxation Authority (ITA)
substantially improved conditions for foreign trade by reducing the number of
customs clearing houses, rigorous selection of staff, introduction of single standards
for imports and exports, etc. Since the creation of the ITA, customs revenues have
increased significantly together with a reduction in customs’ services staff.
Institutions and legislation (technical regulations, conformity assessment,
sanitary and phytosanitary, veterinary issues) for efficient international trade of goods
are generally not sufficiently well developed. Their functioning has been problematic
for many years and they have been considered important obstacles in improving
quality controls of imported goods and serious obstacles for expanding exports.
Protracted internal discussions on how to organise these institutions and how to split
competencies between the central state and two entities have been going on for some
time. The perspective of negotiations with the EU on the Stabilisation and Association
Agreement has helped to work out compromises and accelerate work on the creation
of these institutions and drafting appropriate legislation. 
Technical regulations and standards are still mostly based on ex-Yugoslavia
regulations while new regulations based on the relevant EU directives are expected to
be gradually adopted in the coming years. The Ministry of Foreign Trade and
Economic Relations (MoFTER) has been authorised to lead the process on
transposition of EU legislation. However, the MoFTER’s technical capacity is rather
limited and coordination with other institutions is not always adequate, and as such
the whole process is still at an early stage.
At present, there are four separate institutions for standardisation and conformity
assessment: the Institute for Accreditation, the Institute for Standardisation, the
Institute for Metrology and the Institute for Intellectual Property. The Institute for
Accreditation was created in 2000 and was endowed with relatively strong capacity,
but the other three institutes have been created more recently (by splitting the former
Institute for Standardisation, Metrology and Intellectual Property) and at the time of
writing this report still did not have sufficient resources (staff, equipment) or expertise
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needed for normal operations. These institutions are to receive extensive technical
assistance (mostly from the EU) in order to increase their capacity to support BiH’s
external trade.
Since 2002 there has been important progress on veterinary issues and the BiH
Veterinary Office has become fully functional (including border veterinary inspections).
The 2002 Veterinary Law provides clear regulations governing imports and exports of
live animals. These are generally allowed only from facilities approved by EU
institutions. However, BiH still can not export animal products to the EU market, due
to the lack of veterinary control facilities dealing with exports that satisfy EU standards.
Phytosanitary and food quality issues are regulated in two separate laws, which
were adopted in 2003 and 2004. These laws assign authorities in these areas to the
respective agencies at the state level, but these agencies are still at an early stage of
creation and will need more time to become fully operational.
Legislative Process
The BiH Parliament has exclusive authority to pass legislation on foreign trade
policy and the Council of Ministers passes the ensuing decisions and regulations
required for implementation of the Law on Foreign Trade Policy. However, the
implementation of these laws is the responsibility of the entity governments (i.e. below
the national level). The MoFTER is assigned to coordinate and supervise
implementation of the Law on Foreign Trade and other international trade affairs.
Previously the entities themselves had passed their own legislation and
regulations and established their own implementing institutions, but recent years
have witnessed some unification in this sphere. Setting tariff rates in the Customs
Tariff Law is also a responsibility of the state authorities, i.e. the MoFTER, but the
Governing Board of ITA needs to approve it before submission to the BiH Parliament.
The Governing Board comprises ministers of finance from both entities who can veto
these drafts. Such powers result from a political arrangement to shift authority on
indirect taxes (VAT, custom duties, excises) from the entities to the state level. 
International trade agreements are being negotiated in close cooperation between
the BiH Presidency and the BiH Council of Ministers, with a high level of transparency
in the process. Final authorisation is assigned to the BiH Parliament.
Tariffs and Related Charges
BiH’s customs tariff is regulated by the Customs Tariff Law. Its aims are protection
of the local economy, generation of budget revenues and creation of preconditions for
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development. The HS-based tariff is relatively simple with a scale of four different ad
valorem duties: 0, 5, 10 and 15 percent with relatively modest dispersion. In 2002, the
average MFN applied tariff rate was the lowest in the SEE region – a total of 6%,
agriculture 5% and industry 6.2% (World Bank, 2005). However, analysis of the
Customs Tariff Code reveals that surcharges for some agriculture products (HS chapters
1-24) are very high and are paid as specific rates (per kg). Consequently, in some
instances compound customs tariff rates exceed even 100% of the ad valorem value,
which can be considered a protective measure for local agriculture production17. A
customs registration fee (1% ad valorem) is levied on all imported goods regardless of
country of origin and these revenues are supposed to finance customs administration.
Certain imported goods (tobacco, alcohol, fuel, beverages) are subject to excise
taxes, which are identical to excises for locally produced goods, meaning that imported
goods are not discriminated against. In the past, there were some problems related to
excise taxes, which distorted domestic production and favoured imported goods.
Trade integration negotiations
Any future foreign trade regime will be partly determined by the outcomes of two
ongoing and one recently completed trade negotiations processes related to accession
to the World Trade Organisation (WTO), conclusion of the Stabilisation and
Association Agreement with the EU (SAA), and the creation of the free trade area in
the South East Europe (SEE) region – CEFTA 2006. The three processes started at
different points of time but are currently interrelated in many aspects.
Accession to the WTO
The process of accession to the WTO has been quite slow, as much attention has
been given to regional trade liberalisation. While it would appear that WTO accession
has been given the appropriate political support and has not been questioned by the
major political stakeholders, it was not really very high on the political agenda. The
process started in 1999. In the same year BiH was granted an observer status in the
organisation. It took next three years before BiH submitted its Memorandum on
Foreign Trade Regime as a basis for negotiations to the Working Party (WP). The first
and second rounds of formal negotiations were held in 2003 and 2004, and the third
session is still pending. WTO negotiation are proving to be somewhat complicated by
the future possible accession of BiH to the EU, as BiH needs to get clearance for its
negotiation offer from the European Commission before starting negotiations with the
WTO WP. BiH’s initial WTO offer included far reaching provisions on liberalising
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17 Milk, meat and meat products (after BH Custom Tariff Code and MFTEO).
agricultural and services trade. The EC asked BiH to reduce them, because they were
seen as being beyond the EU provisions18. Future membership in the WTO will have
a limited impact on the BiH trade regime since a large majority of BiH foreign trade
is liberalised through other regional and EU trade deals. However, WTO membership
will provide access to some important WTO institutional instruments, such as the
dispute settlement mechanism, and will facilitate access to other markets.
The Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU
After the European Commission approved progress on fulfilment of the conditions
of the Feasibility Study in late 2005, BiH started Stabilisation and Association
Agreement (SAA) negotiations. Trade negotiations are one of the key areas of interest
for both sides, although at present the most difficult negotiation fields are not related
to trade issues. These negotiations are of enormous importance for future potential EU
accession and BiH officials consider the SAA process as a top priority. Negotiations for
Title IV started in March 2006. As BiH goods already enjoy a liberalised (customs free)
regime in the EU market, negotiations are focused on the terms and conditions of
future trade between BiH and the EU as well as BiH’s tariff concessions for EU goods
imported to BiH. In the framework of a future SAA, BiH would gradually grant
customs free access to almost all trade in industrial goods with the EU. 
For industrial products, transitional periods for different product groups are
being negotiated. For the agricultural sector, given its greater sensitivity in almost
every country, negotiations are slightly different. In SAA negotiations, this group is
divided into three sub-groups: basic agricultural products, processed agricultural
products and fish and fishery products. Unlike in the case of industrial products,
dynamics as well as the level of liberalisation are being negotiated. 
An important aspect of trade liberalisation with the EU concerns non-tariff
barriers for BiH exports. Lack of conformity assessment capacities with legally
binding technical requirements on product safety in BiH may pose a serious obstacle
for BiH exports to the EU. In other words, despite a zero duty regime BiH would face
major obstacles to its exports. Therefore, capacity building of relevant institutions is
essential for facilitating stronger BiH export.
CEFTA negotiations – a single regional free trade agreement
The formal initiative for negotiations on a single multilateral free trade
agreement started in April 2006, when the prime ministers of SEE countries
(Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Moldova,
Romania, Serbia and Montenegro) plus representatives of UNMIK/Kosovo, the
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18 And once BiH joins the EU, the Commission would be obliged to compensate for the difference.
European Commission and Stability Pact, adopted a Joint Declaration on launching
negotiations19. This stemmed from considerations on the need to ensure greater
harmonisation of the network of 32 bilateral FTAs.
After the parties had decided to proceed through joining and amending the existing
CEFTA, new areas were included: investments, services, government procurement and
intellectual property rights. The new agreement was to cover existing bilateral
concessions for goods with additional concessions to be negotiated. In order to
improve trade in the region, specific attention is being paid to creating effective
procedures to remove the various trade obstacles, such as technical barriers to trade. 
The primary declared goal of CEFTA 2006 is to improve trade conditions (in the
sense of trade coverage, removal of non-tariff barriers, transparency of rules and
regulations, etc.), increase market size for potential investors, the introduction of the so-
called ‘diagonal cumulation of origin’ among contracting parties and sub-cumulation of
origin with the EU. An efficient dispute settlement mechanism is another feature that
should provide easier implementation relative to the situation currently in bilateral FTAs. 
BiH expressed its readiness to complete these negotiations by the end of 2006
(when other parties also planned conclusion of talks), but declared at the same time
that various important issues would also need to be resolved. In particular, BiH
demanded that annexes with Croatia and Serbia concerning trade in agricultural
products (milk, diary products, meat and meat products) effectively introducing some
trade barriers in these sectors for imports to BiH, become an integral part of the new
CEFTA agreement. On 9 November 2006, following several rounds of negotiations,
CEFTA 2006 was initiated by 8 partners (Albania, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatia, Moldova, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, and UNMIK/Kosovo). BiH and Serbia were not satisfied with the
outcome of the negotiations and did not sign the joint declaration, but retained the
right to join at a later date. BiH has retained reservations on the rules for trade in
agricultural goods with Croatia and Serbia.
Subsequently, Serbia stated its readiness to drop its reservations and sign the
Agreement. BiH remained the only country declaring it would stay outside the new
CEFTA unless it reaches a satisfactory compromise. The final week before the singing
ceremony was extremely tense with intensive negotiations at various levels eventually
leading to a last minute deal. The compromise can be summarised as follows: BiH
resigned from its protective measures for selected agricultural products in return for
ensuring that the Articles of CEFTA 2006 allow special safeguard measures enabling
the introduction of protective measures (especially in agriculture) in the event of any
significant market disturbance caused by excessive imports from another party. 
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19 Up-to-date information and documents related to the negotiation process can be found at http://www.stabilitypact.org/
The agreement on CEFTA 2006 was signed in Bucharest on 19 December 2006
and is scheduled to enter into force in May 2007, provided the ratification process is
completed earlier. The new agreement, which built upon the experience of already
functioning FTAs, indeed appears to be an improvement over the network of bilateral
FTAs, with modernisation of several instruments and inclusion of the new ones. It
remains to be seen whether CEFTA 2006 will be truly efficiently implemented.
3.3. Description of existing FTAs and their coverage
The 2001 Stability Pact Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on liberalisation
of trade initiated conclusion of a series of bilateral agreements among the SEE
countries (Albania, BiH, Bulgaria, Croatia, The Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, and more recently also
UNMIK/Kosovo). The MoU imposed three requirements: 
• That all quantitative restrictions and measures be abolished
• That import duties be eliminated on 90% of bilateral trade with a double
criterion: 90% of HS tariff lines and 90% of trade value
• That liberalisation covers the majority of goods upon entry into force and that
transition periods should not exceed 6 years
BiH reached FTA agreements with all SEE countries as the first in the group and
later also concluded a similar FTA with Turkey. BiH was able to secure asymmetrical
treatment in implementation of the FTAs with Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro and
Macedonia, where BiH exports to these countries were immediately granted tariff-
free access, while tariffs on imported goods were gradually reduced over 4 to 5 year
periods. Only agreements with Albania and Moldova were symmetrical, since these
two countries were at a similar development level and trade volumes with BiH were
very low. FTAs with Albania, Bulgaria and Romania were limited to only industrial
products and did not cover agriculture products, meaning these agreements did not
conform to the 90% trade coverage rules. 
Still, BiH stands out among SEE countries in its serious attempts to opt for FTAs
with wide product coverage. Out of only 8 FTAs fulfilling both the 90% trade coverage
criteria from the MoU, BiH concluded four such FTAs (with Croatia, Macedonia,
Moldova and Serbia and Montenegro). Only two FTAs (with Macedonia and Moldova)
did not foresee future liberalisation of trade in services, while other countries agreed
to liberalise trade in services in line with WTO rules and Romania opted to implement
EU rules as well. Details are given in Tables 1 and 2.
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Note: X – BiH exports; M – BiH imports.
* – with some exceptions (fuels, gum) liberalised at later date
** – with some exceptions (milk, cheese, oil, some carton and paper products) liberalised at later date
*** – tariffs phased out for industrial goods only
Source: Messerlin and Miroudot (2003) and MoFTER (www.mvteo.gov.ba).
Table 1. Selected characteristics of BiH FTAs, 2001-2006
Coverage
Pace of liberalisation
(Art. 1.2.3)
Quantity Restrictions
(Art. 1.2.1)
Start
of
liberalisation
Country Percentage
of liberalised
HS lines (%)
Percentage
of liberalised HS
lines on the day
of entry
into force (%)
End of
transition
period
Number
of lines
with QR
Date of
cancellation
M 100 25.6 1.1.2004 - -
2001 Croatia
X 100 100
Entry into
force
(start date)
- -
M 100 25.6 1.1.2004 18 Not spec.
2002
Serbia&
Montenegro X 100 99.9
Entry into
force* - -
M 100 25.6 1.1.2005 - -
2002 Macedonia
X 100 99.9
Entry into
force** 2 31.2.2003
M 91.8 27.1 1.1.2005 - -
2003 Romania***
X 88.7 88.7
Entry into
force
- -
M 91.5 27.2 1.1.2005 - -
2003 Bulgaria***
X 88.9 88.9
Entry into
force - -
M 100 88.6 1.1.2008 - -
2003 Albania
X 100 4.7 1.1.2008 - -
M 100 26.2 1.1.2006 - -
2003 Moldova
X 100 44.9 1.1.2006 - -
Note: X – BiH exports; M – BiH imports.
Source: Messerlin and Miroudot (2003).
Table 2. Trade coverage in the agricultural and manufacturing sectors of BiH FTAs
Share of HS tariff lines freed (%)
All products
Agriculture
HS Chapters 1-24
Manufacturing
HS Chapters 25-97
M 91.0 51.4 99.5
Albania
X 93.0 38.8 99.7
M 91.5 42.0 99.5
Bulgaria
X 88.9 24.6 99.3
M 100.0 100.0 100.0
Croatia
X 100.0 100.0 100.0
M 100.0 100.0 100.0
Macedonia
X 100.0 100.0 100.0
M 100.0 100.0 100.0
Moldova
X 100.0 100.0 100.0
M 91.8 42.3 99.6
Romania
X 88.7 28.4 98.5
M 100.0 100.0 100.0Serbia
and Montenegro X 100.0 100.0 100.0
The process of negotiations on bilateral FTAs by several SEE countries was not
very efficient and took much longer than had been initially foreseen. The final results
were not fully in line with the MoU, since many countries were not ready for full
liberalisation of trade. The outcome of the whole process – a series of bilateral
agreements with different levels of liberalisation – can be described as a “quasi-free
trade area” for industrial products. By contrast, agriculture still faces many trade
barriers (only 6 out of 23 FTAs introduce free-trade in this sector) with a great variety
of instruments for granting preferences.
The MoU specified several rules on contingent protection, public procurement,
competition, services and TRIPS. It used references to WTO agreements and to EU
regulations (rules of origin and sanitary and phytosanitary standards). In most cases
BiH’s FTAs include these references, but in principle these issues have not been
tackled with much accuracy and solutions have often been vague, leading to problems
in implementation. Lack of properly designed dispute settlement mechanisms in the
FTAs have also added to the difficulties the parties were facing while trying to solve
their disputes, in some instances leading to unilateral decisions.
An example of such unilateral action relevant for BiH occurred when the country
said imports of selected agriculture products from neighbouring countries were
excessive and the Council of Ministers decided to introduce the following measures
suspending some elements of the FTAs:
• introduction of a 40% MFN customs rate for milk, diary products, meat and meat
products from Croatia in March 2005; this measure was later changed to have
the same effect as measures against Serbia and Montenegro and has remained
in place (more recently only applying to Serbia),
• introduction of an ad valorem customs rate equal to export subsidies for meat,
meat products, milk, diary products, fruits, vegetables, flour, soya oil, wine and
alcohol from Serbia and Montenegro in March 2005; this measure was later
applied only on milk, diary products, meat and meat products (and only to
Serbia, after the process of separation of Serbia and Montenegro had started),
• Serbia complained about restrictions on meat exports to BiH since BiH insisted
that facilities for meat imports in BiH needed to be certified by the EU. Later
such strict conditions were changed and Serbia gained approval to continue
meat exports to BiH.
These measures have become a part of negotiations on the new CEFTA after BiH
insisted such limitations on imports become part of a multilateral agreement. The
compromise solution that was reached did not transfer these measures to parts of the
CEFTA 2006, while extending the safeguard provisions in the new agreement
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enabling the protection of the domestic market (in particular agricultural markets)
from disturbances related to imports from trade partners.
BiH also encountered other problems in the implementation of the FTAs:
• issues related to rules of origin have not been resolved and the FTAs have not
been properly amended in this respect,
• The FTAs required follow-up on mutual recognition of quality certificates, but
this has not yet been implemented,
• Free trade with Montenegro could not be established simultaneously with
Serbia and it took 15 months before Montenegro started to implement the
FTA on its territory
• The FTA with Serbia and Montenegro could not be applied to Kosovo customs
territory so BiH was not able to freely export to Kosovo.
3.4. BiH trade flows
BiH is relatively open to foreign trade if this is measured by the share of total
trade in GDP at over 80% (more recently close to 100%). In the past 10 years this was
primarily driven by import volumes. However, import growth rates have not been
particularly high in recent years (except in 2005, when massive advance imports of
goods occurred before the introduction of VAT), bearing in mind rising world prices
of fuel and the high import dependency of the BiH economy. Export levels have been
significantly lower than imports with a trade deficit of over 45% of GDP leading to a
persistently high current account deficit. However, after a period of decline in 2001
and 2002, export performance improved considerably in 2004-2006 on the back of
ongoing restructuring in certain sectors and foreign direct investment inflows. This
may also be partly associated with liberalised trade regime in the region and the EU.
Export growth is likely to continue since large investment projects, particularly in the
metal industry (steel and aluminium) are underway and production levels in these
sectors are expected to substantially increase in the next 2 years (IMF, 2006; Causevic
and Domazet, 2006). The effect of the introduction of VAT made 2006 export figures
higher and not fully comparable with past data, partly because a shifting of
transaction reporting between the last quarter of 2005 and early 2006 and partly
because increased incentives to report exports.
The bulk of BiH foreign trade is realised with countries within a relatively small
geographical vicinity in accordance with a “standard geographical model” (a gravity
model of BiH trade is presented in section 4.2 of this report), similarly to what is
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observed in other emerging European economies. The most important trade partners
are neighbouring countries (Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro) and close-by EU
countries (Germany, Italy, Slovenia, Austria). BiH’s exports are in practice limited to
the EU market (over 55%) and the SEE region (close to 40%), i.e. the markets where
BiH goods enjoy preferential trade regime. Imports are somewhat more diversified as
the share of non-EU and non-SEE countries is around 20%. There are various
historical reasons, amongst others, for such a structure. Before the war, around 72%
of BiH’s exports was sold within the former Yugoslavia and these business relations
still play an important role – although trade is currently concentrated on only three
regional partners – Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia (which is also related to the past and
current political relations among SEE countries). Ongoing FDI inflows from the EU
are likely to improve BiH’s integration with the EU market since BiH companies will
gradually become part of supply chains of large EU-based multinational companies,
similar to the experiences of the new EU member states.
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Note: There are two series of trade data that can be used. One is original trade statistics (used here) and the other one
is trade data based on BoP. Later one includes some additional substantial adjustments (fob/cif, undervaluation
etc.). In addition, these adjustment "spoil" breakdown by commodities and countries, since these are being applied
on aggregates only. Another dataset is constructed from data obtained by the BiH Chamber of Foreign Trade.
Source: BiH Agency for Statistics, Central Bank of BiH, authors' calculations.
Table 3. Selected data on BiH foreign trade 2001-2006
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Import (billion euro) 3.748 4.114 4.253 4.757 5.715 5.823
Import – annual growth rate (%) 11.4 9.8 3.4 11.9 20.1 1.9
Export (billion euro) 1.152 1.068 1.187 1.441 1.934 2.640
Export – annual growth rate (%) -0.5 -7.3 11.1 21.3 34.2 36.6
Trade balance (billion euro) 2.595 3.046 3.066 3.317 3.781 3.183
Trade deficit (% GDP) 42.6 47.1 45.0 44.2 46.9 -
Current account balance (% GDP) -13.6 -19.4 -21.2 -19.2 -21.1 -
Openness (X+M)/GDP 80.5 80.1 79.9 82.7 95.0 -
* includes Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Hungary (Bulgaria and Romania are within the SEE FTA
countries)
Source: BiH Agency for Statistics, Central Bank of BiH, authors calculations.
Table 4. BiH main trade partners, 2003-2006
Export shares (%) I mport shares (%)
2003 2004 2005 1-92006 2003 2004 2005 1-9 2006
EU 15 38.1 38.4 35.5 37.9 34.2 33.2 35.3 31.0
Germany 12.4 9.5 11.3 12.6 12.1 11.8 14.4 11.5
Italy 14.7 17.4 13.1 12.4 10.2 9.1 8.9 8.7
SEE FTA 35.3 38.8 38.6 33.3 26.8 29.4 30.4 28.5
Croatia 17.5 21.6 20.5 18.8 17.4 17.6 16.9 17.2
Serbia &
Montenegro
16.5 15.8 15.5 13.5 7.9 10.2 10.1 10.2
CEE* 12.6 14.3 16.2 22.0 20.9 16.7 17.1 21.6
Slovenia 10.8 9.1 9.6 12.5 9.3 5.3 7.0 7.4
Others 14.0 8.5 9.7 6.8 18.1 20.7 17.2 18.8
Exports started to grow from a very low base and with a very narrow range of
products. Most exported goods are commodities and manufactured goods with low
added value. Exports are largely concentrated on exploitation of natural resources
and low-skill labour intensive goods (clothing, shoes, etc.). Base metals are the most
important exported items, accounting for a quarter of total exports. The share of wood
products in total exports has been declining in recent years. Electricity energy (see HS
chapter V) has been an important export item, although at present can be only
transmitted to adjacent markets since BiH has only recently started to integrate into
the wider European electricity market. The metal processing industry, mainly
production of car spare parts, has expanded very rapidly in recent years, with exports
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Source: Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina, authors' calculations (full tables are in Annex 3).
Table 5. BiH exports by goods, HS classification, 2003-2006
HS Description 2003 2004 2005 2006
XVI MACHINERY & MECHANICAL APPLICANCES 8.2 7.2 14.4 12.5
V MINERAL PRODUCTS 11.8 13.3 11.8
IV PREPARED FOODSTUFF 3.4 3.2 2.8
XV BASE METALS & ARTICLES THEREOF 22.4 24.9 25.0 26.9
VI CHEMICAL PRODUCTS 7.5 7.6 6.7
XVII TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT 2.9 1.8 2.4 1.9
XI & XII
TEXTILE & TEXTILE ARTICLES &
FOOTWEAR, HEADWEAR
12.1 9.6 7.3 10.7
IX & X WOOD, WOOD & PULP PRODUCTS 19.2 17.8 12.0 10.8
Other 19.3 16.0 14.7 16.0
9.5
3.7
2.7
Note: numbers are % shares in total exports
Source: Calculations based on Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina data.
Figure 4. Structure of BiH exports, 2006
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of these goods tripling in just two years, and this trend is likely to continue as BiH
producers are joining supply chains of the large car manufacturers in the EU.
Agriculture products account for only small fraction of exports (around 5-6%) and
these products are almost entirely directed to the regional market, since BiH does not
have relevant institutions (SPS inspections) for agricultural exports to the EU.
Exports of ammunition and weaponry were very significant in the 1990s as BiH had
extensive capacities for military production. Ammunition and weaponry exports
doubled between 2004 and 2005 and there is some potential for a further increase,
though by 2006 they accounted for only 0.5% of total exports.
The BiH economy is very import-dependent in many areas, including consumer
goods, raw materials and energy. Merchandise imports include a very wide spectrum
of goods. Machinery and transportation equipment are related to investment in re-
starting domestic industrial production and together have accounted for up to 25% of
total imports in recent years.
Food imports (including prepared foodstuff, animal products and vegetable
products) have been relatively large, accounting for 16% of total imports in 2006
(down from over 20% in 2004), but their dynamics has recently slowed compared to
total imports. Mineral product imports are almost entirely related to oil imports since
BiH does not have local resources and rising world prices (and rising demand due to
rebounding economic activity) have affected the country’s trade deficit over the last
few years (with the share of mineral products in total imports rising from below 13%
in 2004 to above 16% in 2006). Base metal industries (steel and aluminium
production) also heavily rely on imported raw materials. Imports of base metals have
been growing steadily and accounted for over 10% of total imports in 2006.
There had been a general expectation that FTAs may encourage regional trade
and thus spur total foreign trade volumes. So far, it is difficult to estimate volume
growth, due to the lack of data. What has been observed so far, however, is that trade
growth with FTA partners has been broadly in line with average growth of trade.
While export growth has surpassed import growth for the last 4 years, with the
coverage of imports by exports increasing from 26% in 2003 to 34% in 2005 and over
45% in 2006, very small initial values of exports implied that BiH’s trade deficit was
deepening in absolute terms and – to a smaller extent – also relative to GDP until
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Source: BiH Agency for Statistics, Central Bank of BiH, authors' calculations.
Table 6. Annual growth o BiH foreign trade rates (% per annum), 2003-2005
Exports I mports
2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
Croatia 29.6 50.2 27.1 8.7 13.0 15.5
Serbia & Montenegro -18.0 16.7 31.8 -5.9 44.2 19.9
Other FTA countries 16.8 14.9 34.8 2.7 7.9 18.5
Rest of the world 11.2 21.4 34.2 3.4 11.9 20.1
2004. However, 2005 and 2006 saw a reversal of this trend20. The largest deficit has
since being recorded in trade with the EU, while FTA countries account for
approximately 18% of the total deficit (as of 2005).
Export and import dynamics with BiH’s two main FTA partners, Croatia and
Serbia (until recently Serbia and Montenegro) have shown different trends. Between
2001 and 2005 exports to Croatia increased by 313% and to Serbia and Montenegro
by 126%. In the same period, imports from Croatia grew by 170% and from Serbia
and Montenegro by 217%. Thus, the trade deficit with Croatia has been broadly stable
over the past 5 years and in relation to the total trade deficit has gradually declined
to around 15%. By contrast, the trade deficit with Serbia and Montenegro has been
rapidly expanding, albeit from a very low 2001 level, reaching 7.4% of the total trade
deficit in 2005 (Figure 5). Preliminary data for the first 10 month of 2006 suggest a
continued increase of exports to Croatia but also a revival of exports to Serbia and
Montenegro accompanied by stagnating imports from both countries. This implies
declining absolute values of trade deficits with both countries, in line with trends
observed in trade with BiH’s other partners.
Imports from Croatia are dominated by oil derivatives (28.8%) and manufactured
goods (17%). Imports of food and beverages (group 0 and 1) are important segments
of imports from both countries, with 21-22% shares. Imports of raw materials are very
small from both countries (Figure 6).
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Note: 2006 data refer to he period January-October.
Source: Authors' calculations based on Central Bank BiH and Agency for Statistics of BiH data.
Figure 5. BiH Trade Deficit with FTA countries, 2001-2006 (million EUR)
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20 Analysis of trade data for 2005 and 2006 is further complicated by the introduction of VAT in January 2006.
This provided incentives for reporting imports in late 2005 and reporting exports in 2006. Thus, the
comparability of data is affected by shifting (in timing) of actual trade flows and reporting and possibly also
by registering part of exports that had earlier been in the grey economy.
Exports to Croatia and Serbia and Montenegro are more concentrated on just a
few product groups. The bulk of exports to Croatia are classified as various
manufactured goods (over 40%), mostly aluminium and steel. Exports to Serbia and
Montenegro are concentrated on wood and iron (various manufactured goods
account for 24.3%) and mineral fuels (including electric power) 21.4%. Exports of
agriculture products account for less than 10% of BiH’s total exports to both Croatia
and Serbia and Montenegro (see Figure 7).
59
REGIONAL FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA...
CASE Reports No. 69
Note: % share in total imports from respective country 
Source: BiH Agency for Statistics, authors' calculations.
Figure 6. Structure of BiH imports from Croatia and Serbia and Montenegro, SITC classification
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Source: BiH Agency for Statistics, authors' calculations.
Figure 7. Structure of BiH exports to Croatia and Serbia and Montenegro, SITC classification
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3.5. Summary
Since 1997, BiH has had a relatively liberal trade regime. However, the creation
of its trade institutions has encountered several problems. The building of post-war
government structures led to proliferation of entity legislation, institutions and
practices disregarding the need for co-ordination between entities and the state and
inter-entity relations. As a result, the existing foreign trade regime has had some
peculiar features. Foreign trade laws and regulations are passed by the state, but until
recently have been implemented by the entities, without clear monitoring of
compliance. Until not so long ago there were two  customs administrations, one for
each entity, collecting custom duties which went to both budgets, leading to losses of
public revenues, widespread smuggling and undervaluation in customs declarations.
The State Border Service was created in 2000 and effective control of border
crossings was established only in 2004. On a positive note, the unification of the
customs administration in 2004 and creation of the state-level Indirect Taxation
Authority (ITA) substantially improved conditions for foreign trade. 
However, there are still substantial institutional impediments to foreign trade.
Institutions and legislation dealing with technical regulations, conformity assessment,
sanitary and phytosanitary and veterinary issues are generally not sufficiently developed.
The prospect of negotiations with the EU on the Stabilisation and Association Agreement
has helped to work out compromises and accelerated institutional reforms, although they
have yet to be fully accomplished and bear fruit. An important obstacle is limited capacity
to deal with complicated technical trade-related matters at the Ministry of Foreign Trade
and Economic Relations and other relevant institutions. 
Trade integration with SEE partners has been driven by the 2001 Stability Pact
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which foresaw the conclusion of a series of
bilateral agreements among the SEE countries (Albania, BiH, Bulgaria, Croatia, the
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Serbia and
Montenegro, and more recently also UNMIK/Kosovo). BiH relatively quickly reached
FTA agreements with all SEE countries. The country was able to secure asymmetrical
treatment in implementation of FTAs with Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro and
Macedonia, where BiH exports to these countries were immediately granted tariff-
free access, while tariffs on imported goods were gradually reduced over 4 to 5 years. 
Relative to other countries in the region BiH initially quite vigorously pursued an
opening of its agricultural markets. However, BiH later unilaterally introduced
protective measures on a few selected agricultural products (mainly milk and meat
products) from Croatia and Serbia and Montenegro. This has caused some problems
and has been continuously raised by BiH’s trade partners, who point to the unilateral
character of BiH’s policies (dispute settlement mechanisms were not used, although
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these were arguably not well defined in the FTAs) and to the fact that BiH has never
presented convincing evidence to justify suspending of a few elements of the FTA.
Following a last-minute compromise on the shape of CEFTA 2006, compared to other
signatories, BiH will again be the country with probably the most liberalised market
access for agricultural goods.
BiH is relatively open to foreign trade. In the past 10 years this was primarily
driven by import volumes, but since 2003 export performance has improved
considerably on the back of ongoing restructuring in certain sectors and FDI inflows.
In 2002-2005, BiH recorded large trade deficits to the tune of 45% of GDP (less, if
GDP figures are augmented to take into account the unregistered economy). Export
growth is likely to continue since large investment projects, particularly in the metals
industry (steel and aluminium) are underway and production levels in these sectors
are expected to substantially increase in the next 2 years.
BiH exports are in practice limited to the EU market (around 55%) and SEE region
(35-40%), i.e. the markets where BiH goods enjoy preferential access. Imports are
somewhat more diversified as the share of non-EU and non-SEE countries is around 20%.
BiH’s very narrow export base is an important problem exposing the country to
volatility in international markets. Exports are largely concentrated on exploitation of
natural resources and low-skill labour intensive goods. Base metals and metal
products dominate in the export structure and their share has been growing recently.
Agricultural products account for only a small fraction of exports (around 5-6%) and
these products are almost entirely directed to the SEE market, since BiH does not
have relevant institutions (SPS inspections) for agricultural exports to the EU.
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This chapter takes a closer look at BiH’s trade. It aims to find the key
determinants of BiH’s trade flows and capture the effects of creating a network of
regional FTAs on BiH’s trade, by applying various analytical approaches. It starts
with comparative advantages revealed in different product groups, then moves on to
estimating BiH’s trade equations and concludes with a qualitative analysis of non-
tariff barriers to trade.
4.1. RCA indices
Conventional neo-classical trade theory argues that foreign trade happens mainly
because countries have comparative advantages in production of particular goods or
services. These comparative advantages are not directly observable (although in some
instance may be guessed). However, one can use data on actual trade patterns to form
measures of so-called revealed comparative advantages (RCA). RCA indices can
indicate sectors and markets where BiH exports are more (or less) competitive in
relation to the other trading partners present on a given destination market. 
Where:
xik – the value of BiH’s exports of products from the SITC section k to market j,
Xit – the total value of BiH’s exports to market j,
mjk – the value of imports of products from the SITC section k to market j (Croatia,
Serbia, etc.),
Mjt – the total value of imports to market j.
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4. Existing problems hampering full
exploitation of BiH FTAs' potential
In other words, the measure shows if for a given product category (and given
destination country) its BiH export share is higher than the destination market import
share (averaged across all of the trading partners on that destination market). RCA
values of well above 1 may indicate BiH’s comparative advantage revealed on a
particular foreign market segment. 
The indices were obtained on the basis of historical data (2005) for BiH trade with
its key trade partners: Croatia, Serbia, the EU25 and Slovenia, and for BiH partners’
trade with the rest of the world. The level of aggregation is unusually high, due to the
lack of more detailed data.
The above table reveals the strong comparative advantages of BiH’s exports on all
four markets in crude materials (SITC 2) and manufactured goods (SITC 6). Besides
this, BiH also appears to have comparative advantages in animal and vegetable oils
(SITC 4) on Croatian and Slovenian markets, in beverages and tobacco (SITC 1) on the
Croatian market, in mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials (SITC 3) on the
Serbian market, and in miscellaneous manufactured articles (SITC 8) on the EU25 and
(to a lesser extent) Slovenian market. In some other sectors BiH’s RCA is just above one,
suggesting a slight comparative advantage. This applies to food and live animals (SITC
0) on Croatian and Serbian markets, as well as machinery and transport equipment
(SITC 7) on the Slovenian market. RCA indices are also presented as charts in Annex 5.
One can seen that, as opposed to trade with the EU, BiH reveals more diversified
comparative advantages in trade with Croatia. This suggests that BiH’s potential has
started to be realised in exports to Croatia21. The falling BiH trade deficit with
respect to Croatia in 2005 (see chapter 3) further supports this view. It is clearly not
yet the case with Serbia.
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21 It may also suggest complementarities in the partners’ structures of production.
Note: RCA values above (below) 1 indicate revealed comparative (dis)advantage. EU25 includes Slovenia. High
RCA values for SITC 9 category may suggests problems with classification of BiH exports to respective markets.
Source: own calculations based on Central Bank of BiH and Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia data.
Table 7. RCA indices, 2005
SITC section Croatia Serbia Slovenia EU25
0 – Food and live animals 1.02 1.05 0.52 0.46
1 – Beverages and tobacco 2.39 0.13 0.13 0.10
2 – Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 5.55 4.08 4.44 6.05
3 – Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 0.93 1.47 0.09 0.06
4 – Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes 5.02 0.01 1.48 0.57
5 – Chemicals and related products, n.e.s. 0.19 0.37 0.08 0.24
6 – Manufactured goods, classified chiefly by material 2.32 1.31 1.01 1.79
7 – Machinery and transport equipment 0.20 0.32 1.07 0.66
8 – Miscellaneous manufactured articles 0.79 0.78 1.01 1.79
9 – Commodities n.e.c. 41.76 0.50 101.42 1.58
4.2. Determinants of BiH trade flows – a gravity model
Theoretical foundations
For a long time, the gravity model has been widely used for analyses of
international trade flows. Gravity trade models draw analogy from physics and the
Newton’s theory of gravitation. Similarly to the Newton’s equation, the gravity models
tries to explain international trade flows by “economic mass” of countries and
distance between them. The economic mass of a country is usually measured by a
country’s GDP and distance is measured as distance between capital cities, although
other measures, particularly for distance variable, have also been used. Thus, the
basic gravity model is expressed by the following equation:
Where β0, β1, β2 are constants and Dij denotes distance between two countries.
Empirical models often include additional variables into the basic model in order
to capture influences of other factors that may promote or impede the international
trade, beyond the effects of countries’ GDPs and distance.
Although this model has a long ago proved its usefulness as an empirical tool for the
analyses of international trade, many economists cast doubts on the theoretical
justification of gravity specification. However, several works have brought the gravity
model on very stable theoretical grounds22. The generalised versions of the model have
proven the possibility to analyse theories of international trade beyond basic model’s
direct relation to geography and spatial issues, such as Heckscher-Ohlin’s theory, Linder
hypothesis and Helpman-Krugman hypothesis (Helpman and Krugman, 1985, p. 167).
Data and methodology
The availability and quality of BiH economic data from local sources is a well-known
problem. Therefore we have had to rely mainly on data from external sources. The main
source of data was the IMF, with its DOTS and IFS databases. Data on trade flows, GDP,
GDP per capita and population were collected from these sources. Some data missing in
these databases were collected from other sources. Details can be found in Annex 4.
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22 See, for example, Anderson (1979).
Data for Serbia and Montenegro were only available at the aggregate level of this
federal country, even though the economies of two member states, Serbia and
Montenegro, have been separated since 1999 when border check points were
established on the internal border. Furthermore, Montenegro has not recognised the
Serbian dinar and uses the euro as legal tender. Quite literally, all monetary and fiscal
policies were run separately in the two member states. Therefore, the drawback of this
type of analysis was that it considered these two countries as one, while considering
them as two separate countries would be much closer to reality. The most striking
example are values on exchange rate variability, where the variability between BiH and
Serbia was significant during the analysed period, and the same values for Montenegro
were zero for most of the period (all years, except 1998). Due to the data availability,
we were not able to overcome this problem, which is why we are just mentioning it
here as a weakness of the analysis that readers of this report should be aware of. We
believe that this drawback does not significantly impinge on our final results.
The availability of data has a key influence on our choice of time span for
conducting this analysis. In order to have balanced panel data we were forced to
choose a list of 33 partner countries and an eight-year period, between 1998 and 2005.
These 33 countries accounted for 93% of BiH’s exports and 96% of BiH’s imports
during the period under consideration, so that they may be considered as
representative for almost all of BiH’s trade flows.
The basic gravity model posits that the chief determinants of international trade
are supply/demand conditions in the analysed countries involved and the distances
between them. There is a vast range of empirical models, using different variables to
capture the influences of supply/demand conditions of countries. Most of these models
capture these influences using two variables, one for “economic mass” and the other
for income differences. As a proxy for the “economic mass”, we have considered
several possible solutions. One is GDP, as in the basic gravity model, and other is a
product of BiH’s and its partner countries’ GDP, as proposed by Xhepa and Agolli
(2004). We considered the following proxies for income differences: GDP per capita,
absolute differences between BiH’s and partner countries’ GDPs per capita, as
suggested in a paper by Pugh and Tyrrall (1999), and a so-called similarity index
comparing two countries’ GDPs.
We have tested three specifications with different combinations of variables for
supply/demand factors affecting international trade. The first uses GDP as the only
variable for these effects, as proposed in the basic gravity equation. The second
incorporates two variables, GDP and the Linder effect variable (the absolute difference
of two countries’ GDPs per capita), after Pugh and Tyrrall (1999). The third uses the
product of the two countries’ GDPs and a similarity index, as in Xhepa and Agolli
(2004). Analysis of formal and informal diagnostics tests carried out on these different
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specifications revealed that the gravity model with products of GDPs and similarity
index variables as proxies for the calculation of the “economic mass” and income
differences is the most appropriate for the purpose of our analysis23. The model is:
Where:
i = Bosnia and Herzegovina,
j = 1, 2, … 33 – partner country,
t = 1998, 1999, … 2005 – year
Yijt – the value of exports (imports) from BiH to partner country j in year t, in
million US$,
GDPitGDPjt – the product of GDPs of BiH and partner country j in year t,
SIMijt – similarity index,
DOSTij – the distance between Sarajevo and a partner country’s j capital city, in
kilometres,
TRijt – trade resistance measure (volatility of bilateral exchange rate),
– the set of dummy variables, k = 1, 2, … 4.
The model is defined in a log-linear form, which means that values of all
quantitative variables, except similarity index and trade resistance variables24, were
transformed into natural logarithms. 
Apart from variables capturing economic mass and the distance between
trading partners, we followed the empirical literature in including several other
variables commonly found to play a significant role in explaining trade patterns
(Oguledo and MacPhee, 1994; Thursby and Thursby, 1987) Firstly, trade patterns
exhibit significant persistence over time, thus we include the lagged dependent
variable in the model.
The similarity index is used to measure the similarity between two countries in
terms of their GDPs. The rationale behind the inclusion of such variables may be
found in Helpman and Krugman (1985), who found that countries with similar levels
of income tend to trade more (the so-called Helpman-Krugman hypothesis; see also
Helpman 1987, Feenstra 2004, p. 147.). The formula used for the index is:
∑
=
k
i kijt
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1
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23 Detailed results of specification and diagnostics tests are available on request.
24 The values of these variables were already transformed into logarithms by the original equation.
The similarity index gives better results when used at the disaggregated level (i.e.
for sectors, with definitions of sectors matching trade data). Unfortunately, this is not
feasible for BiH, so we rely on an aggregate index comparing the size of partner
countries’ economies. The index (in its log form) ranges from minus infinity to log
(0.5), taking a value of log (0.5) for countries with equal GDPs, and declining to minus
infinity with an increasing difference in GDP levels.
The trade resistance variable captures the effects of the variability between the
two countries’ exchange rates on their trade values and it is calculated as 1+ standard
deviation of difference between the actual and previous month's logged values of
exchange rates (Tenreyro, 2006). Existing literature on the effects of exchange rate
variability on trade affords mixed results (Thursby and Thursby, 1987; Rose, 2000;
Baldwin, 2005; Tenreyro, 2006). Hence, the sign of the trade resistance variable
cannot be predicted. Pugh and Tyrrall (1999) argue that the actual effects of the
variations in bilateral exchange rates on trade flows depend mainly on the degree of
risk aversion among business people in those countries.
Additionally the model includes a set of four dummy variables on the countries’
characteristics that are typically found highly relevant determination of foreign trade
flows. These are dummy variables for countries that were, together with BiH,
members of Yugoslav Federation (EXYUDV), dummy for EU member states (EUDV),
dummy for countries sharing a common border and language with BiH (COMDV)25,
and dummy for countries that have signed free trade agreements with BiH (FTADV).
The variable EXYUDV should capture effect of the “path-dependency” for these
countries, which were members of the same country (Yugoslavia) for 70 years and it
is clear that some trade linkages still remain (Gligorov, 2001).
The dummy variable for FTAs, which will be of key interest from the perspective
of this report, was created by assigning the value of 1 to pairs of countries that signed
bilateral FTAs in the year after it was implemented (the implementation year in the
case of the BiH - Croatia agreement which entered into force in February) and
subsequent years. We have not assigned a value of 1 for the years when agreements
were entering into force to take into account the fact that many of these agreements
actually lowered trade barriers gradually rather than immediately. Also, the
implementation of some agreements started in the middle of a calendar year rather
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25 In our case, common border and common language effect were presented by the same dummy, since the
countries sharing these characteristics with BiH are the same ones, namely Croatia and Serbia and
Montenegro. Inclusion of two separate dummies into equation would cause perfect multicollinearity problem.
than at the beginning. We believe that our approach to the creation of FTA dummies
stands good chances of capturing the effects of FTA agreements. However, some of the
agreements were implemented asymmetrically (e. g. export liberalised faster than
imports), which could have created effects on BiH imports and exports at different
times. Therefore, additional set of dummies were created: separate for import and
export. They have values of 1 in the years where the majority of tariffs on BiH
import/export were already freed (in some cases, lowering of tariffs took quite a few
years), and values of 0 otherwise (prior to liberalisation). The equations including
these FTA dummies are included below, denoted as “model 5”. As can be seen in the
following section, they do not change the results, when compared with a single FTA
dummy, being an average for lowering of tariffs on both import and export.
Following the model specification, various choices were needed on the estimation
approach. Diagnostic tests (reported in Annex 6) strongly suggested that one-way
models were preferred over two-way models and OLS. Regarding the choice between
fixed and random effects models, we could not rely on the Hausman test since the
difference between variance matrices was not positively defined. Therefore, following
the suggestion of Greene (2002b; E8-47), we opted for a random effects model.
Estimation results
Export equation
In order to ensure the robustness of the analysis we carried out estimations for 4
specifications of the model, with the first specification using only one dummy variable
for FTA, and subsequent specifications introducing other dummies. Thus, the fourth
(most comprehensive) of the estimated models looked as follows:
Model 4:
EXPORTijt = β0 + β1LAGEXPij(t-1) + β2GDPitGDPjt + β3SIMijt + β4DISTij +
β5FTADVijt + β6EXYUDVij + β7EUDVijt + β8COMDVij + uijt
Where EXPORTijt denotes aggregate BiH exports to country j at time t.
The point estimates for values of coefficients for all four models, along with
indication of their statistical significance levels, are presented in Table 8.
The signs and magnitudes of the coefficient estimates are consistent with the
underlying theory of gravity models in international trade. The results remain very
similar in all four models, so we can say that our model is robust in that sense. The
regressors included are jointly significant and explain around 86 % of total variation
of the dependent variable. 
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As we can see from the table, the product of GDPs and distance variables retain
their signs and statistical significance throughout these different specifications of model.
The range of point estimates for GDP product is between 0.428 and 0.523. The
interpretation can be that ceteris paribus, a 1% increase of the product of GDPs of
partner countries raises BiH’s exports to a partner country by around 0.5%, on average.
The impact of distance to destination markets on BiH’s exports is, as expected,
strongly negative. A 1% increase in distance is associated with around a 1% decline in
BiH’s exports to the market, ceteris paribus. This is typically explained by transportation
and other transaction costs, that can increase with distance as well as the availability
and ease of exchange of information between potential exporters and importers. This is
also the usual value of distance coefficient often found in gravity equations.
The statistically significant and negative coefficient on trade resistance variable
measured by the volatility of exchange rates confirms the role of exchange rate
variability in deterring BiH exports. Indirectly, this result may be taken as a (weak)
indication that the current foreign exchange rate regime serves the BiH export sector
well (any other exchange rate regime would likely result in larger average volatility of
exchange rates vis-à-vis the main trading partners).
Among all dummy variables, it is only the variable for former member states of
the Yugoslav Federation that emerges as statistically significant (positive) throughout
all models. This confirms our hypothesis that strong trade relations among countries
of former Yugoslavia positively affect BiH’s exports beyond the effects explained by
GDPs and geographic proximity.
The estimate of the coefficient on the FTA dummy (and FTA export dummy as in
model 5), of key interest from the perspective of this report, is not statistically different
from zero in all specifications. This suggests that FTAs have not (yet) played a role in
boosting BiH’s exports to countries with which agreements have been signed. There
are a few caveats which need to be added to the interpretation. Firstly, FTA
agreements are relatively new and their impact on trade flows may take longer to
materialise. Secondly, it may well be that some of the FTAs might have been effective
in reducing trade barriers for BiH exports while other agreements (for reasons related
to their design and / or implementation) have not played such a role. 
Interestingly, EU markets do not seem to be better penetrated by BiH’s exports
beyond the impact of other variables included in our gravity model. This is despite the
abolition of customs duties on BiH’s exports (autonomous trade preferences since
2000). The explanation may lie in non-tariff barriers in EU markets or it may be that
eased market access takes some time to translate into higher BiH export flows (a
similar mechanism that we discussed in the case of FTA functioning). Part of this
(although limited, given BiH’s supply-side constraints) may also be due to the lack of
access to the EU market for BiH’s agricultural products.
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As could have been expected, the inclusion of a dummy variable for countries that
share a common border and language with BiH, along with dummy variable for ex-
Yugoslav countries, leads to a problem of near multi-collinearity. Among the ex-
Yugoslavia and common border & language dummies we opt to keep the ex-
Yugoslavia dummy as ex-Yugoslavia had a common official language that is still
fluently understood and spoken by the majority of the population in all ex-Yugoslavia
countries. Thus, model 3 can be taken as our preferred specification.
Import equation
Identical models were estimated for BiH imports from its partner countries. The
results are summarised in Tabale 9.
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Note:
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*** Statistically significant at 1 % level
' The rule of thumb is that value of ρ < 0.3 indicates that there is not serious problem with autocorrelation in
the model. The value obtained from the Durbin – Watson d- based test for autocorrelation. Calculated by the
following formula: ρ = 1 – DW/2.
Model 5 includes different formulation of FTADV (which takes into account asymmetry in implementation of
regional FTAs).
Source: Own calculations.
Table 8. Results of REM estimation of BiH export equations, 1998-2005
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Constant
2.533***
(0.503)
1.759***
(0.469)
1.875***
(0.483)
1.846***
(0.478)
1.855***
(0.479)
LAGEXP
0.582***
(0.048)
0.507***
(0.053)
0.501***
(0.053)
0.497***
(0.054)
0.507***
(0.054)
GDPiGDPj
0.428***
(0.106)
0.523***
(0.107)
0.497***
(0.110)
0.487***
(0.110)
0.488***
(0.113)
SIMIND -0.021
(0.140)
-0.060
(0.132)
-0.063
(0.132)
-0.075
(0.132)
-0.067
(0.133)
DIST
-1.150***
(0.199)
-1.002***
(0.181)
-1.031***
(0.184)
-1.017***
(0.182)
-1.019***
(0.184)
TR
-2.489***
(0.890)
-2.437***
(0.884)
-2.408***
(0.884)
-2.452***
(0.886)
-2.383***
(0.888)
FTADV
0.080
(0.114)
0.032
(0.114)
0.051
(0.115)
0.051
(0.115)
0.055
(0.101)
EXYUDV
0.611***
(0.148)
0.615***
(0.148)
0.526***
(0.164)
0.593***
(0.153)
EUDV 0.081
(0.077)
0.088
(0.076)
0.085
(0.077)
COMDV 0.208
(0.183)
R2 0.859 0.869 0.869 0.900 0.899
Adj. R2 0.856 0.865 0.865 0.878 0.878
F stats 226.94 (.0000) 209.94 (.0000) 183.98 (.0000) 41.07 (.0000)
42.14
(.0000)
Autocorr. ρ’ 0.077 0.077 0.072 0.072 0.071
No. of
observations 229 229 229 229 229
Again, the signs of the obtained coefficients are consistent with the underlying theory
of gravity models. The key results remain broadly unchanged in all 4 specifications, so we
can say that our model is robust in that sense. The regressors included are jointly
significant and explain around 95 % of the total variation of BiH’s imports26. 
Generally, our interpretation of the results for the export equation can also be
applied in the case of the import equation. Economic mass and distance between
partner countries do indeed appear as important determinants of BiH’s imports. The
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26 We recognise that this value is higher than could be expected. It may suggest some problems within the model.
Unfortunately, diagnostics tests for panel data analyses are still not well enough developed to allow proper
identification of the problem that causes such a high value of R2.
Note:
Standard errors are in parentheses
*** Statistically significant at 1 % level
** Statistically significant at 5 % level
* Statistically significant at 10 % level
' The rule of thumb is that value of ρ < 0.3 indicates that there is no serious problem with autocorrelation in the
model. The value obtained from the Durbin – Watson d- based test for autocorrelation. Calculated by the
following formula: ρ = 1 – DW/2.
Model 5 includes different formulation of FTADV (which takes into account asymmetry in implementation of
regional FTAs).
Source: Own calculations.
Table 9. Results of REM estimation of import equations, 1998-2005
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Constant
1.459
(0.377)
0.254
(0.238)
0.904
(0.397)
0.901
(0.399)
0.899**
(0.396)
LAGIMP
0.741***
(0.034)
0.894***
(0.029)
0.684***
(0.038)
0.684***
(0.038)
0.686***
(0.038)
GDPiGDPj
0.271***
(0.060)
0.153**
(0.064)
0.370***
(0.067)
0.370***
(0.067)
0.355***
(0.067)
SIMIND 0.023
(0.084)
0.074
(0.071)
-0.009
(0.085)
-0.009
(0.085)
-0.025
(0.086)
DIST
-0.610***
(0.144)
-0.143
(0.092)
-0.503***
(0.144)
-0.502***
(0.145)
-0.495***
(0.144)
TR
-0.107
(0.455)
-0.162
(0.543)
-0.031
(0.457)
-0.031
(0.458)
0.005
(0.457)
FTADV
0.064
(0.059)
0.050
(0.070)
0.020
(0.061)
0.021
(0.061)
0.065
(0.062)
EXYUDV
0.105
(0.072)
0.404***
(0.188)
0.399***
(0.136)
0.395***
(0.118)
EUDV
-0.098*
(0.050)
-0.098*
(0.050)
-0.093*
(0.050)
COMDV 0.010
(0.154)
R2 0.953 0.954 0.954 0.954 0.975
Adj. R2 0.952 0.952 0.952 0.952 0.970
F stats 762.55
(.0000)
657.24
(.0000)
577.90
(.0000)
511.42
(.0000)
185.34
(.0000)
Autocorr. ' -0.137 -0.137 -0.139 -0.139 -0.137
No. of observations 229 229 229 229 229
ρ
only difference between the export and import equations is that values of coefficients
on lagged dependent variables are higher, and on GDPs and distance lower in the
import equation. This suggests that imports may be more persistent and that
economic mass and particularly distance of import markets appear to play a smaller
role in explaining BiH imports that was the case for BiH exports.
The estimated coefficient on the FTA dummy variable is again very small and not
significantly different from zero in all model specifications (including the one with
more precise construction of import FTA dummy; model 5). Again, this result may
possibly be explained by the short time that passed since the FTAs implementation.
Interestingly, the EU appears to be (slightly) underrepresented among BIH
import markets, as suggested by the negative sign of the coefficients on the EU dummy
variable. In contrast, strong linkages with ex-Yugoslav countries are also confirmed in
the import equation. 
Potential trade
The gravity equation for BiH trade estimated above allows calculating “normal”
or “potential” levels of trade, i.e. levels that are predicted by the model. From this one
can compare the difference between these predicted and actual trade values to
identify the scope of potential trade gains. This type of analysis has been widely used
in many contexts for both developed and developing countries.
For both export and import equations a third (“preferred”) specification was
employed27. All the coefficients from this specification were used for calculating the
potential values28. For ease of interpretation the results are presented in Tables 10 and
11 as ratios of actual over potential trade values. Only FTA signatories and selected
other most important trade partners are shown for the ease of exposition. A ratio of
around 1 indicates that the gravity model has closely predicted values of trade in a
particular year and for a particular partner country. Ratios above 1 indicate “over-
performance”, i.e. actual trade flows exceeding those predicted by the model.
Similarly, ratios below 1 indicate under-performance.
There is one caveat related to our approach to calculating potential trade. The
gravity equation on which it is based was calculated only for BiH trade with other
countries and not for all bilateral flows within a group of analysed countries. This
implies that over- and under-performance is a relative concept, i.e. we can only observe
that BiH trade with one country is relatively higher than with some other country. By
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27 Primarily for the reason that statistics between the third and the fourth specifications were comparable, and
adding a common border/language dummy (in the fourth specification), did not add any statistically
significant information. Neither alternative FTA dummy (specification 5) did it.
28 These were variables LAGEXP (or LAGIMP), GDPiGDPj, SIMIND, DIST, TR, FTADV, EXYUDV and EUDV.
construction, BiH is on average trading at its potential in this specification. Thus, we
cannot use these results to see how far is BiH from potential trade with its partners
relative to, for example, how far Croatia is from its potential trade.
The results for export potential suggest that we can divide BiH’s partner countries
into three groups. The first group comprises countries to which BiH has constantly “over-
performed” in exports, that is it has exported more than would be predicted by the gravity
model. The group is comprised of Germany and Turkey for the whole period, but also
Slovenia, Croatia, Moldova and Romania for most of the years under consideration. The
second group of countries that absorbed much less BiH exports than predicted by the
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Note: Shaded cells present data for years after a particular agreement with BiH entered into force (the same
years used for creation of an FTA dummy). Values are ratios of actual over potential exports. Values above
(below) 1 indicate that in a particular year BiH exports to a given country exceeded (were below) levels
predicted by the model.
Source: Own calculations.
Table 10. Actual and potential BiH exports, 1999-2005
Importer 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
ALBANIA 5 0.73 0.54 1.41 1.03 0.96 0.87
BULGARIA 0.84 1.08 0.86 0.93 0.69 0.77 0.71
CROATIA 8 0.89 1.18 1.14 1.17 1.24 1.17
GERMANY 0 1.02 1.11 1.00 1.19 1.21 1.03
ITALY 3 1.09 1.03 1.05 1.02 0.92 0.95
MACEDONIA 0.95 0.75 0.74 0.78 0.77 0.75 0.73
MOLDOVA - 0.50 1.77 1.31 1.26 1.89
ROMANIA 3 1.65 1.25 0.39 0.68 2.70 1.30
SERBIA & MONTENEGRO 0.96 1.44 1.42 1.07 0.94 0.99 1.04
SLOVENIA 3 1.05 1.05 1.01 0.98 0.93 1.38
TURKEY 1.81 1.01 1.10 1.24 1.18 1.10 1.09
0.4
0.9
1.0
1.0
-
1.1
1.0
Note: Shaded cells present data for years after a particular agreement with BiH entered into force (the same
years used for creation of an FTA dummy). Values are ratios of actual over potential exports. Values above
(below) 1 indicate that in a particular year BiH imports from a given country exceeded (were below) levels
predicted by the model.
Source: Own calculations.
Table 11. Actual and potential BiH imports, 1999-2005
Row Labels  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
ALBANIA - 0.20 1.15 0.59 0.43 0.54 0.51 
BULGARIA 1.01 1.09 1.10 1.04 0.94 1.04 0.97 
CROATIA 1.01 1.02 1.12 1.14 1.13 1.09 1.09 
GERMANY 1.02 1.02 1.08 1.08 1.04 1.07 1.01 
ITALY 0.96 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.94 0.92 0.92 
MACEDONIA 0.91 1.00 0.81 0.90 0.91 0.90 0.86 
MOLDOVA - 0.62 2.25 1.80 0.95 0.57 1.28 
ROMANIA 0.93 1.08 0.99 1.04 0.99 1.31 1.09 
SERBIA & MONTENEGRO  0.70 0.98 1.00 1.03 0.89 1.01 0.95 
SLOVENIA 1.11 1.12 1.10 1.13 1.04 1.20 1.07 
TURKEY 1.08 0.89 1.06 1.22 1.16 1.16 1.06 
model is comprised of Macedonia, Albania and Bulgaria. BiH exports to other countries
do not reveal any clear trend of either relative “over-“ or “under-performance”. 
A similar grouping can be done for BiH’s imports. The first group of countries that
“over-perform” in the BiH market includes Croatia, Germany, Slovenia and Turkey.
Albania, Italy and Macedonia can be described as relative underperformers.
The tables also allow for a visual inspection of developments around the dates
when FTAs were implemented. Comparison of pre-FTA and FTA periods (shaded
cells) does not reveal any clear patterns. Countries which tended to over- or under-
perform usually stay in the same group after FTA implementation. The only exception
seem to be BiH export to Croatia, which tend to over perform after implementation
of the FTA. Among FTA countries’ trade flows with Albania and Macedonia (in the
case of exports also Bulgaria) are below potential suggesting existence of some other
barriers in relations with these countries but also the possibility for improvement once
the barriers are eased.
4.3. Estimates of trade creation, trade diversion and trade deflection
effects
Estimation of possible trade diversion and trade creation effects is a natural step
that one would want to carry out in a study like this. However, in the case of BiH it
proved difficult to assess these effects given the lack of sufficient trade volume data
needed to calculate unit values, i.e. the prices of BiH’s trade flows. Moreover, trade data
broken down both by commodity and partner country have existed only since 2005,
which makes comparisons with pre-FTA periods impossible. Finally, the introduction of
VAT in January 2006 was a major policy change affecting incentives to declare exports
and imports, which resulted in a significant increase in the declared value of exported
goods. It affected trade data for 2005 and 2006, thus making a comparison doubtful (see
also section 3.4 of this report). Nevertheless, below we speculate on the possibility of
trade creation and trade diversion effects on the basis of available evidence.
Trade creation
Trade creation occurs when – after lifting customs duties – cheaper imports replace
more expensive domestic production. Looking from another perspective, it takes place
when exports to a partner country are boosted, as domestically manufactured goods
become less expensive on a partner’s market. This may be accompanied by so-called
trade expansion, where falling prices lead to higher demand.
74
Amir Hadžiomeragić, Małgorzata Jakubiak, Nermin Oruè, Wojciech Paczyński
CASE Reports No. 69
It is difficult to estimate the extent of trade creation resulting from the
implementation of regional FTAs, due to the lack of price / volume data29. What one can
do, however, is to check whether demand for BiH exports increased in the SEE region
and whether demand for imports from the FTA countries increased in BiH. Indeed, we
can see that exports to the region30 substantially increased during 2004-2006. As a
result, the share of FTA countries in total BiH exports rose from 36% in 2003 to 39% in
2005. Although the demand for regional imports in BiH was a bit less dynamic, it also
grew (and its values were higher; there is still a trade deficit in regional trade, see
chapter 3 for details). In effect, the share of the FTA region in total BiH imports
increased from 33% in 2003 to 36% in 2005. Increasing regional trade played some role
in raising BiH’s export/import ratio31. In the first 3 quarters of 2006, however, while
exports to regional markets continued to expand by above 20% (particularly to Serbia
and Montenegro), they somewhat lagged behind exports to the EU, leading to a decline
in the share of SEE in total exports. One would need to wait for more data to find out
whether this trend will continue or whether it was linked to other factors.
Summing up, there are grounds to believe that some expansion occurred with
respect to BiH’s trade with its FTA partner countries, which was rapidly growing after
FTA introduction. However, lack of price (volume) data makes the estimate of trade
creation somewhat difficult for the time being.
Trade diversion
In the context of this paper, trade diversion can be of particular significance to
BiH’s imports. This is because BiH has a huge trade deficit and about half of this
deficit is due to trade with its SEE partners32. The danger of diversion of imports lies
in the possibility of importing goods produced more expensively in other SEE
countries (parties to BiH’s bilateral FTAs) and not subject to customs duties, rather
than cheaper products from the rest of the world burdened with tariffs. Theoretically,
this possibility could have occurred due to the phasing out of tariffs on imports from
the FTA region, with unchanged protection towards third parties.
Trade diversion can be expected if BiH’s imports from third countries (in some
sectors) are similar to BiH imports from any of the SEE countries and when tariff
barriers towards third countries are relatively high (see e.g. Finger and Kreinin,
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29 If imports from FTA markets were an important part of domestic consumption of some goods one could look
at domestic prices. However, the high level of data aggregation and use of incompatible trade and economic
activity classifications for external trade and domestic production makes such a comparison impossible.
30 Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro
31 Such an approach to trade creation effects was carried out e.g. in early analyses of the European Community,
e.g. Balassa (1974).
32 About 50% of the overall BiH trade deficit in 2005 was in trade with the FTA partners.
1979). The first of these factors can be analysed using the similarity index for imports,
comparing the structure of BiH’s imports from a given partner country, p, with those
of any other supplier of imports to the BiH market, j,
where wpi is the share of product i in total BiH imports from a given SEE partner
country p, and wji is the share of the same product in BiH’s imports from country j.
Table 12 presents the indices calculated for four FTA partner countries (including the
two main partners – Croatia and Serbia and Montenegro) relative to 3 other regions that
are relatively important sources of BiH’s imports: EU25 (over 50% of BiH imports in
2005), Russia (3% of BiH imports in 2005), and Turkey (3% of BiH imports in 2005)33.
Similarity indices for BiH’s 2005 imports show that there is little possibility for
diversion of imports away from Macedonia (and perhaps Albania). Overall, small
import values from both partners (which are also confirmed by the gravity model
described in section 4.2) suggest that there is still a lot of unused potential for boosting
imports to BiH from these two countries. 
It would appear that slightly higher chances for trade diversion exist in relation
to BiH’s trade with Serbia and Montenegro and Croatia. The structure of BiH’s
imports from these countries seems to resemble the structure of imports from the
EU25 and (to a lesser extent) Turkey, which as of 2005 were still protected by MFN
custom duties34. However, one should be very careful drawing such a conclusion, as
the calculations were made at a quite aggregated level. Particular categories are
broad and may include products that are not similar. Calculations of similarity indices
at a much lower level of aggregation would be needed to confirm the results.
( )Minnpj pi jii=1 = , * 100S w w∑
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33 The criterion was that a comparator should not be a partner in the Stability Pact for SEE, but should be a
significant source of BiH imports.
34 BiH’s import tariffs for Turkey were liberalised in 65% in 2005. The elimination of tariffs on Turkish goods
entering the BiH market is scheduled for 2007.
Note: Indices range from 1 to 100. Higher number represents more similar product structure. Calculations were
done at SITC section level (1-digit).
Source: Own calculations based on data from Agency for Statistics of BiH.
Table 12. Similarity indices of BiH imports from some FTA countries, 2005
FTA partner  
relative to BiH  
imports from EU25  
relative to BiH  
imports from Russia  
relative to BiH  
imports from Turkey  
CROATIA 66 46 56 
SERBIA & MONTENEGRO  68 28 63 
MACEDONIA 57 13 42 
ALBANIA 61 28 54 
The relative similarity of BiH’s imports from Croatia to BiH imports from Russia
comes from the fact that mineral resources have been bought from these two sources.
There are also various other reasons that incline us towards scepticism as to the
probability of trade diversion effects playing any significant role. Firstly, imports from
Serbia, Montenegro and Croatia on one hand and the EU on the other – even if falling
into similar categories of classification of goods – are probably of different type and
quality when it comes to individual products. Moreover, this difference will likely
persist for the few years. Secondly, BiH will soon fully liberalise its imports from
Turkey (actually, the FTA agreement foresees this already in 2007) and in a few years
also with imports from the EU, so that any incentives to divert imports from these two
partners will disappear. Finally, the level of BiH’s MFN tariffs is already now rather
low, making trade diversion forces rather weak. 
One may also see the possibility of diverting BiH exports too much to the FTA
region, as a result of eliminating tariffs. In the future the BiH economy may be
negatively affected if by the time its FTA partners open up their markets for imports
from third countries BiH producers have not restructured and adjusted their
businesses to gain international competitiveness. In other words, the danger of too
much exports diverted toward the SEE region would be translated into a lack of
motivation to restructure. However, one important precondition for this to happen is
that BiH exports react to the implementation of the regional FTAs. The estimates of
the determinants of BiH exports in 1999-2005 (see section 4.2 of this report) show that
this has not yet been the case. Therefore, so far there are no grounds to believe that
BiH’s exports have been artificially diverted to the region.
Summing up, we do not see reasons to expect trade diversion effects resulting from
implementation of regional FTAs of any magnitude that could harm the BiH economy.
Trade deflection
Trade deflection can arise when in the absence of effectively implemented rules
of origin the country with the lowest external tariffs is likely to serve as an entry
point into its partner’s market (with higher tariffs) for the goods originating in non-
member countries.
When analysing possibilities for trade deflection, it is worth looking at tariff
protection of FTA partners from the third countries. Firstly, it is already clear from the
discussion in chapter 3 of this report that other SEE trade partners have higher
protection of agricultural trade than BiH (see also Annex 4). Therefore, it is very unlikely
to expect agricultural imports from third countries to reach the BiH market duty-free
through its SEE trading partners, due to weakly implemented rules of origin.
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However, such an option appears somewhat more feasible in the case of
manufacturing imports. The data on average manufacturing tariff rates from 200235
(see Annex 4) suggest that Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro and Moldova could
theoretically serve as possible entry points for industrial goods. These three FTA
partners had lower average tariff protection for manufacturing goods imported from
third countries. High transportation costs would likely make the procedure of duty-
free imports through Moldova prohibitively expensive. Therefore, the only important
import sources that could have served as entry points remain Croatia and Serbia and
Montenegro. Looking at the average third country import tariffs for industrial goods,
this could be more important for imports from Croatia36.
Indeed, there have been claims from BiH market participants and BiH government
representatives that specific third-country products were entering the BiH market
through Croatia duty-free (oil, beer, see Annex 10). However, so far the BiH
government has presented no convincing evidence of the violation of rules of origin.
What is more probable is that BiH sometimes serves as an entry point for duty-
free third party imports. Even looking at BiH’s average MFN tariff one can think of
several potentially profitable possibilities (see Annex 4). Moreover, there have been
claims from some of BiH’s FTA partners (Macedonia, Croatia, Serbia, see Appendix
10) that BiH origin certificates are faked. In addition, one of the interviewed BiH
market players admitted exporting to a final destination via another country precisely
to avoid specific protection measures that the destination country was applying on
goods from BiH. Taking into account the relative low level of institutional
development and relatively high corruption in BiH (even relative to the regional
average, see also section on rules of origin in part 4.4 of this report), it would be more
probable to expect trade deflection to occur with BiH being the regional entry point.
Anyway, it is hard to gather convincing evidence based only on the average tariff
rates and a limited number of interviews. To address the issue properly one would
need to carry out a large number of interviews with exporters from all the countries
concerned. However, it seems rather logical to expect that if trade deflection occurs
in the region BiH is more likely to be a convenient point of entry and less a ‘victim’ of
trade deflection, i.e. a country importing ‘rest of the world’ production with no tariffs
through the FTA partners.
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35 Tariffs have remained broadly stable since then.
36 Serbia and Montenegro at various stages ran different tariff policies and then harmonised their tariffs,
bringing the average common tariff rate for industrial products to between 5% and 6%. This was relatively
close to the BiH tariff (about 6.7% in 2005), which makes the profitability of faking rules of origin low, on
average. After the break-up in 2006, Serbia and Montenegro started to run independent trade policies.
4.4. Non-tariff barriers to trade (NTB)
This section relies heavily on the opinions of stakeholders from BiH. For the
purpose of this report, the research team carried out in-depth interviews with 8 BiH
companies involved in foreign trade operations with the use of a structured
questionnaire (see Annex 7). The questions covered licensing, quotas, additional levies
on trade, technical regulations and standards, sanitary and phytosanitary measures,
issues connected with rules of origin, functioning of customs services and any other
policy measures affecting trade. While drafting the questionnaire, existing
methodologies and results of the studies conducted so far for BiH were used as a
starting point (for the latter, see for example Causevic 2006, SP Trade Working
Group, 2005). The reader is directed to Annex 8 for more detailed information.
As popular opinion on the ‘ineffectiveness’ of the regional network of FTAs is that
the agreements have not facilitated trade, and as BiH has a large trade deficit, the focus
was on interviewing exporters. Out of 8 companies, 6 exported to the FTA countries
and 2 to the EU (but considered selling also to the SEE region). The companies were
mostly private (5, of which 3 had foreign ownership), 1 was state-owned and two had
a mixed form of ownership (private and state capital). Some of them imported some
inputs from the EU or SEE region. The firms were differentiated in size: 2 were very
large (3,000 workers), 4 were of ‘medium’ size (140-500 workers), and 2 were small (50
workers). They were also chosen to represent various manufacturing sectors. The
selection criteria required that companies should be either large exporters, producing
commodities that have a significant share of BiH’s total exports or/and having large
export potential. This resulted in a sample of enterprises producing the following
commodities: metals, car parts, wood, furniture, paper, and pharmaceuticals37.
In addition to interviews with the enterprises, the research team interviewed
representatives of business associations (the Foreign Trade Chamber, BiH
Associations of Employers), representatives of the BiH government and central
administration (Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations, the Central Bank
of BiH, Indirect Tax Authority, Export Credit Agency – IGA), advisory/technical
assistance programmes/business development agencies (IMF, EU TDI – EU Capacity
Building Initiative for Trade Development and FDI Attraction to BiH, EU programme
for technical assistance in custom and fiscal issues – CAFAO), and analysts and
researchers (Economics Institute Sarajevo, Faculty of Economics in Sarajevo, EPPU).
The other stake-holders were also interviewed with the use of the structured
questionnaire, whenever it was rational and possible to do so.
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37 The authors of this report are aware that the sectors differ with respect to regulations. The pharmaceuticals
industry, in particular, is expected to be the most regulated.
In general, the respondents were asked about:
• identification and estimates of the ‘magnitudes’ of barriers to trade,
• changes compared to the pre-FTAs period,
• the priority of barriers,
• proposed policies to cope with them.
Questions were differentiated according to the occupation and activity of
respondents.
Licensing
While import licensing is in practice restricted to specific sectors only, this was
reported as an additional burden in terms of waiting time. For example, the need to
deal with two ministries (of Health and Foreign Trade) in the case of imports of
pharmaceuticals was perceived as particularly difficult. External observers noted that
sometimes imports were over-licensed, and gave the example of retail consumer-
imports (e.g. of cars) that cannot be carried out by a physical person. However, 6
companies out of 8 reported no problems related to licensing.
Quotas/limitations for export/import
There were no problems reported with regard to quotas38.
Import levies in destination countries
When asked about additional import levies in BiH and at destination markets,
some respondents noted that the transition periods for the FTAs with Albania and
Moldova were still not over. The FTA with Kosovo was signed in October 2006.
Therefore, tariffs on goods shipped to these destinations are still applied.
The respondents also indicated the existence of ‘small’ or ‘soft’ border taxes in the
FTA countries (such as payments for transit). These are not very regulated, and
sometimes are paid and sometimes not.
Rules of origin
When asked about the difficulties connected with certifying origin of goods, some
companies complained about the costs of obtaining relevant certificates (EUR1
certificate in most cases), and on lengthy procedures, lack of information and
corruption. However, sometimes the reported problem with the BiH origin certificate is
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38 Import quotas for fresh meat were briefly introduced in 2005, to be abolished in 2006, but the sample of
interviewed companies did not include firms active in trade in agricultural products.
that it is not always recognised beyond the ex-Yugoslav market (for example in Romania
and Bulgaria). In this way, it limits possibilities to use the full potential of the FTAs.
Experts added that without diagonal cumulation of origin, at least among the
other SEE countries, fewer BiH products can qualify as of BiH origin. Therefore,
origin requirements in the present form create significant barrier for exports (CEFTA
2006 should improve the situation). 
BiH Customs
BiH customs were characterised by complicated and lengthy procedures, the
insufficient knowledge of staff and corruption, according to the representatives of 3
companies. They gave examples of lack of expertise (wrong classification of
transported goods, attempts to impose tariffs on already tariff-free imports, different
treatment of the same goods and documents at different border crossings). However,
five companies did not complain about the BiH customs service.
In fact, much in this sphere has improved recently (see chapter 3 for details). Time
spent on customs clearance and technical control in BiH (2 days, see Table 13) –
although longer than in Serbia or Romania – is the same or significantly shorter than
in the other FTA countries.
Respondents from the BiH central administration still see a lot of room for further
improvement of technical skills and reduction of corruption at border crossings. This is
because there is still evidence of corruption, including numerous cases of undervaluation
of imports and “preferences” for particular customs clearing houses. As for reform of the
customs service itself, the main issues are related to further improvement of capacity of
customs administration and harmonisation with EU standards.
Customs of other FTA countries
Three companies out of 8 complained also about Romanian and Moldovan
customs. Data from Table 13 suggests that there should be relatively little room for
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Source: World Bank, Doing Business 2007.
Table 13. Duration of trade procedures in BiH and in other FTA countries, 2006
Duration (days)  BiH Croatia Serbia Montenegro  Macedonia Albania Moldova Bulgaria Romania 
Export procedures:           
Documents preparation  11 7 2 2 19 11 22 15 9 
Inland transportation and handling  4 8 3 5 3 16 3 4 1 
Customs clearance and technical cont rol 2 3 1 7 7 2 3 2 .. 
Ports and terminal handling  5 8 5 5 3 5 5 5 4 
Totals: 22 26 11 19 32 34 33 26 14 
Number of documents needed for export  5 7 6 6 10 7 7 7 4 
Import procedures:           
Documents preparation  11 11 5 5 20 23 21 13 9 
Customs clearan ce and technical control  2 1 2 7 5 2 7 4 1 
Ports and terminal handling  8 3 2 3 6 5 5 6 2 
Inland transportation and handling  4 3 3 2 4 4 2 2 2 
Totals: 25 18 12 17 35 34 35 25 14 
Number of documents needed for import  7 9 8 8 10 12 7 10 4 
corruption in the Romanian service (the small number of documents needed,
relatively little time spent waiting at the border).
Technical standards
Interviewed companies did not perceive technical standards as an obstacle to
trade. All of them had to adhere to the technical standards required by their foreign
partners and saw the procedure as unavoidable (although costly). However, several
companies interviewed for a study by Causevic (2006) did point to the lack of
institutions dealing with quality control and technical standards as an important
factor determining BiH’s large trade deficit.
Policy makers stressed that although the agreements on mutual recognition of
technical standards have not yet been ratified either by Serbia or Croatia, both trading
partners recognise some BiH standards related to specific products. On the import
side they complained that effective lack of BiH standards allows a low quality of
imported products to penetrate the market. More discussion on progress in creating
internationally recognised institutes for certification of technical standards can be
found in chapter 3. It appears that the still largely dysfunctional institutions dealing
with standards are a more important obstacle for exports to the EU than to the SEE
partners. However, in the near future, as other FTA partners harmonise their
standards with the EU, these may become a significant barrier in intra-regional trade.
Sanitary and phytosanitary regulations
Two companies complained about the necessity of obtaining a BiH phytosanitary
certificate that is not recognised even in ex-Yugoslavia. They also needed to get a
Croatian one, thus increasing costs. However, it is difficult to draw any conclusions
as to the significance of this barrier, since half of the interviewed companies were not
able to answer this question.
The policy makers emphasised that the phytosanitary certificates are a problem
for agricultural trade and that BiH certificates have been questioned several times by
other SEE countries. The relevant bodies are slowly becoming operational now (see
chapter 3 for details), so an improvement will hopefully be seen in the future. At the
moment, a BiH certificate just adds costs and creates bureaucracy, while not being
recognised abroad.
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4.5. Backbone service sectors
There is a link between the functioning of services such as transport, utilities,
finance and telecommunications and the FDI and trade performance of countries. The
current state of such services and reforms aimed at reducing the costs and increasing
the availability of such services may play an important role in improving linkages to
global markets and production networks. In other words, sound regulation and
competition in trade-related services can strengthen the export response to trade
liberalisation, such as FTAs, and increase the welfare gains from liberalisation (Eby
Konan and Van Assche, 2006). Also, better functioning backbone services can increase
the attractiveness of the economy in question for foreign investments, which in turn
may also have a strong impact on exports. For these reasons, we briefly summarise the
barriers related to the functioning of trade-related services in BiH below.
Financial intermediation
Interviewed companies have often complained about the costs of their operating
capital. BiH firms (especially small ones) operate on tight margins, so the costs of
capital is a very important question for their business operations. This also has
consequences for insuring their exports. Small companies often do not insure them
since they perceive the costs (interest rates) as too high. Exporting companies also
noted that their clients from the ex-Yugoslav market face similar problems. They
cannot afford financial guarantees, which makes them either pay in cash, and freeze
their money, or resign from transactions, leading to lower demand in the region.
Almost completed privatisation, strong foreign investment and restructuring of
the banking sector are widely regarded as BiH’s key achievements. They are clearly
playing a positive role in improving the quality of financial services that BiH
companies have access to. Indeed, between 2002 and 2005 waves of EBRD-World
Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), the share
of companies indicating access to financing as an important barrier to operations,
declined, although even in 2005 it was still above average for the SEE region.
The rapid credit growth observed in recent years can be regarded as a positive
phenomenon, although it certainly poses policy challenges. In particular, it becomes
evident that more effective supervision and banks’ more reliable credit risk assessment
capacity is important in ensuring that the current boom supports a sustainable
development of BiH business and avoids instability of the financial sector, which would
be transmitted to production sectors. One of the recommendations raised by the IMF
was unification of banking supervision. This was rather uncontroversial as far as the
general principles are concerned, although BiH authorities remained divided on
important practical issues concerning the institutional set-up (IMF, 2006).
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However, overall progress in financial sector reform still appears to be lagging
behind BiH’s competitors in the SEE region. While EBRD transition indicators
suggest a slight improvement in the scores in the field of banking reform and interest
rate liberalisation between 2002 and 2006, other countries also recorded an
improvement along this dimension, leading to the gap to the SEE average as well as
other benchmark groups remaining unchanged (Figure 8). On a positive note, two
strengths of the BiH banking sector are its efficient and simple payments abroad
through local banks and a relatively liberal capital account regime for import
payments and export proceeds.
The spreads between lending and deposit rates in BiH are broadly similar to the
SEE average (6.1% in BiH vs. 7.1% SEE average in 2005), and somewhat higher than
in the CEE countries (4.2% in 2005; Investment Compact, 2006), while the inflation
rate in BiH was very low relative to other SEE and CEE countries. The perceived
difficulty in accessing capital and its cost differs between the interviewed companies
(both in our survey and in the survey carried out by Causevic, 2006). The interviews
confirm that access to capital is relatively easy for larger, well-established companies
and particularly for those with foreign investors. In contrast, smaller newly established
companies as well as state owned enterprises more often report problems of access to
capital and perceive banks as not much interested in co-operation with them. A much
larger BEEPS survey indicated that over 60% of companies perceived the cost of
financing as a problem and close to 50% viewed access to capital as difficult.
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Note: FTA7 denotes a group of SEE countries with FTA agreements which BiH that are studied in this report
(Serbia and Montenegro are treated separately). CEE denotes 8 EU member states that joined the EU in 2004.
CIS denotes 12 CIS member countries. Simple averages plotted for all groups.
Source: EBRD.
Figure 8. EBRD transition indicators of financial sector - BiH in the regional perspective, 2002
and 2006
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Summing up, problems related to financial sector development do not at present
appear to be playing a key role hindering the development of companies involved in
foreign trade operations, although smaller companies experience problems with
access to capital, which is also rather costly. However, in the longer run it is essential
that financial sector reforms is accelerated, keeping pace with rising demand for high
quality financial services from domestic companies. The competitiveness of the BiH
financial sector in the region will have an impact on the competitiveness of the BiH’s
exports, so reforms in the field should try to make up the gap that can currently be
observed relative to regional competitors. 
While several interviewed companies reported problems related to insurance of
foreign trade transactions, the Investment Guarantee Agency (IGA), which provides
export credit insurance, reports relatively modest demand for its services. This is
probably related to lack of information in companies on such possibilities and the fact
that many BiH exporters operate on small margins and try to avoid additional costs.
With increasing value added of BiH exports this may be changing and IGA capital
may prove insufficient to meet demand. More generally, difficulties in availability of
reasonably priced insurance of foreign trade transactions appear to be a significant
barrier to BiH’s trade.
Transport
Interviewed respondents complained about the quality of BiH’s railways and
roads. They tended to stress that railway transport is not always available, is slow and
expensive. Road transport therefore remains as the only alternative, although it is also
quite expensive and not particularly fast given the quality of the road network. The
condition of the roads, especially those in the East-West direction, is considered sub-
optimal. BEEPS survey confirmed that between 2002 and 2005 the share of
companies reporting transportation as a problem for their operations increased to
around 25%, which is significantly higher than the SEE average. 
The average waiting time at border crossings (as in other SEEs) is very high
compared to the average waiting time in Western Europe before 1992 (World Bank,
2004). A survey indicated that on average 24% of travel time is spent at borders, while
a reasonable waiting time should be about 2% (pre-Schengen crossing time). The
World Bank and the EU have made serious investments in border crossing
construction in recent years, but further improvements are needed to make border
crossing easier and cheaper.
The BiH transport infrastructure was heavily damaged during the 1990s war and
in subsequent years support form external donors has helped in gradual
improvements. The road network has been much reconstructed since then, but its
development has lagged behind the pace of increase in traffic. Improvements in road
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infrastructure would be an important factor improving the competitiveness of
companies based in BiH in the longer-term. The railways are in a worse condition
than road transport infrastructure. Before the war they functioned reasonably well,
but since then the railways have not returned to efficient operations, thus losing
almost all of its share in both freight and passenger transport. While in 1990 railways
accounted for 34% of freight transport, in 2000 this had collapsed to below 4%39. One
specific complication in this sphere relates to fragmentation of the rail network
between entities. This adds to inefficiencies in maintenance and operation costs and
contributes to railways making losses. Unification would theoretically appear the
easiest thing to fix (as it does not require costly investments in physical
infrastructure), but the solution hinges on political will.
Telecommunication
BEEPS shows that the share of BiH companies indicating telecommunications as
an obstacle to their functioning is higher than the regional average. Analysis of sectoral
indicators in a regional perspective confirms the relative backwardness of the sector in
BiH (Figure 9). Also, reforms of the sector are lagging behind other countries. The
EBRD index of reforms in telecommunication for BiH has stayed unchanged since
2000, whereas most other transition economies have recorded substantial progress in
this sphere. In 2006, even the average score for CIS countries (2.4) surpassed the result
for BiH (2.3) and FTA partner countries were well ahead (3.2). This leads to relatively
high costs of telecommunication services (Investment Compact, 2006).
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39 Data provided by the Word Bank in an undated note available at
http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/ECA/Transport.nsf/Countries/Bosnia%20&%20Herzegovina?Opendocument
Note: Phone penetration lines per 100 inhabitants. Internet penetration per 10,000 inhabitants.
Source: EBRD.
Figure 9. Selected telecommunication indicators, 2005
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4.6. Internal factors and issues specific to the BiH market
Government interventions
There was only one change in domestic policy that was reported to influence
trading conditions for the surveyed BiH exporters. This was the additional burden put
on exporters in early 2006 after the introduction of VAT. Since then exporters have
needed to prove that their merchandise has been exported in order to qualify for a
VAT refund. The required proof is in the form of returned invoices stamped by foreign
clients. The Indirect Tax Authority maintains that it is too early to lift this
requirement, as the possibility for faking exports in order to get VAT refunds is still
high. There was also one complaint about BiH’s public procurement favouring
foreign companies (by requiring standards that were easier to obtain abroad).
There was also one complaint about public procurement abroad, resulting from
the action of a strong destination country lobby. The lobby perceived a BiH producer
as a tough competitor, and managed to partially close the market for a specific BiH
product. The refusal of Serbian (and earlier Croatian) authorities to recognise BiH
origin certificates was also quoted as an example of foreign government intervention
hampering trade.
Supply side constraints
Some of the interviewed companies pointed to the need for privatisation and
restructuring. State-owned companies face higher uncertainty as to their future and
firms that have been for years ‘in the process of restructuring’ face high credit costs.
More generally, private agents typically make more optimal economic decisions than
the state in BiH as well as elsewhere. The BiH private sector accounted for 55% of the
GDP in 2006, which was still much lower than the average for the eight new EU
members (76%), and the SEE average (BiH excluded; 66%, EBRD, 2006).
Another constraint is related to the production structure inherited from ex-
Yugoslavia. BiH’s export flows broken down by commodity still reflect this. Due to
unfinished restructuring, a large part of production is still composed of metals and
other commodities with a low level of processing, leading to a narrow export base.
4.7. Summary
The analysis of BiH’s revealed comparative advantages does not give very strong
results, partly because of the unusually high level of data aggregation for which the
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calculations are possible. BiH appears to reveal more diversified comparative
advantages in trade with Croatia, relative to its trade with the EU.
Gravity equations for BiH trade flows indicate the following pattern: both BiH’s
exports and imports seem to be strongly influenced by the size of the destination or
origin market and by geographical distance. These relationships seem to be stronger
in the case of exports. Trade relations with other ex-Yugoslav markets enhance both
export and import flows. Exports to the EU are in line with basic gravity specification,
while imports are lower than predicted by the basic specification. The effects of
regional trade liberalisation were not found to significantly affect trade flows either in
the export or import equation. This suggests that FTAs have not (perhaps not yet)
played a role in boosting BiH trade with countries with which the agreements have
been signed. There are a few caveats that need to be added to this interpretation.
Firstly, FTA agreements are relatively new and their impact on trade flows may take
longer to materialise. Secondly, it may well be that some of the FTAs might have been
effective in reducing trade barriers for BiH’s exports while other agreements (for
reasons related to their design and / or implementation) have not played such a role.
Irrespective of lowering tariffs, there exist numerous non-tariff barriers that hamper
trade. Interviews with BiH entrepreneurs, policy makers and analysts, together with
limited comparative statistics, suggest that severe barriers to trade are related to the
following issues: lack of recognition of BiH phytosanitary certificates abroad, corruption
and the low qualifications of BiH customs (although respondents noted strong recent
improvements in this sphere), poor transport infrastructure (especially railways), over-
licensing in some sectors, and obtaining certificates of origin (waiting time, lack of
information, problems with acceptance of certificates). Regional statistics also point to
telecommunications infrastructure, that is lagging behind some other SEE countries, and
the costs of telecommunication services. Quite unexpectedly, respondents did not list
technical standards among the major trade barrier. Possibly, at the moment these pose a
significant barrier in trade with the EU only. Analysis of other trade-related services
suggests that the (under)development of the financial sector does not seem to be an
important obstacle to trade. However, given the supply-side constraints and the fact that
small BiH firms operate on tight margins, the gradual development of the sector is of
crucial importance for further support of BiH’s exports. Some BiH respondents also
indicated the existence of some ‘soft’ border taxes in the destination markets and
complained about the functioning of customs in selected foreign countries.
Estimation of possible trade diversion and trade creation effects is a natural step
that one would want to carry out in a study like this. However, in the case of BiH it
has proved difficult to assess these effects given the lack of sufficient data.
There are grounds to believe that some trade expansion happened with respect to
BiH’s imports and exports from the FTA region. However, one needs to confirm this
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once volume data are available. The possibility of trade diversion was checked with
the use of similarity indices for imports for the most important FTA partners. The
analysis showed that, contrary to popular opinion, there are no reasons to expect
trade diversion effects resulting from the implementation of regional FTAs of any
magnitude that could harm the BiH economy. As to the possibility of getting third-
country imports tariff-free due to violation of rules of origin, BiH may often be a
convenient point of entry and less the ‘victim’ of trade deflection, i.e. a country
importing ‘rest of the world’ production with no tariffs through the FTA partners.
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The general conclusion emerging from the analysis presented in this report is that
while the regional FTAs might have had some positive impact on the BiH economy,
this effect was not particularly strong and the full potential of the FTAs has not yet
fully materialised. The reasons for this are manifold, including the small economic
size of the SEE region relative to the EU and the short time that has passed since the
FTAs were implemented. One should remember that the regional liberalisation has
been overshadowed by growing trade with the EU countries. The CEFTA experience
from the early 1990s suggests that it may take longer before regional trade flows are
boosted more substantially to the benefit of all sides and that progress in economic
integration with the EU plays a role in this. Several non-tariff barriers to trade
between SEE countries are still in place and although there is some evidence of their
decrease after the implementation of FTAs, their elimination has been relatively slow
and uneven. The outlook for the future depends on the effectiveness of policies in
removing the remaining barriers to trade and the ability of BiH companies to meet
the challenges of increasing international competition. This section summarises the
recommendations related to such policies and not only to the implementation of FTAs,
which was the core of analysis in this paper. The focus is on trade potential with
regional SEE partners, although most of the issues discussed below are in fact
relevant for all foreign trade. Since completion of the report coincided with the
conclusion of negotiations on the multilateral regional trade agreement (CEFTA
2006), which replaces all bilateral FTAs, our recommendations are no longer related
to the future functioning of FTAs. However, the lessons and recommendations from
this analysis are relevant for the new CEFTA, if only because many features of the
FTAs were preserved in CEFTA 2006. Moreover, several of the recommendations are
in fact much broader in scope and remain relevant in the context of general trade
policies irrespective of their specific institutional set-up.
There are clearly several trade-specific policies that could help in utilising the
potential of the FTAs with BiH’s regional partners and CEFTA 2006. However, one key
conclusion emerging from our analysis is that several problems hindering the
development of BiH’s foreign trade are related to the general economic and institutional
framework, investment climate and conditions for entrepreneurship. In other words,
the first set of key barriers to improved trade performance is of a domestic nature.
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5. Policy recommendations
Therefore, recommendations on general BiH economic policies are an important part
of this section. It is also important to realise the interrelations between various policies.
While some policy measures discussed below may have a positive effect irrespective of
decisions in other spheres, other will only work if implemented as a package. The
coherence of the overall policy stance is very important from this perspective.
5.1. Recommendations for general economic policies in the BiH
The first, very general, recommendation concerns the need for simplification of
the institutional framework for economic policy management and – to the extent this
is possible – the need to opt for simple regulations so that inefficiencies in
implementation are not magnified. It has been widely recognised that the extremely
complicated governing structure of BiH implies certain costs – in terms of fiscal
expenditures on the functioning of the large administration at various levels, but also
in terms of co-ordination problems in defining and implementing policies.
Additionally, bargaining power in various levels of government delays economic
reforms and sometimes leads to deadlocks. 
Some specific examples concern the lack of functioning of state level ministries
that could take a leading role e.g. in defining BiH’s agricultural policy. The creation
of these ministries would help ensure coherence between policy making (which at
the moment remains at the entity levels), its implementation and other policies,
notably those related to foreign trade in industrial and agricultural products (which
is set at the state level). 
Implementation of the above recommendations is quite difficult for purely
political reasons (although it is seems that a ministry of agriculture will be created in
the near future). Different stakeholders use the debate on shifting powers between
institutions and governance levels as an element of the bargaining process on other
issues. Wider public support may be needed to eventually force decision makers at
various levels of government to reach a compromise. In order to build such public
pressure it would be advisable to ensure wide dissemination of analysis on the
implications of alternative institutional set-ups. The international community may
play a role in this process and this may prove a more efficient strategy than direct
external pressure on domestic policy leaders, which has already been used quite
extensively for the last decade or so. The EU accession process should also be used as
a catalyst for improvement and simplification of economic policy management, since
BiH’s integration with the EU will require better economic coordination and
harmonisation with the relevant EU institutions.
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The capacity of BiH institutions is a problem in itself. This applies to general
economic policies as well as to trade policy-specific institutions (e.g. those dealing
with negotiations on WTO accession, the SAA, trade disputes, etc.) where anecdotal
evidence suggests that relevant ministries have not always been prepared to deal with
international trade disputes on a technical level and have not provided support for the
legitimate claims of BiH traders. The recruitment and training strategy may need to
be revised to ensure improvement in this sphere.
Disappointing export results in some sectors are down to the weak
competitiveness of these branches. This in turn is directly linked to delays in
privatisation and very slow restructuring. A serious acceleration of privatisation and
restructuring is needed if the BiH export base is to be widened to include more
capital- and technology-intensive products with higher value added. Privatisation may
also help in attracting FDI, which is vital for the upgrade of the competitiveness of the
BiH manufacturing sector. Also, the closure of loss-making enterprises (mostly state-
owned) through the bankruptcy procedure would be necessary to make the real sector
more productive and based on sound corporate governance.
One priority area where well designed state support is needed is the creation of a
favourable climate for the functioning of small and medium enterprises. Among other
measures, there is room for substantial simplification of business registering process
(this should also be accompanied by harmonisation of some of the rules between the
entities), a simplified tax structure and streamlined inspection procedures.
Motivating companies to restructure needs to be accompanied by reforms aimed
at bringing more flexibility to the labour market. The problems are related to the
fragmentation of labour markets, the large unregistered economy and high tax wedge
on (registered) labour. A change in the set of incentives is needed to increase the
attractiveness of registered employment (this will likely require a reduction of the tax
wedge for labour) and reducing barriers to labour mobility. Several detailed
recommendations concerning the labour market can be found in World Bank (2005).
It should also be noted that BiH’s average gross wages are higher than in Bulgaria,
Romania, Macedonia and Serbia and unit labour costs have been recently rising faster
than in neighbouring countries (IMF, 2006). Reduction of the tax wedge could be one
mechanism helping to solve this problem, as well as improving the skills (and
therefore the productivity) of the labour force. However, the most important
challenge, related at the same time to the labour market and to the competitiveness of
the economy, is unification of the two entities’ social security systems. If done this
would most likely improve labour mobility.
Broad economic policies should avoid creating incentives excessively supporting
the current leading export branches (e.g. metals, etc.) at the expense of other sectors.
The attraction of FDI could be a very important catalyst for the development of
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competitive advantages in various sectors of the BiH economy and integration of BiH
companies in supply chains of regional and transnational companies (mostly with EU
headquarters). It would help to boost exports both to the SEE region and to the EU,
since deepening trade integration in the SEE region and with the EU builds a large
market for foreign investors. Thus, policies stimulating FDI inflows are a very
important element of any foreign trade promotion strategy.
Access to infrastructure is an important determinant of investment decisions and
the competitiveness of businesses. Given underdevelopment in infrastructure provision
in BiH, improvements in this field could have a substantial impact on the
competitiveness of BiH companies. Taking into account the central state’s budget
constraints and at other government levels, priority should be given to creating an
appropriate environment for development of privately owned or operated infrastructure
services, such as telecommunications, rather than making heavy public investments in
infrastructure projects. Transparent privatisation of utilities and setting the right
investment incentives and regulatory framework would promise the best outcomes.
Improving the reliability of the power supply appears important for some companies,
including some of the largest exporters. On-going road transport projects should in the
medium- to long-term have a positive effect on business conditions. Reconstruction and
increasing capacities of railways is necessary for further expansion of merchandise
trade, especially for the metal sector and oil derivatives. The existing road network is
unlikely to be much expanded in the medium term, so railways should play a more
important role for bulk transport in the region. Additionally, there are some operational
and procedural issues that could be tackled rather easily thus reducing costs and time
of transport within the region. These measures include: harmonisation and
simplification of documentation at border crossings, signing and implementation of
international customs conventions (Kyoto, ATA , 1984 UN convention), and more
efficient system for bilateral trip permits (see also World Bank, 2004).
Analysis of other trade-related services suggests that the (under)development of
the domestic financial sector does not seem to be a major obstacle to trade. Although
it seems that the bulk of trade has been conducted without any kind of financial
insurance or adequate financial guarantees. This clearly limits possibilities for new
trade contacts and quickly growing trade turnover. Given the supply-side constraints
and the fact that small BiH firms operate on tight margins, the gradual development
of the sector is of crucial importance for the further support of BiH’s exports.
From the foreign trade perspective, one relevant fiscal policy issue concerns excise
taxes. The whole system would need to be adjusted so that it does not send
counterproductive incentives to firms. Also, given the constraints on implementation
capacity, it needs to be easy to monitor/implement. One example of ineffective
regulation in this sphere is excise taxes on coffee, alcohol and regulations for retail
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sales in duty free zones. Problems with wrongly drafted excise legislation have caused
problems for local producers. It took some time before this issue was resolved. Some
problems related to excise tax functioning were still being reported – these concerned
e.g. the lengthy procedure to get a waiver from excise duties on alcohol to be used as
an intermediate input in the production process (e.g. in the pharmaceuticals industry).
5.2. Recommendations for specific trade-related policies
One key trade policy issue that emerged prominently in the debate on the
functioning of BiH’s FTAs and the optimal shape of the new CEFTA agreement
concerned the extent of liberalisation of agricultural trade and the perceived unfair
competition from a few agricultural products (e.g. meat, milk) from producers in
BiH’s key trade partners – Croatia and Serbia and Montenegro (and more recently
Serbia). This has led BiH to act unilaterally on introducing market protection
measures on selected imports from these two FTA partners and to demand that these
measures become part of the new CEFTA agreement. Lack of consensus on this last
point resulted in BiH not joining the 8 other SEE countries that initiated the CEFTA
2006 agreement on 9 November 2006 and nervous last-minute negotiations before
signing CEFTA 2006 on 16 December 2006. As a result, BiH agreed to abandon its
protective measures while retaining the right to react in the future if imports cause
serious disturbances to its markets. We believe this is a good compromise from BiH’s
perspective and below, we suggest a way of thinking on the more general issues
related to regional trade liberalisation.
In our view, BiH should not expect any strong gains from attempts to protect and
develop selected domestic sectors by means of trade barriers. The example of selected
agricultural products is telling – while BiH decided to set tariffs on Croatian and
Serbian imports it still lacks any coherent strategy for the development of its
agricultural sector and has so far been unable even to set up a ministry that could work
out such a strategy at the state level. Running efficient sectoral policies is difficult
everywhere and requires strong institutional capacity to carry out the necessary
analysis to support informed policy choices that then need efficient implementation
tools. Otherwise, sectoral policies are likely to end up being influenced by the lobbying
of interest groups without considering of the interests of the whole economy. It seems
that BiH’s authorities have no clear strategy for market protection and foreign trade.
The general orientation is to diversify exports by increasing the share of goods with
higher added value, while at the same time protective measures were designed for
small-scale agriculture producers with low productivity.
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Another risk with setting protective measures is that it provides arguments for
partner countries to raise protection of their domestic markets. In other words, with
rather limited institutional resources, concentrating them on selected sectoral policies
may not be optimal, and without such resources sectoral policies may end up being
highly inefficient and protectionism may only motivate other countries to raise
barriers to BiH’s exports. In this context, it is important to remember that BiH had a
revealed comparative advantage in agricultural trade with Croatia (chapter 4), even
at times when trade barriers were in place. Additionally, the BiH economy does not
exhibit production surpluses in any segment, so “protection of domestic production”
is likely mainly to lead to higher prices and lower the purchasing power of consumers.
Therefore, protecting agriculture and raising other barriers appears to go against
BiH’s overall interests. A similar reasoning can apply to other industries. 
Balkan trading partners (Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro) indeed appear to
subsidise their economies, including the agricultural sector, more than in the case in
BiH. In our view the best response to this could be an attempt to promote
harmonisation of rules on state aid at the regional level (and signs of this can indeed
be seen in the CEFTA 2006 agreement) and proceed with full liberalisation of trade.
Persuading partners to agree on state aid rules will certainly be very difficult (also
because of the pressures of interest groups in these countries), but only wide coverage
and efficient implementation of CEFTA 2006 can ensure the agreement is relevant for
the overall development of the economies (see chapter 2).
Summing up, while past trade relations with Croatia and Serbia and Montenegro
in some sectors might have been perceived – perhaps rightly so – as ‘unfair’ from
BiH’s perspective, it is debatable whether BiH would improve its situation by trying
to retaliate with protectionist measures. Unilateral moves in this respect are very
unlikely to produce desirable results, especially that FTAs provide dispute settlement
mechanisms (although there have been doubts as to its functionality). New rules
included in CEFTA 2006 should bring an improvement in this sphere. This whole
problem can also be taken as another argument favouring early WTO accession,
which could help resolving issues related to state aid and dumping.
The preceding analysis has confirmed the existence of several technical barriers
to trade, complicating relations between BiH and its partner FTA countries. In
particular, problems related to certification and standards are among the key
obstacles to expanding BiH’s export potential (although the relative importance of
this appears higher in the case of expansion to EU markets than for trade creation
among the FTA signatories covered in this report). Therefore, we see a need to
concentrate efforts on creating fully operational and effective institutions and to adopt
modern standards and legislation, since the bulk of current regulations are outdated
and not in line with the EU. Internationally recognisable institutions for certification,
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accreditation, metrology and standards should boost the export capacities of domestic
companies and promote the development of the manufacturing sector. So far,
progress on agencies responsible for standardisation, metrology, intellectual property
and accreditation has been rather slow and no clear plan for capacity building is
easily visible. Progress to date has been mostly driven by EU requests, but very often
newly established or reformed institutions have not been able to provide basic services
for traders, although the functioning of the Veterinary Institute has been better. EC
(2006) also underlines the need for further development of the market surveillance
system, which remains weak.
One general recommendation related to the making of trade policy is that it could
be improved by making the whole process more transparent and therefore limiting the
scope for ‘unfair’ lobbying by interest groups. Forcing them to switch to more
transparent lobbying by requiring that they openly present and motivate their
positions would be beneficial, although arguably very difficult. A counterpart to this
is the need to build stronger analytical capacity within the government and in
independent institutions to be able to verify the claims of lobby groups. This analytical
capacity can perhaps be supported from sources outside the government sector, e.g.
it should be easy to ensure financing – even from external, e.g. EU sources – for local
economic analytical centres. It would also be helpful if all exporters and importers
had a platform to exchange their views on the obstacles to trade they face. This could
help in collecting such vital information in one place, to motivate action from the
government when necessary and limit the scope for the lobbying of the most powerful
and well connected (but not necessarily representative) groups.
An important related issue is the need for improved collection of foreign trade
data and making them publicly available. Recent developments in data collection
appear to be moving in the right direction. The poor quality of past data is a reality
one cannot do much about, but an important improvement, and an easy one to
implement, would be to ensure that all existing data are freely available in the public
domain. The same applies to better quality data now collected primarily from the ITA.
The authors of this report have encountered peculiar problems in trying to access to
existing datasets, which were deemed ‘unofficial’ and therefore ‘not to be revealed’.
Such an approach may benefit narrow circles of institutions or people with insider
access to data, but is surely detrimental to the quality of the policy making of the
country as a whole. For BiH, the more independent the analysis (by academic,
research and other institutions), the better are the options for the country’s trade
policy – and authorities should in fact try to promote such research and at the very
least try to facilitate it by freely publishing all existing datasets.
BiH’s tariff structure, while relatively simple and generally avoiding high rates,
nevertheless has some particularities that may harm trade and domestic production.
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It appears that a broad vision on tariff policy is needed to avoid a situation where
some specific elements of the policy are set under the influences of lobbies without
taking into account the broader economic impact. One issue concerns custom tariffs
on some raw materials and intermediate products that are not produced in BiH (and
not in the FTA countries) but are used in production processes in BiH. This reduces
the effective rate of protection for processed products and may be detrimental to
domestic production capacity. 
The export/import procedures at the border could also be simplified and made
more predictable (in terms of waiting times). In particular, it would be advisable to
limit the possibility to apply various small fees. Some of these fees (a fee for processing
customs declarations) need to be dismantled in relation to the negotiation process with
the EU given that they are not compatible with the relevant EU acquis. A related issue
concerns the way these fees are collected. The present system, in which sometimes very
small amounts need to be transferred by separate bank transfers (in some instances
leading to bank fees exceeding the value of transfers), could be improved by replacing
the fees with stamp taxes (apart from reducing the number of fees to be paid). 
There have been numerous complaints about corruption in the customs service
and lengthy customs procedures. Long waiting times and the low number of cases per
day per customs officer also reflect this. Also, there have been complaints from the
central administration about undervaluation of imports and smuggling. Much has
improved in this area recently (see section 3.2.1 of this report). However, efforts still
need to be put into further strengthening of the capacity of customs, including better
coordination between different custom offices and moving more customs offices to the
border (which should limit ‘local’ corruption). Gains may be seen in higher budget
revenues (also in VAT and excise40 – due to correct valuation).
There seems to be scope for export promotion and information provision services
for companies interested in expanding their activities in foreign markets. The key
issue here is ensuring that these services are of high quality and carried out at
reasonable cost. The most natural approach for BiH would be to try to learn from the
best practice in such services (e.g. Ireland, Slovenia, perhaps Turkey) taking into
account the limited capacity of the BiH administration.
Issuance of certificates of origin does not appear to be among the key issues
hindering BiH companies’ foreign trade operations, but is nevertheless causing some
problems. The problems appear to be related to negative past experience with faked
certificates. Simplification and unification of procedures, strengthening the credibility of
issuance of EUR1 certificates and better controls of foreign certificates (also by closer co-
operation with relevant institutions in the SEE region) may be the best way to proceed. 
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40 Especially when tariffs will be lower in the future (at least vis-a-vis the EU).
5.3. Sectoral recommendations
For the last 2 years or so the metal industry has been among the key drivers of BiH’s
export performance. This trend is likely to continue at least in the near future as recent
foreign investments boost production capacity. While this is clearly a positive
phenomenon, increasing the concentration of exports in a sector very vulnerable to
international cyclical swings exposes the country to the risk of macroeconomic
instability. BiH comparative advantages in the metal sector will be explored, but
government policies should avoid attempts to give disproportional support for this
sector. Efforts to improve general conditions for investors, simplification of foreign
trade formalities, improvements in the transportation sector (particularly railways) and
the reliability of electricity provision should be particularly welcomed by the sector. 
One sector where, according to the consensus view, BiH may have substantial
potential is production of automotive parts. This follows both from the strong tradition of
the sector during the Yugoslavia period (and thus the abundance of technical and
engineering skills in the labour force and established co-operation with key global players,
e.g. the strong presence of Volkswagen in BiH) and from the experience of several ex-
CEFTA members, now EU member states, such as Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland,
that have been attracting growing flows of FDI in the sector and have become important
European players in the production of several automotive components. 
The problems hindering faster development of the sector are not that different
from those observed elsewhere. An in-depth study by the World Bank (2006) identified
that the most important perceived problems relate to the high cost of labour (high
social security contributions), lack of harmonisation of several economic policies and
implementation practice between entities, reservations towards FDI among some
stakeholders and outdated technology at some plants. Interviews with selected
companies from this sector (mostly foreign-owned) carried out as part of this project
confirmed their strong reliance on imported inputs and in some cases only limited the
level of processing taking place locally (see also Causevic and Domazet, 2006). On the
other hand, these firms are characterised by high quality output, they do not face
problems with certification (as this is done using the established practice of parent
companies abroad) and have large potential for expansion. In this view, attracting
more FDI to the sector is vital for its future development and could lead to strong
export expansion in the medium- to long-term. The provision of information for
prospective investors, help in establishing contacts between BiH producers and
potential clients / investors and support for marketing of BiH products are important
elements of the strategy supporting the sector. Similar objectives motivated the
creation of the Automotive Custer BiH41, which was supported by foreign donors
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(GTZ). The creation of such self-organised producer groups appears to be a potentially
promising option also for other sectors, as it allows explorations of economies of scale
in activities such as marketing, information exchange, etc.
Yet another sector with particularly strong export potential is food and beverage
processing. BiH has very favourable natural conditions for cultivation e.g. of fruits and
vegetables. Also, there appear promising opportunities in the expansion of low-tech
organic produce and ethnic products (World Bank, 2006). The barriers to faster
development of the sector appear to be related to sector fragmentation, lack of capital
to invest in high-tech processing, lack of promotion and marketing strategy and lack of
information on existing opportunities for potential investors, producers and clients.
The development of the sector and its exports hinges on the attraction of investments,
particularly foreign investments, export promotion, information provision on existing
opportunities to SMEs, the availability of training to small producers, support for
merging (or creating producer groups) of small enterprises into farming and producer
groups so that they can reap economies of scale in terms of access to credit, marketing,
building brand names, packing, investing in production technology (new processing
lines, new crops). All these actions could become part of a simple and coherent
agricultural development strategy that is still missing in BiH. Complete alignment with
EU sanitary and phytosanitary standards is an essential part of the package.
Another sector with a somewhat similar characteristics to food processing is
production of wood products. Again, the advantage is abundance of material (wood,
particularly hard wood – this differentiates BiH from CEE countries), a tradition of
development in the sector and relatively cheap labour force. The current problem is
concentration of production and exports of wood with only very limited processing.
The suggested solutions are similar to the ones for food processing. Know-how on
design, high-tech processing equipment and marketing of products is needed. This
requires both capital (which may need to come from abroad) and self-organisation of
the industry to explore economies of scale and facilitate information flows. 
Yet another issue pertains to the pharmaceuticals sector. One specific obstacle
identified here is related to the licensing of exports of medicines that is perceived by
companies as too cumbersome, bureaucratic and time consuming (licenses must be
approved by both Ministry of Health and the MoFTER). Simplification of the
procedure for domestic producers (without compromising on prevention of narcotics
trade) could be contemplated.
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Trade flows of early CEFTA members
Source: IMF DOTS.
Figure 10. Exports to other early CEFTA members in USD millions, 1993-2005
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Figure 11. Imports from other early CEFTA members in USD millions, 1993-2005
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Intra-Balkan trade shares, 1999-2005 
Notes: 
• Problems with foreign trade data for Serbia & Montenegro imply that shares of reported estimates of SEE8
trade are likely somewhat overestimated for Serbia & Montenegro and underestimated for Croatia.
• Exports of a column country to row countries in % of total exports 
Source: Own calculations based on IMF DOTS with the exception of BiH - Serbia & Montenegro trade flows
which were taken from BiH central bank database, Serbia & Montenegro trade flows with Croatia,
Macedonia which were taken from Central Bank of Serbia (2002-2005 data) and Christie (2002)-1999 data.
Table 14. Intra-regional export shares of FTA countries, 1999-2005
1999 Albania BiH Bulgaria Croatia Macedonia Moldova Romania 
Serbia & 
Montenegro  
Albania  0.0 0.9 0.2 1.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 
BiH 0.0  0.2 12.8 1.5 0.0 0.1 17.0 
Bulgaria 0.0 0.0  0.0 2.0 1.1 1.6 1.1 
Croatia 0.1 14.4 0.1  3.7 0.0 0.1 2.0 
Macedonia 1.5 1.1 3.0 1.5  0.0 0.1 14.7 
Moldova 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0  1.2 0.0 
Romania 0.0 0.8 1.4 0.1 0.1 8.9  4.1 
Serbia & 
Montenegro 1.2 18.2 4.3 NaN 9.3 0.0 1.0  
EU 94.4 57.9 58.2 67.3 45.2 28.2 71.4 51.2 
SEE8 2.9 34.5 10.4 14.6 17.8 10.2 4.3 39.0 
         
2002 Albania BiH Bulgaria Croatia Macedonia Moldova Romania 
Serbia & 
Montenegro  
Albania  0.1 0.7 0.3 1.2 0.0 0.1 0.6 
BiH 0.0  0.2 14.4 1.6 0.1 0.1 16.6 
Bulgaria 0.0 0.1  0.2 2.0 0.5 1.3 1.1 
Croatia 0.0 14.3 0.3  5.3 0.0 0.3 2.1 
Macedonia 1.5 1.2 2.2 1.2  0.0 0.1 10.2 
Moldova 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0  0.8 0.1 
Romania 0.0 0.1 2.8 0.2 0.1 8.8  1.1 
Serbia & 
Montenegro 2.2 19.5 3.1 NaN 22.1 0.1 0.9  
EU 92.8 60.0 59.7 65.1 53.8 26.6 72.6 63.4 
SEE8 3.8 35.2 9.6 16.4 32.3 9.6 3.5 31.8 
         
2005 Albania BiH Bulgaria Croatia Macedonia Moldova Romania 
Serbia & 
Montenegro  
Albania  0.1 0.5 0.2 1.3 0.0 0.1 0.7 
BiH 0.2  0.6 14.7 2.5 0.0 0.5 21.1 
Bulgaria 0.5 0.2  0.5 3.7 0.7 2.7 2.3 
Croatia 0.0 15.8 1.4  4.0 0.0 0.8 5.8 
Macedonia 1.6 0.8 2.0 0.9  0.0 0.2 7.7 
Moldova 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0  1.2 0.1 
Romania 0.2 1.6 3.8 1.0 0.2 10.6  2.8 
Serbia & 
Montenegro 5.0 14.2 3.0 NaN 22.5 0.0 1.1  
EU 88.7 58.2 56.6 62.0 53.1 27.4 67.8 49.3 
SEE8 7.5 32.8 11.4 17.3 34.2 11.4 6.5 40.6 
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 external trade by goods in 2003-2006
Table 15. BiH export and import of goods, by HS chapters, in KM thousands, 2003-2006
Source: BiH Agency for Statistics.
  EXPORT IMPORT 
    2003 2004 2005 1-3Q 2006 2003 2004 2005 1-3Q 2006 
  TOTAL 2 322 846 2 818 780 3 783 280 3 793 085  8 318 941 9 305 942 11 178 545 8 130 574  
I ANIMALS & ANIMAL PRODUCTS  16 976 24 497 35 421 29 224 282 450 265 025 300 405 168 179 
II VEGETABLE PRODUCTS  38 662 34 495 43 335 34 535 459 461 492 526 489 955 332 376 
III ANIMAL OR VEGETABLE FATS  1 796 11 680 24 335 16 884 97 472 110 170 96 819 66 798 
IV PREPARED FOODSTUFF  84 864 96 412 120 238 103 753 1 028 338 1 090 883 1 094 461 834 326 
V MINERAL PRODUCTS  220 207 332 422 503 060 443 662 913 850 1 181 196 1 585 540 1 387 583  
VI CHEMICAL PRODUCTS  62 076 210 352 286 550 281 376 790 215 876 964 1 037 509 770 335 
VII PLASTIC AND RUBBER  38 356 43 152 61 924 74 729 403 631 446 086 518 272 382 142 
VIII HIDES & SKINS  60 067 69 826 69 591 78 299 96 285 114 971 147 918 183 347 
IX WOOD & WOOD PRODUCTS  390 987 429 256 376 614 329 031 93 550 100 497 124 466 88 056 
X WOOD & PULP PRODUCTS  55 963 73 024 78 158 68 539 270 706 295 873 321 845 233 466 
XI TEXTILE & TEXTILE ARTICLES  167 296 163 505 157 575 184 973 465 038 488 395 574 568 433 596 
XII FOOTWEAR, HEADWEAR  113 249 107 779 119 918 222 176 143 551 157 490 178 615 140 445 
XIII 
ARTICLES OF STONE, PLASTER,  
CEMENT, ASBESTOS  21 494 25 982 30 713 30 232 337 634 312 926 319 205 216 327 
XIV 
PEARLS, PRECIOUS METALS  
OR SEMI-PREC.  STONES 
174 72 503 1 287 4 099 5 243 6 161 5 853 
XV BASE METALS & ARTICLES THEREOF  520 895 701 903 946 988 1 027 988  695 504 838 098 1 068 844 835 551 
XVI MACHINERY & MECHANICAL  APPLIANCES  191 494 202 793 543 973 465 848 1 278 647 1 447 067 1 980 797 1 238 479  
XVII TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT  67 001 51 434 92 588 73 337 596 980 702 498 911 419 560 212 
XVIII INSTRUMENTS  MEASURING, MUSICAL  16 925 15 873 18 659 10 771 115 621 125 078 157 100 88 355 
XIX ARMS AND AMMUNITION  15 845 17 808 35 613 20 324 4 917 4 107 6 359 2 906 
XX MISCELLANEOUS  207 908 201 344 231 367 294 567 208 828 215 714 235 980 160 039 
XXI 
WORKS OF ART, COLLECTORS' PIECES  
AND ANTIQUES  222 415 1 458 865 4 703 3 999 836 361 
  UNCLASSIFIED  30 387 4 756 4 700 688 27 460 31 137 21 471 1 844 
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Source: Own calculations based on data from Agency for Statistics of BiH.
Table 16. BiH export structure, by main trading partners, 2005
 EU 25 Russia Turkey Croatia 
Serbia 
& Montenegro  
Macedonia Albania 
BIH export in 2005,  
in KM millions  2023 3 23 775 587 35 8 
Food and live animals  3% 10% 1% 7% 8% 1% 2% 
Beverages and tobacco  0% 0% 0% 2% 1% 0% 0% 
Crude materials, inedible,  
except fuels  19% 0% 17% 11% 17% 6% 72% 
Mineral fuels, lubricants  
and related materials  
3% 0% 1% 14% 21% 0% 0% 
Animal and vegetable oils,  
fats and waxes  
0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 
Chemicals and related  
products, n.e.s.  
3% 1% 28% 2% 6% 2% 7% 
Manufactured goods  
classified chiefly  
by material  
24% 27% 17% 44% 24% 39% 11% 
Machinery and transport  
equipment 23% 11% 31% 7% 13% 14% 3% 
Miscellaneous  
manufactured articles  21% 37% 6% 9% 7% 37% 2% 
Commodities and  
transactions, n.e.c.  3% 13% 1% 2% 2% 0% 3% 
Source: Own calculations based on data from Agency for Statistics of BiH.
Table 17. BiH import structure, by main trading partners, 2005
 EU25 Russia Turkey Croatia 
Serbia 
& Montenegro  
Macedonia  Albania 
BiH import in 2005,  
in KM millions  
5 664 322 314 1 886 1 135 99 2 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Food and live animals  12% 5% 14% 14% 23% 0% 40% 
Beverages  
and tobacco  2% 0% 0% 8% 7% 0% 0% 
Crude materials,  
inedible, except fuels  2% 0% 0% 2% 4% 2% 0% 
Mineral fuels,  lubricants  
and related materials  4% 82% 1% 29% 11% 0% 10% 
Animal and vegetable  
oils, fats and waxes  0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 
Chemicals and related  
products, n.e.s.  
11% 0% 6% 11% 13% 4% 16% 
Manufactured goods  
classified chiefly   
by material  
21% 6% 21% 17% 14% 8% 18% 
Machinery and  
transport equipment  
35% 5% 21% 8% 10% 78% 10% 
Miscellaneous  
manufactured articles  
9% 1% 30% 8% 10% 6% 4% 
Commodities and  
transactions, n.e.c . 3% 0% 7% 2% 7% 2% 1% 
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MFN tariff rates in BiH and in other SEEs
Source: Excerpted from WB (2004), p. 31.
Table 18. Average MFN applied tariffs in SEE, in percent, 2002
Country All goods Agriculture  Industrial goods  
Albania 7.4 9.5 7 
BH 6 5 6.2 
Bulgaria  9.7 16.7 8.6 
Croatia 5 10.2 4.2 
Macedonia, FYR  12.6 20.8 11.2 
Moldova 5 10.1 4.2 
Romania 17.1 23.1 16.1 
Serbia 7.4 15.7 6.2 
Montenegro  6.1 12.2 5.2 
comparator:  
  European Union  
4.4 9.4 4.2 
Source: Own calculations on the basis of data provided by the EU Capacity Building Initiative for Trade
Development and FDI Attraction to BiH 
Table 19. Average MFN applied tariff in BiH, by HS2, 2005
HS Description  Simple average tariff  
I Live animals and animal products  5.8 
II Vegetable products  3.7 
III Fats and oils  2.5 
IV Processed foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco  9.9 
V Mineral products  1.1 
VI Chemical products  2.7 
VII Plastics, rubber and r elated products  7.2 
VIII Leather, skin and related products  6.4 
IX Timber and timber products  3.7 
X Wood pulp, paper and board  5.8 
XI Fabrics and fabric products  10.5 
XII Shoes, hats, and cups  13.8 
XIII Glass, stone products, cement  7.9 
XIV Pearls, precious stones  5.4 
XV Non-precious metals  5.8 
XVI Machinery and equipment  6.6 
XVII Transport equipment  6.0 
XVIII Measure and controlling equipment  4.4 
XIX Arms and ammunition  11.2 
XX Various manufactures  9.4 
XXI Works of art  2.1 
 Total 6.4 
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These are the data used for the gravity model of the chapter 4.
Data for trade flows between BiH and Serbia & Montenegro for the period 1999-
2005 were taken from BiH Central Bank's Annual Reports. These data were expressed
in convertible marks figures. Therefore, we have used average annual BiH/USA
exchange rates to recalculate these figures. Trade flows for 1998 were obtained from
the UN COMTRADE database. Data for the population of Serbia & Montenegro for
the period 1998-2001 were available at the Serbian Statistics Office. The data for the
rest of period we have obtained from the CIA Factbooks. 
Distance has been measured as the distance between Sarajevo and partner
countries’ capital cities, in kilometres. For collecting the data on these distances our
source was www.indo.com/distance, which measures them using the “great circle
distance” formula. It takes into account the shape of the Earth and calculates the
minimum distance between two places “as the bird flies”.
For the calculation of exchange rate variability we have used nominal bilateral
exchange rates between BiH and partner countries. We obtained these data from the
Pacific Exchange Rates Service, but only for EU members and several other countries.
The same data for Albania, Croatia, Lithuania, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovenia and
Ukraine for the period May 2000 - December 2005 and for Macedonia and Moldova
for the period November 2001 - December 2005, were obtained from www.fxtop.com.
For the rest of the period for these countries we have obtained daily exchange rates
from www.oanda.com, and then calculated monthly averages. 
Along with these data that were be used for the creation of variables for the model
a set of dummy variables were created. The data for dummy variables that aim to
capture the effect of bilateral free trade agreements, namely the dates of
implementation of the FTA agreements, were collected from BiH Ministry of Foreign
Trade and Economic Relations sources.
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Explanation of data sources
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Revealed comparative advantage indices
of BiH by export market
Source: Own calculations.
Figure 12. RCA for BiH-Croatia trade in 2005
Source: Own calculations.
Figure 13. RCA for BiH-Slovenia trade in 2005
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Source: Own calculations.
Figure 14. RCA for BiH-EU-25 trade in 2005
Source: Own calculations.
Figure 15. RCA for BiH-Serbia trade in 2005
Table 22. Correlation matrix
GDP   GDPIGDPJ     GDPC          LIN   SIMIND       POP        DIST           TR
GDP   1.00000          .99070 .72806 .67847     -.94846 .69914      .50831     -.17490
GDPIGDPJ     .99070 1.00000     .73167 .67509     -.92069 .68229      .49566     -.18528
GDPC     .72806 .73167 1.00000     .92747 -.64246    .01977      .46268     -.21547
LIN     .67847          .67509     .92747 1.00000     -.63569    .02581      .54369     -.26158
SIMIND    -.94846 -.92069 -.64246    -.63569    1.00000   -.71504 -.50525      .14746
POP     .69914         .68229     .01977      .02581    -.71504 1.00000      .25821     -.03328
DIST      .50831         .49566     .46268     .54369     -.50525     .25821   1.00000     -.13597
TR    -.17490         -.18528   -.21547     -.26158     .14746    -.03328    -.13597     1.00000
GDP   GDPIGDPJ     GDPC          LIN   SIMIND       POP        DIST            TR
TRDV     -.47801        -.49080   -.46310     -.45076      .47011   -.21764     -.28659      .10478
EUDV     .63539         .64120     .70099      .68795     -.61982   .19890       .42786     -.15208
EXYUDV    -.40973        -.39948    -.24415     -.29938     .42037   -.33301     -.62129      .08558
COMDV    -.23897        -.23299    -.21907     -.26286     .28262   -.09862      -.49725     .03913
FTADV    -.18294        -.13411    -.18795     -.25594     .20576   -.06278     -.26010     -.01629
TRDV         EUDV  EXYUDV  COMDV     FTADV
TRDV    1.00000        -.61643      .21875     .14961     .13405
EUDV    -.61643       1.00000     -.30840    -.24271    -.21746
EXYUDV     .21875        -.30840    1.00000     .68392     .29095
COMDV     .14961         -.24271     .68392   1.00000     .23567
FTADV      .13405        -.21746      .29095     .23567   1.00000
Note: values above 0.7 were underlined, since such high values may indicate possible correlations between
variables
Source: Own calculations.
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Results of diagnostic tests
Source: Own calculations.
Table 20. Results of diagnostic tests, BiH export equation
Hypothesis test  Likelihood Ratio test  F test 
Models compared  Chi-squared  d.f. Prob. F value num. denom. Prob value  
Model 
favoured 
One-way vs OLS  60.22 32 0.001 1.76 32 188 0.010 One-way 
Two-way vs OLS  66.90 39 0.003 1.58 39 182 0.023 Two-way 
Two-way vs One-way  6.67 6 0.352 0.89 6 182 0.498 One-way 
Source: Own calculations.
Table 21. Results of diagnostic tests, BiH import equation
Hypothesis test  Likelihood Ratio test  F test 
Models compared  Chi-squared  d.f. Prob. F num. denom. Prob value  
Model 
favoured 
One-way vs OLS  138.13 32 0.000 4.86 32 188 0.000 One-way 
Two-way vs OLS  165.12 39 0.000 4.93 39 182 0.000 Two-way 
Two-way vs One-way  13.41 6 0.062 1.620 6 188 0.131 One-way 
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Identity of respondent:
• Area of activity:
– Government
– Industrial or commercial association representative
– Importer (indicate sector)
– Exporter (indicate sector)
– Researcher/analyst
– Other (please specify)
• If enterprise, then:
– Employment (<9; 9-50, >50)
– Ownership (private, public, foreign)
– Exporter/importer to what countries, regions
– What % of total production is exported (rough estimate)
• Geographical location of firm’s BiH headquarter 
Questions for exporters/importers:
• Quotas existing in destination countries (in BiH for importers):
– which sectors
– how much it costs you: in extra days spent etc.
– did it change in comparison to pre-FTA (years…)
• Export/import limitations in BiH? Export/import quotas?
• Export/import licensing:
– which sectors
– how much it costs you: in extra days spent etc.
– did it changed in comparison to pre-FTA (years…)
• Import prohibitions (like safeguard actions to restrict imports):
– What sectors
– When
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Structured questionnaire used in interviews
about NTBs
– Were such measures in use before FTAs? More/less intensively?
• Import levies in BiH (Rep. Srpska towards Serbia and Montenegro?):
– Magnitude
• Import levies in destination country/BiH (or border taxes):
– magnitude
– sectors
– did it change in comparison to pre-FTA
• Rules of origin certificates (for exporters):
– do you possess?
– is it difficult to obtain?
– is it costly?
– are there any other difficulties connected with it? Please, specify
• (for importers) How effectively implemented are the rules of origin? Is it possible
to overcome them and import from a third country (through a partner with the
lowest external tariff) at a lower price?
• Technical standards (safety and industrial standards, regulations, packaging and
labeling regulations) at export markets/BiH:
– which sectors
– how difficult to cope with (extra time and money spent)
– did it change in comparison to pre-FTA
• Sanitary and phytosanitary regulations of export markets/BiH:
– which (groups of) goods
– how difficult to cope with (extra time and money spent)?
– are they mutually recognizable?
– did it change in comparison to pre-FTA?
• How would you evaluate your capacity to follow the rules of origin and technical
regulations, safety standards, conformity assessment etc. in your export
markets? 
very good, good, satisfactory,  poor.
• Currency exchange or financial requirements affecting trade:
– which ones
– how much costs in terms of money and extra days spent, lost opportunities etc.
– did it changed recently?
• Burdensome customs procedures: if so, explain which ones…
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• Other administrative requirements and procedures: explain which ones:
– uncertainty regarding law and regulations
– weak access to information
– extra expenses (corruption)
– other: ….
• Government intervention in trade, restrictive practices and more general
policies:
– Subsidies and other aids to industry
– Government procurement (like “buy national”)
– State trading, government monopolies etc.
– Other national regulations that discriminate between domestic and imported
products
– Competition policies
• Problems with visa requirements. Explain:…
• Poor infrastructure:
– Underdeveloped local banking system
– Credit and insurance markets
– Poor transport infrastructure
• Please name 3 main obstacles to export to your destination markets. Why these? How
did they change during the last years (specifically, relative to pre-FTA period?)?
• What policies would – in your opinion – address these drawbacks efficiently:
– Sectoral policies (which sectors)
– Specific trade-promotion policies (like credits for export insurance etc.)
– General economic policies in BiH
– General economic policies of BiH trading partners
– Other – explain which…
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This annex summarises the complaints about NTBs registered during interviews
with 8 BiH companies involved in foreign trade, representing the most important
manufacturing sectors, representatives of industrial lobbies, policy makers, advisors
and analysts. Perceptions on NTBs are classified by topic and within each topic
answers given by firms are presented separately from opinions of other stake-holders.
Licensing:
Companies:
• Need to get import licences every year (for exports of pharmaceuticals products).
It is a lengthy procedure (especially for a company located outside the capital).
• Registration of some products (even if they are only for exports) is compulsory
in BiH. In spite of this, there exists an export licence for medicines (in place for
3 years already). This has no sense, since: i) it duplicates the registration of
products and ii) importing countries are already protecting their markets and do
not check BiH’s licence. Importers need a destination country licence for every
product anyway. Licences require the agreement of the Ministry of Health and
the Ministry of Foreign Trade, which makes it lengthy (5-15 days, too long to be
able to respond to demand from some clients). 
• There is also a need to have a license on the production of alcohol. Irrespective
of the additional surcharge paid (excise, even if alcohol is used only for
production), it takes 25 days to get this license, because the alcohol content in
every product has to be checked. 
Licences are not a problem for 6 companies
Other stake-holders:
• There exist licences for importers. Sometimes it is an exaggeration: if you want
to import a car, you have to do it through a licensed company, not as in the case
of physical persons.
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Annex 9.
List of non-tariff barriers reported by BiH
actors
Quotas/limitations for export/import:
Companies:
Not a problem
Other stake-holders:
Not a problem
Import levies in destination countries:
Companies:
• There are still tariffs charged in Albania (2%), Kosovo (10%) (no FTA
implemented yet)
• There are tariffs in Kosovo (10%), but the company exports through Macedonia,
which has an FTA with Kosovo)
• There are tariffs charged in Moldova – 10%.
• There are also sometimes ‘small’ or ‘soft’ border taxes in the FTA countries (like
payment for transit). These are not very regulated, and sometimes you pay, and
sometimes not.
Other stake-holders:
Not a problem.
Rules of origin:
Companies:
• Certificates are costly (Bosnian EUR1 is more expensive than in the
neighbouring countries)
• Complicated procedure, lack of information (also to when a certificate will be
issued), long waiting times, corruption (certificates have to be stamped by the
Ministry of Foreign Trade)
• There is no database with payments for the rules of origin. If any delay in bank
transfer occurs, it is hard for a company to prove that they paid it.
• Not a problem for Ex-Yugoslav countries, problem with the recognition of BiH
rules of origin certificates in Bulgaria and Romania
Not a problem at all for 3 companies.
Other stake-holders:
• Without diagonal cumulation of origin, at least among other Balkan countries,
not many BiH products can qualify as of BiH origin. Therefore, rules of origin
requirements in the present form create a significant barrier for exports (de facto
limiting the coverage of FTAs).
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• Domestic institutions are sometimes unable to determine BiH rules of origin,
and as a consequence they are often not respected abroad.
BiH Customs:
Companies:
• Differential treatment of the same goods and documents at different border
crossings.
• Corruption (sometimes SAD are kept at customs offices for a long time for no
particular reason; it then becomes difficult for the producer, because it cannot
claim a VAT refund without them).
• Complicated procedure of paying some stamp taxes (one transfer per each
document required; it is inefficient and costly if several documents are following
goods together)
• Customs procedures (when you import machinery) are lengthy. Sometimes
customs clearance may take several days and it stops production. 
• Long and complicated procedures, insufficient qualifications of customs officers
(often make errors when classifying goods, in one customs office they wanted to
put a tariff on already tariff-free imports from Romania).
Not a problem for 5 companies
Other stake-holders:
• Corruption is still a problem. One can observe for example that merchandise
from large producers uses very remote border crossings that are not optimal
from the point of view of travel distance and time spent when exporting.
Probably, corruption is higher there. There is also evidence that when
functioning of a given border crossing is improved and possibilities for having
unofficial payments reduced, large amounts of traffic suddenly prefer to use
others. Other examples include: smuggled cigarettes and alcohol present on the
BiH market, oil, and even livestock (from Republika Srpska). There are also
cases of violating property rights (fake copies of known apparel and shoe brands
present in large quantities in BiH). There are also numerous cases of
undervaluation of imports (although here the situation is improving).
• Reform of the customs service has been going in the right direction. However,
the main remaining problem is the speed of unification of the customs service
and improving its capacity.
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Customs of other FTA countries:
Companies:
• The low quality of Romanian customs, lack of information exchange (BiH official
stamps refused by Romanian customs)
• Moldovan customs are corrupt.
• Goods destined to Moldova go through Ukraine. Ukrainian customs are corrupt
and ask for a number of additional documents to force the company to pay
unofficially
Not a problem for 5 companies.
Other stake-holders:
Not reported.
Technical standards:
Companies:
• Just adds time and money, but inevitable
• In the case of products that are usually licensed, every country has different
standards according to the product. But it is impossible to avoid.
Costs excluding, all companies did not perceive this as a problem. One company
noted that since the FTA’s implementation they no longer need to send samples for
inspection in destination country.
Other stake-holders:
• The agreements on mutual recognition of technical standards have not been yet
ratified either by Serbia or Croatia. However, both trading partners recognise
some standards related to specific products.
• There are still problems with mutual recognition of standards with Serbia (in the
past also with Croatia).
• It will still take tame before standardisation bodies will become operational.
Currently, they are not. And it is not yet clear whether they will operate
efficiently thus lowering TBTs and boosting trade, or whether they will just end
as weak regulators creating unnecessary burdens.
• The lack of BiH standards allows for low quality of imported products to
penetrate the market.
• It is also a big barrier to exporters; they have to certify their products abroad,
which raises costs.
• EU pressure on separation of the once unified Institute for Standardisation,
Metrology and Intellectual Property into three separate agencies has proved
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counterproductive in the short-term as the old institution stopped normal
operations before new institutions became operational. 
Sanitary and phytosanitary regulations:
Companies:
• Croatia does not recognise the BiH certificate, so there is a need to get a Croatian
one. Adds time and costs.
• BiH requires one, although it is not required by the Croatians. It adds costs.
For 2 companies it is no problem.
4 companies did not answer this question.
Other stake-holders:
• It is still big problem in agricultural trade.
• The agency for phytosanitary standards was established some months ago.
However, it is not yet operational (no staff, no budget).
• The most needed at the moment are food safety and veterinary agencies, which
did not exist in the past. Their weakness is a huge barrier.
• Veterinary agency works best compared to other agencies.
• Sanitary certificate in BiH is required but it is not recognised abroad. At present
it just adds costs and creates more bureaucracy.
Government policies and government interventions in trade:
Companies:
• In BiH: introduction of VAT proved to be costly for exporters in terms of
additional papers. Exporters need to prove that the merchandise was exported,
in order to qualify for the VAT refund. Therefore, they need to send back invoices
stamped by foreign clients. It would be easier if these invoices were stamped
only at the border and then sent from there by the drivers.
• In Serbia: Serbia removed a product (medicine) of a BiH company from the list
of refunded medicines for no reason (the result of a domestic producer lobby).
Other stake-holders:
• Serbia did not recognise the origins of BiH goods (predominantly processed food,
beer) that were entering through Montenegrin border crossings. It added costs,
since BiH trucks had to go around and enter through the BiH-Serbia border.
• BiH public procurement in some instances appears to give preferential
treatment to foreign companies as they require certificates that are easier to
obtain abroad than in BiH
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Access to information about regulations:
Companies:
• Weak access to information about procedures required by other countries. As a
result trucks can wait at a border due to change in regulations and lack of
requires documents.
Not a problem for 7 other companies (although one of them said it was a problem
in the past)
Other stake-holders:
Not reported
Visa requirements:
Companies:
• there were visas with Albania until August 2006
• visas needed for Bulgaria, Romania and Moldova
• visas are barriers but more for clients/partners from Moldova
Other stake-holders:
Not reported
Exchange or financial requirements affecting trade:
Companies:
Not a problem for all companies
Other stake-holders:
Not reported
BiH financial intermediation:
Companies:
• Capital is still expensive, and it is very costly for clients to insure their credits so
they have to pay in advance
• Credit is expensive, and (small) clients on ex-Yugoslav markets have problems
getting financial guarantees. Because the other option for them is to pay in cash
and freeze their money, this translates itself into lower demand in the region.
• Also, it is difficult to get access to export credit (capital is expensive)
Other stake-holders:
• The price of credits is still high. The same for export credit insurance. So the result
is that usually producers (operating on tight margins) do not insure themselves.
117
REGIONAL FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA...
CASE Reports No. 69
Transport infrastructure:
Companies:
• The railway line to Serbia still does not operate at full capacity
• The railway network within BiH is not fully integrated – division along entity
borders causes problems
• Transport costs are still high (roads, railways)
• The railway from Zenica in the direction of Rijeka is very slow and inefficient,
therefore cannot be used to ship large quantities.
• Bad roads (takes a long time to transport merchandise)
• Bad condition of the Jajce – Banja-Luka road
• The quality of roads abroad (Ukraine, Moldova) also creates a barrier if they
supply faraway markets like Moldova
Other stake-holders:
Transportation is still an obstacle because railways are still not working properly.
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This annex collects anecdotal evidence on examples of trade deflection that were
gathered during interviews on NTBs in BiH. The validity of claims has not been verified
and the examples cannot be treated as representative for the trade deflection trends. 
Good entering BiH from FTA partners (despite different true origin):
• There have been claims that Slovenian beer comes from Croatia, using BiH-
Croatian FTA. However, BiH government has so far failed to provide convincing
evidence on the issue.
• Croatian oil imported to BiH may be of different than declared origin. It comes
as Croatian, although it is only refined there.
Goods entering markets of other FTA countries as made in BiH (despite different
true origin):
Trade experts assess that taking into account low BiH tariffs and weakly
implemented rules or origin vis-a-vis main trading Balkan partners, trade deflection
occurs rather through BiH market. Examples of such procedures include:
• Own production of one interviewed BiH firm was transported to Kosovo through
Macedonia (that has an FTA with Kosovo) avoiding Kosovo custom tariffs.
• Macedonia complained about milk imported from BiH, claiming it was not really
made in BiH.
• Croatia complained about foodstuff coming from BiH, claiming that rules of
origins were not effectively implemented.
• Serbia complained about origin of BiH processed food and beer that were
entering through Montenegro. BiH may be a good entry point for agricultural
products from third countries that could then go to Serbia and Montenegro,
rather than the other way round (since custom duties on agricultural goods are
lower in BiH).
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Annex 10.
Examples of trade deflection
ADE (2003), Study on Potential Revenue Sources for the Institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
European Commision Delegation to BiH, Sarajevo.
Anderson, James E. (1979) A Theoretical Foundation for the Gravity Equation, American Economic
Review, March 1979, 69, 106 – 16
Baldwin, R. (2005) The Euro’s Trade Effects, paper prepared for the ECB Workshop on June 16, 2005
Causevic, Fikret (2006), Foreign trade policy and trade balance of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Economics Institute Sarajevo.
Causevic, Fikret and Anto Domazet (2006), Export Potential and Competitiveness of the Metal Sector
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, mimeo, Economics Institute Sarajevo.
Central Bank of BH (2006), Annual Report 2005.
Chmielewska-Gill, W., Korona, B., Poślednik A., Zielinska W. (2004), Liberalizacja handlu
spożywczego w ramach CEFTA w latach 1993-2003. Raport Podsumowujący (Liberalisation of
food trade within CEFTA during 1993-2003. Summary Report; in Polish). E-paper of (Polish)
Foundation for Aid Programmes in Agriculture, Department of Economic Analyses and
Agricultural Policy. Available at http://www.fapa.com.pl/saepr/rap/cefta_calosc_pl.pdf 
Christie, Edward (2002), Potential Trade in Southeast Europe: a Gravity Model Approach, WIIW
Working Paper No. 21
Commission (2003), Report from the Commission – The Stabilisation and Association process for
South East Europe - Second Annual Report, Brussels, March 26, COM (2002) 139 Final.
Damijan, J, M. Ferjancic, and M. Rojec (2006), Growing Export Performance of Transition
Economies: Where does it come from?, paper presented ate EACES 9th bi-annual conference in
Brighton, UK, September 
Dangerfield, M. (2004), CEFTA: Between the CMEA and the European Union. Journal of European
Integration, Vol. 26, No. 3, pp. 309-338.
Eby Konan, Denise and Ari Van Assche (2006), Regulation, Market Structure and Service Sector
Liberalization, CIRANO Scientific Series 2006s-18.
Evans, D., M. Gasiorek, S. McDonald, and S. Robinson (2006), Trade Liberalisation with Trade
Induced Technical Change in Morocco and Egypt, Paper prepared for the Middle East Economic
Association Conference, January 6-8 2006, Boston, MA.
EBRD (2006), Transition Report 2006
EC (2006), Bosnia and Herzegovina 2006 Progress Report, SEC (2006) 1384, Commission Staff
Working Document, Brussels, 8 November.
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